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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation an integrated framework of process performance monitoring 
and fault diagnosis was developed for nuclear power systems using robust data driven 
model based methods, which comprises thermal hydraulic simulation, data driven 
modeling, identification of model uncertainty, and robust residual generator design for 
fault detection and isolation.  In the applications to nuclear power systems, on the one 
hand, historical data are often not able to characterize the relationships among process 
variables because operating setpoints may change and thermal fluid components such as 
steam generators and heat exchangers may experience degradation.  On the other hand, 
first-principle models always have uncertainty and are often too complicated in terms of 
model structure to design residual generators for fault diagnosis.  Therefore, a realistic 
fault diagnosis method needs to combine the strength of first principle models in 
modeling a wide range of anticipated operation conditions and the strength of data driven 
modeling in feature extraction.  In the developed robust data driven model-based 
approach, the changes in operation conditions are simulated using the first principle 
models and the model uncertainty is extracted from plant operation data such that the 
fault effects on process variables can be decoupled from model uncertainty and normal 
operation changes.  It was found that the developed robust fault diagnosis method was 
able to eliminate false alarms due to model uncertainty and deal with changes in 
operating conditions throughout the lifetime of nuclear power systems. 
Multiple methods of robust data driven model based fault diagnosis were 
developed in this dissertation.  A complete procedure based on causal graph theory and 
data reconciliation method was developed to investigate the causal relationships and the 
quantitative sensitivities among variables so that sensor placement could be optimized for 
fault diagnosis in the design phase.  Reconstruction based Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) approach was applied to deal with both simple faults and complex faults for steady 
state diagnosis in the context of operation scheduling and maintenance management.  A 
robust PCA model-based method was developed to distinguish the differences between 
fault effects and model uncertainties.  In order to improve the sensitivity of fault 
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detection, a hybrid PCA model based approach was developed to incorporate system 
knowledge into data driven modeling.  Subspace identification was proposed to extract 
state space models from thermal hydraulic simulations and a robust dynamic residual 
generator design algorithm was developed for fault diagnosis for the purpose of fault 
tolerant control and extension to reactor startup and load following operation conditions.  
The developed robust dynamic residual generator design algorithm is unique in that 
explicit identification of model uncertainty is not necessary. 
Finally, it was demonstrated that the developed new methods for the IRIS Helical 
Coil Steam Generator (HCSG) system.  A simulation model was first developed for this 
system.  It was revealed through steady state simulation that the primary coolant 
temperature profile could be used to indicate the water inventory inside the HCSG tubes.  
The performance monitoring and fault diagnosis module was then developed to monitor 
sensor faults, flow distribution abnormality, and heat performance degradation for both 
steady state and dynamic operation conditions.   
This dissertation bridges the gap between the theoretical research on 
computational intelligence and the engineering design in performance monitoring and 
fault diagnosis for nuclear power systems.  The new algorithms have the potential of 
being integrated into the Generation III and Generation IV nuclear reactor I&C design 
after they are tested on current nuclear power plants or Generation IV prototype reactors. 
 vi
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Performance monitoring and fault diagnosis has received increased attention in 
nuclear power systems since the 1970s, when economics, reliability and safety, and 
sustainability became increasingly important.  After the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-
II) accident, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized the importance 
of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) to prevent accidents and avoid human errors for 
accident treatment.  As nuclear deregulation becomes inevitable, utilities have to 
reconsider the implication of using condition-based maintenance technologies including 
modern fault diagnosis methods to reduce plant downtime and save maintenance cost.  
Generation IV nuclear power systems are also awaiting emerging technologies for 
operation performance improvement and fault diagnosis for use in their advanced 
Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems. 
 
1.1.1 Lessons Learned from TMI-II Accident 
 
The importance of fault diagnosis to the safety of nuclear power systems can be 
considered as a lesson learned from TMI-II accident in 1979.   
The TMI-II accident was initiated by the mechanical failure of the main reactor 
feed water pump.  After the reactor was automatically shut down, the pressurizer relief 
valve was triggered to open due to the loss of heat sink.  The accident began when the 
valve failed to close because after the reactor pressure was relieved the operators were 
not able to determine the status of the valve position due to the inadequate parameter 
display in the control room.  In the meantime, the emergency feed water was not opened 
until about eight minutes into the accident because a valve on the line was not reopened 
after a maintenance test.  As voids began to form in the core when the pressure continued 
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to decrease, the pressurizer became full of water.  The operators were confounded again 
by the level indication and stopped the operation of high-pressure safety injection system.  
From this point on, an anticipated operation event evolved into a severe accident resulting 
in the partial core melt and a limited amount of release of radioactivity into the 
environment.   
An immediate lesson learned from the TMI-II accident is that a computer based 
operator support system would play a critical role in maintaining safe operation of 
nuclear power plants.  Not long after the accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
issued a regulatory guide that a minimum set of parameters defining the safety status 
must be adequately displayed in the control room of nuclear power plants (NUREG-
0585, 1979).  Since then, computer based operator support system has become a basic 
licensing requirement of nuclear power plants and many research tasks have been 
launched to develop automatic systems for alarm processing and for emergency operation 
(Choi, Chung, and Lee, 1998), (Jae and Moon, 2002), (Kim, Kwon., Hwang., Lee, Park, 
Kim, and Lee, 2001), (Park and Seong, 2002). 
Although a computer based operator support system with improved parameter 
display and computerized alarm processing is able to help operators to avoid human 
errors for accident treatment, its efficiency to improve plant safety is still limited without 
a supporting FDI system.  On the one hand, if a fault can be detected and rectified at its 
incipient stage before abrupt failures occur, the possibility of some accidents can actually 
be eliminated.  On the other hand, because optimal alarms and emergency operations are 
a sensitive function of the abnormal events, especially at early stages of transients before 
reactor scram, correct identification of an abnormal transient is of paramount importance 
for computerized emergency operation.  For this reason, many investigations were 
reported on the development of fault diagnosis methods for transient identification 
(Bartlett and Uhrig, 1992), (Ohga and Seki, 1993), (Kim and Bartlett, 1994). 
 3
1.1.2 Position of Utilities on Performance Monitoring 
 
In the early 1980s, performance monitoring and fault diagnosis was introduced by 
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the context of condition-based 
maintenance to improve the operational safety and the economic performance of nuclear 
power plants (EPRI NP-2240, 1982).  Because the functional status of sensors, actuators, 
and field devices are monitored on line, this makes it possible to perform maintenance 
tasks only when it is necessary.  As a result, significant reduction in plant downtime, 
considerable maintenance cost savings, and reduction in maintenance errors can be 
expected.   
Condition based instrument monitoring has been considered as an important 
advancement for safety improvement and higher autonomy in the control function of 
nuclear power plants.  Some sensors are indicators for plant monitoring and others are 
used for closed-loop control.  The sensor faults of the first type may force reactor 
operators to derate the power level and thus degrade the operation performance.  It is 
reported that venturi feed water flow meter fault due to fouling is causing the amount of 
derated power ranging from 1% to 3% full power for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) 
plants in the U.S. (Kavaklioglu and Upadhyaya, 1994), (Gribok, Attieh, Hines, and 
Uhrig, 1999).  The sensor faults of the second type may propagate their effects to the 
regulated variables and subsequently disturb other process variables through feedback 
control loops.  The deleterious consequence of such disturbances is that the related 
actuators and plant equipment would not be able to operate at the designed optimal 
conditions and their expected lifetime may be shortened.  In addition, both types of 
sensor faults may mislead operators to take incorrect actions and cause safety problems if 
they occur during abnormal transients.   
On-line equipment performance monitoring was also an initial incentive when 
condition based maintenance was introduced to nuclear power plants.  As early as the 
1980s, neutron noise analysis was successfully performed to measure the vibration of 
reactor internals, which is now able to reach a resolution better than 0.025 mm.  The 
cross-correlation between the neutron flux and the core exit temperature was used to 
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characterize the reactor core flow rate and detect any flow anomaly such as flow 
blockages, flow shifting, and other problems (Hashemian, 1998), (Hashemian, 2002).  
On-line monitoring of the thermal efficiency of nuclear steam generators has now 
become an industrial practice for many nuclear power plants.  Because of fouling, the 
decline of steam generator thermal efficiency may force the reactor to reduce the steam 
generator operating pressure lower than the designed value and cause a lower electric 
output per unit reactor thermal power.  In order to overcome this issue, on-line steam 
generator performance evaluation is used to trend the behavior of the overall heat transfer 
coefficient and predict their future behavior as a function of the secondary water 
chemistry. 
 
1.1.3 Role of Fault Diagnosis in Generation-IV Nuclear Power Plants 
 
After the TMI-2 accident, the design of nuclear power plants experienced two 
major changes.  As compared with Generation-II operating commercial nuclear reactors, 
Generation-III reactors represented by advanced light water reactors — ABWR, System 
80+, AP1000 — are characterized by passive safety design and the use of digital 
technology such as software based controls and computerized operation procedures.  
Generation-III design is evolutionary in the sense that it anticipated only a moderate 
performance improvement over the current design such that the licensing would not incur 
substantial additional effort.  In fact, as far as instrumentation and control (I&C) is 
concerned, software based control is utilized solely for non-safety related systems and 
little effort is invested in making full use of the contemporary digital and computer 
technologies.   
In order to strategically improve the technology in nuclear power system design 
and broaden the opportunity of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the U.S. Department 
of Energy prompted the development of Generation-IV nuclear reactors, with an 
emphasis on the advances in economics, safety and reliability, and sustainability (Savage, 
2001).  For Generation- IV nuclear power systems, it is expected that the I&C design will 
see a revolutionary innovation.  For the better use of the emerging I&C technologies, 
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such as smart sensing, automated monitoring and diagnosis systems, and computer 
simulations, the technical requirements of Generation- IV I&C design have been defined 
as follows (O’Hara, 2002): 
In order to welcome the challenges arising from deregulation, the plant economic 
parameters will be monitored on-line and optimized with the constraints that the related 
nuclear safety regulations are rigorously satisfied.  On-line monitoring, fault diagnosis, 
and response simulation will be available to support real time operation and maintenance 
decision-making.  A higher autonomy of control will be utilized to maximize the human-
machine efficiency and reliability.  Real time risk monitoring will be improved to 
optimize plant surveillance testing and maintenance such that the risk due to off-normal 
alignments can be minimized.  A more efficient human-machine interface will be 
developed such that the plant personnel in the control room can conveniently obtain 
adequate information in a concise manner for all the related operation tasks. 
As evidenced by the above technical requirements, process performance 
monitoring and fault diagnosis plays a central role in the Generation- IV I&C design.  
The fault diagnosis system needs to provide information about the health status of 
sensors, actuators, and plant equipment to the operator support system or the plant 
surveillance system in the control room, thus assisting operators in making operation and 
maintenance planning.  Under certain circumstances, the fault diagnosis system also 
needs to interface with plant control systems to implement advanced control such as 
adaptive control and fault tolerant control. 
 
1.2 Overview of Fault Diagnosis Techniques 
 
1.2.1 Common Terminology Used in Fault Diagnosis 
 
With the increasing interest in the research and application of fault diagnosis in a 
variety of fields, a technical committee SAFEPROCESS on Fault Detection, Supervision, 
and Safety for Technical Process, was established within IFAC (International Federation 
of Automatic Control) in 1993.  This committee standardized the definitions of the 
 6
terminology used in fault diagnosis (Simani and Fantuzzi, 2002), which are duplicated for 
use in this dissertation. 
 
Fault 
An unacceptable deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter of the 
system from the acceptable, usual, or standard condition. 
 
Fault Detection 
Determination of faults present in a system and the time of fault occurrence. 
 
Fault Isolation 
Determination of the kind, location, and time of the occurrence of a fault. 
 
Fault Identification 
Determination of the size and the time-varying behavior of a fault. 
 
Fault Diagnosis 
Determination of the kind, size, location, and the time of the occurrence of a fault.  It 
includes fault detection and identification. 
 
Monitoring 
A continuous real-time task of determining the conditions of a physical system, by 
recording information, recognizing and indicating anomalies in the system behavior. 
 
 
1.2.2 History of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis 
 
The simplest fault diagnosis method is to monitor the magnitude and the trend of 
individual signals.  If the magnitude exceeds the design limit or the trend deviates the 
expected behavior, a fault is then detected.  Although this scheme is simple, it can only 
be applied to simple processes with the aid of experienced operators for fault isolation.  
Hardware redundancy is a traditional fault diagnosis design method that uses 
more than two components such as sensors, actuators, controllers, and computers to 
perform the same function.  If one component does not perform its function as designed, 
a voting logic and a switching mechanism can be employed to detect, identify, and isolate 
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the malfunctioned component.  Hardware redundancy is widely used in safety critical 
systems such as nuclear power plants and aircrafts.  The major problem with the 
hardware redundancy design is the extra equipment and maintenance cost in addition to 
the extra space. 
Modern fault diagnosis is based on analytical redundancy provided by the 
functional relationships governed by physical laws in a process system.  Instead of using 
hardware redundancy, functional relationships are used to cross check process variables.  
The simplest scheme of consistency checking is to compare the measured values with the 
estimated values obtained from redundant relationships.  The difference is called physical 
residual, which can be used as a fault signature for fault detection and isolation.  In the 
context of analytical redundancy, model based fault diagnosis is defined as a systematic 
approach to generate residual quantities and analyze the residual properties such that the 
potential faults can be detected, identified, and isolated.  
A novel advantage of model based fault diagnosis is that no additional hardware 
is needed for fault detection and isolation.  Because the redundancy provided by 
functional relationships has the same reliability as a processing computer, its reliability is 
much higher than traditional hardware redundancy.  The most significant contribution of 
analytical redundancy to fault diagnosis, which many researchers do not stress, is that the 
generated fault signatures are fully decoupled from the operation conditions if the 
developed functional relationships can cover entire operation regime.  Although 
analytical redundancy is nothing but a principle, an overwhelming advancement has been 
seen in the field of fault diagnosis since the original work of Beard at MIT (Beard, 1971) 
along with the increasing power of computer technology. 
 
1.2.3 Progress of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis in Other Industries 
 
Many model based fault diagnosis techniques have been developed in a variety of 
industries  in  the  past  two   decades   under    the   principle   of  analytical   redundancy 
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Figure 1.1.  Classifications of model based fault detection and isolation approaches. 
 
 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).  In a broad sense, these techniques 
can be classified according to what form of models are used.  As shown in Figure 1.1, 
physical model based approaches use quantitative parametric models while data driven 
model based approaches use parametric or nonparametric models extracted from historic 
data.   
The physical model based approaches were mainly investigated by control 
engineers in aircraft industry.  Beard-Jones Fault Detection Filter was developed to 
generate directional residuals for fault diagnosis (Beard, 1971), (Jones, 1973).  The 
innovation sequence generated by Kalman filter was tested on its statistical measures 
including the whiteness, mean and covariance for fault detection (Mehra and Peschon, 
1971).  The Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) on innovation sequence was used 
for fault diagnosis by Willsky and Jones, 1976.  Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) 
was implemented by Upadhyaya for sensor incipient fault detection (Upadhyaya, 
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Wolvaardt, and Glocker, 1989).  Multiple model adaptive filter approach based on 
multiple-hypothesis testing on the innovations generated by a bank of Kalman filters was 
proposed by Beric, 1998.  Observer based fault diagnosis approach was first introduced 
to sensor fault detection and isolation by Clark, 1978.  Parity space approach was 
proposed for fault diagnosis by Chow and Willsky, 1984.  Parameter estimation approach 
was introduced for process fault diagnosis by Isermann, 1991a, and 1991b.  A detailed 
description of these fault diagnosis methods, their industrial applications, and the 
performance comparison can be found in some recent survey papers by Frank, 2000, 
Isermann, 1997, Patton and Chen, 1997, and Patton and Chen, 1994.  The robust issues of 
model based fault diagnosis were investigated by Chen and Patton via unknown input 
observers, eigen-structure assignment, optimal parity relations, and frequency domain 
design (Chen and Patton, 1999).  The physical models used in model based fault 
diagnosis may take different forms including first-principle models such as macroscopic 
transport phenomena model (Himmelblau, 1978), input-output models (Gertler, 1998), 
and state space models (Chen and Patton, 1999) obtained from system identification 
through well-designed experiments (Ljung, 1999).  Several signal validation methods 
were developed by Upadhyaya and his co-workers at The University of Tennessee (Erbay 
and Upadhyaya, 1997), (Holbert and Upadhyaya, 1990), (Holbert and Upadhyaya, 1994), 
(Upadhyaya, 1985), (Upadhyaya, 1987), (Upadhyaya, 1989), (Upadhyaya and Ferreira, 
1999). 
Data driven model based approaches were mainly developed by process engineers 
in chemical, refinery, and petrochemical industries.  As digital technology becomes 
popular, thousands of measurements with strong spatial and serial correlations are 
routinely available.  The principle of analytical redundancy motivated a better use of the 
redundant information contained in the historical data.  The major data driven modeling 
techniques can be categorized as multivariate statistical modeling and artificial 
intelligence.   
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) originated by Pearson, 1901, and Partial 
Least Squares (PLS) originated by Wold et al., 1984, are two most popular statistical 
modeling methods for process monitoring.  The PCA approach to process monitoring was 
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investigated thoroughly by Qin’s research group (Dunia, Qin, Edgar, and McAvoy, 
1996a, 1996b) and the PLS approach to process monitoring was studied by MacGregor’s 
group (Kresta, Marlin, and MacGregor, 1994).  Qin and MacAvoy, 1992, proposed 
nonlinear PLS algorithms and Dong and MacAvoy, 1996, developed nonlinear PCA 
algorithm for fault diagnosis.  The multiway PCA approach was developed by Nomikos 
and MacGregor, 1994, to monitor batch processes.  In order to deal with a very large 
process, muiltiblock PLS algorithm was proposed by MacGregor et al., 1994.  
Discriminant analysis and PCA were combined by Raichand and Cinar, 1996, for better 
fault isolation.  A survey of statistical model based process monitoring may be found in 
(Kourti and MacGregor, 1995), (Qin, 2002).  The Group Method of Data Handling 
(GMDH) approach was developed for fault diagnosis of sensors and field devices 
(Upadhyaya et al., 1999, 2004). 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Fuzzy Logic (FL) were studied for fault 
diagnosis in Artificial Intelligence community.  The fault diagnosis was considered in the 
beginning simply as a classification problem using ANN classifiers (Watanabe et al., 
1989).  In order to explicitly reduce the feature space, Neural Networks were investigated 
as both a predictor and a classifier (Venkatasubramanian and Chan, 1989).  Different 
Neural Network architectures were investigated to enhance the performance of modeling 
for fault diagnosis.  Multi-layer feedforward Neural Networks with backpropagation 
training algorithms were used to develop static input-output characterizations 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 1990).  Recurrent Neural Network with neurons having 
intrinsic dynamic properties was used for dynamic fault diagnosis (Gan and Danai, 1999).  
Radial Basis Neural Network was introduced to fault diagnosis to address the issue of 
novelty identification (Simani and Fantuzzi, 2000).  Self-Organizing Neural Networks 
represented by ART2 network were applied to fault diagnosis by Chen et al, 1998.  A 
comparative study was performed (Ranaweera, 1994) for fault diagnosis with different 
Neural Network Structures.  Physical model based fault diagnosis was compared with 
neural network-based fault diagnosis by Rengaswamy et al., 2001. 
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1.2.4 Status of Model Based Fault Diagnosis in Nuclear Industry 
 
In parallel with other industries, analytical redundancy based FDI methods have 
also been extensively studied for nuclear power systems since three decades ago.  
Multivariate time series analysis, Neural Networks, and PCA were proposed for process 
monitoring and sensor fault diagnosis by Upadhyaya et al., 1980, 1992, 2001.  The 
univariate and multivariate time series approach was successfully used to estimate the 
response time characteristics of thermometers (Hashemian et al., 1988), in-core flow 
dynamics (Sweeney, 1985), BWR stability (Upadhyaya and Kitamura, 1981), moderator 
temperature coefficient (Shieh et al., 1988), and sensor faults of PWR pressurizer 
subsystem (Upadhyaya and Skorska, 1984).  Neural Network was applied to monitor the 
feed water flow rate and component thermal performance (Kavaklioglu and Upadhyaya, 
1994).  PCA was applied to detect and isolate nuclear plant sensors and actuator faults 
(Upadhyaya et al., 2003).  Adaptive Neural Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) was 
proposed by Hines for sensor validation (Hines and Wrest, 1997).  Multivariate State 
Estimation Technique was developed at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) for process 
monitoring (Singer et al., 1996).   
 
1.2.5 Trends in Fault Diagnosis for Industrial Application 
 
Although many different fault diagnosis methods have been developed from 
various industries including nuclear power plants, there is no single method that is 
sophisticated enough to handle all the requirements for an engineering problem.  The 
only pragmatic solution is to have a thorough investigation of the weaknesses of 
individual methods and build an application dependent method to fully utilize their 
strengths (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 2000).   
Except for a few, most researchers in fault diagnosis are paying more attention to 
the academic value than the engineering value.  A hybrid of model based fault diagnosis 
and neural network was proposed by Hines, 1994.  Bhushan et al., 2000, stressed the 
importance of instrument placement for maximal sensitivity of fault detection and best 
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resolution of fault isolation.  Venkatasubramanian evaluated quantitative model based 
methods, qualitative model based methods, and historical data based methods for fault 
diagnosis with the conclusion that a hybrid approach is needed to overcome the 
limitations of individual methods (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
 
1.3 Objective of the Dissertation: the Integrated Approach to 
Performance Monitoring and Fault Diagnosis 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop appropriate procedures and methods 
of performance monitoring and fault diagnosis to improve the economics and safety of 
Generation-IV nuclear power systems.  The developed performance monitoring and fault 
diagnosis system will be an integral part of the advanced digital I&C system as shown in 
Figure 1.2.   
After digital control systems are used, a large amount of on-line measured data 
will be available on the field buses and the communication highway of nuclear power 
plants.  The role of the developed performance monitoring and fault diagnosis system is 
to utilize the measured data to enhance the economics and safety of nuclear power plants.  
The information that can be obtained from the developed system will include the health 
status of sensors and actuators and the operation performance of critical components such 
as steam generators and reactor main pumps.  On the one hand, this system will enable 
individual control loops to reset the setpoints to improve plant efficiency when operation 
performance degrades and to reconfigure the control actions when controlled variables 
have measurement faults.  On the other hand, the obtained information can provide a 
technical basis for optimal maintenance management and optimal operation scheduling. 
 
1.3.1 The Architecture of the Integrated Approach 
 
An integrated approach to performance monitoring and fault diagnosis was 
developed in this dissertation research.  Figure 1.3 illustrates the overall architecture of 
the integrated approach.   
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Figure 1.2.  The performance monitoring and fault diagnosis in the I&C system. 
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Figure 1.3.  The conceptual architecture of the integrated approach. 
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The developed system consists of two paralleled subsystems shown in Figure 1.3.  
The subsystem based on steady state model such as plant-scale mass balance and heat 
balance equations are used to perform performance monitoring and steady state fault 
diagnosis.  This subsystem provides plant monitoring in the time scale of minutes to days 
and is especially useful for operation scheduling and maintenance scheduling.  For 
instance, the inferred values of measured variables based on balance equations can 
provide a basis for instrument calibration.  The subsystem based on process dynamic 
models of individual components such as reactor core, pressurizer, steam generators, etc. 
is used to perform dynamic fault diagnosis.  This subsystem is able to provide real time 
monitoring information during transient conditions, so it is appropriate for fault tolerant 
control.   
The sensor placement design is emphasized in the developed integrated approach 
shown in Figure 1.3.  In nuclear power systems, the consequence of an incorrect decision 
on fault diagnosis may be so adverse that the public cannot even accept a very low 
probability.  For this reason, a fault diagnosis engineering system must be able to give 
reliable FDI results.  Although the capability of an FDI system is method dependent, it is 
a much more sensitive function of sensor placement.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
incorporate fault diagnosis into the instrumentation design phase.   
Based on the presented architecture, the design of a performance monitoring and 
fault diagnosis system can be achieved by the following tasks: 
1. Develop plant-scale steady state mass balance and heat balance models and dynamic 
simulation models for the control loops of nuclear power plants. 
2. Determine the sensor placement requirements for efficient performance monitoring 
and fault diagnosis. 
3. Develop steady state fault diagnosis algorithms for both sensor and process fault 
diagnosis. 
4. Develop dynamic fault diagnosis algorithms, which are applicable to dynamic 
operation conditions such as reactor startup and load following. 
5. Test the performance on the developed simulation models. 
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Figure 1.4.  Robust data driven model based fault diagnosis. 
 
1.3.2 Robust Data Driven Model Based Fault Diagnosis of the 
Integrated Approach 
 
A robust data driven model based approach was developed in this dissertation to 
implement the presented architecture of performance monitoring and fault diagnosis.  In 
this approach, shown in Figure 1.4, data are generated from the developed simulation 
model with well-designed simulation calculations.  Because the data are generated with 
adequate input excitation, the developed data driven models will be able to cover the 
entire anticipated operation conditions.  However, because the simulation model will 
always contain model uncertainty, robust fault diagnosis techniques must be applied to 
avoid false alarms.  
The advantage of robust data driven model based approach is that the strength of 
historical data based approach and first principle model based approach, which are 
reviewed in Section 1.2, can be combined.  A first principle model is able to represent the 
relationships among variables for all the operation conditions in a compact manner.  
However, the model may be too complicated for robust fault diagnosis design.  On the 
contrary, data driven model based fault diagnosis usually has a relatively simple 
structure, which enables robust fault diagnosis design.  However, the performance of data 
based approach depends strongly on the quality of collected data.  For instance, the 
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degradation of steam generators and heat exchangers and the changes in operation 
setpoints are inevitable throughout the reactor lifetime, the past historical data would 
definitely not be able to characterize the inter-variable relationships for all the power 
levels at the most recent conditions of system configuration and component degradation.  
Therefore, a combination of the two types of approaches will be able to improve the 
performance of fault diagnosis in terms of reducing false alarms and avoiding 
misdiagnosis. 
Linear model structure is pursued throughout the dissertation.  Although nuclear 
power systems indeed have nonlinearity, this nonlinearity can be handled either by 
recursively updating a linear model or by using model uncertainty decoupling techniques 
for fault diagnosis design.  Most importantly, linear state space model is the only class of 
systems tractable with rigorous theory.   
 
1.4 Contributions of the Dissertation 
 
The proposed integrated approach has provided a systematic solution to 
performance monitoring and fault diagnosis for nuclear power systems.  The new 
architecture of fault diagnosis design is the first to emphasize the importance of sensor 
placement design for fault diagnosis and the importance of dynamic fault diagnosis for 
nuclear power systems.  The developed robust data driven model based fault diagnosis 
algorithms for steady state conditions and dynamic conditions are a first effort to 
combine the strength of first principle model based fault diagnosis and the historical data 
based fault diagnosis. 
The following original contributions are made in this dissertation: 
1. The development of a simulation model of IRIS Helical Coil Steam Generator (HCSG) 
systems.  Through the steady state thermal analysis, it is discovered that the primary 
coolant temperature profile can be used to indicate the HCSG tube inside fluid level.   
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2. The development of a new and complete algorithm based on causal graph theory and 
data reconciliation to perform sensor placement design for process and sensor fault 
detection, identification, and reconstruction. 
 
3. The application of reconstruction based PCA approach to steady state fault diagnosis 
of IRIS HCSG system, which was able to deal with joint sensor and process faults 
based on subspace characterization of fault effects and quantify fault detectability and 
fault identifiability. 
 
4. The development of a robust PCA model based approach for steady state fault 
diagnosis, in which PCA models were developed using data generated from simulation 
models while the model uncertainties were identified from plant measurements. 
 
5. The development of a hybrid PCA model based approach for steady state fault 
diagnosis, which allowed the incorporation of partially known system knowledge into 
the PCA based fault diagnosis. 
 
6. The development of a robust subspace model based approach for dynamic fault 
diagnosis.  In this approach, a low order linear state space model was identified based 
on the data generated from well-designed simulation runs using widely available 
nuclear system analysis codes such as RELAP, RETRAN, TRAC, etc.  A robust 
residual generation algorithm was then developed using measured data without directly 
identifying the model uncertainties.   
 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the state-of-the-art model based fault diagnosis techniques.  
The necessary conditions of fault detectability and isolability are emphasized.  It is shown 
that the performance of fault diagnosis is a strong function of the fidelity of models used 
for residual generation.  The robust issues of fault diagnosis are also discussed.  In order 
to fulfill the requirements of fault diagnosis for an engineering system, the need to 
combine data driven modeling and fault diagnosis theory is motivated. 
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Chapter 3 develops both steady state and dynamic model for the IRIS HCSG 
systems.  The steady state simulation study shows that the primary coolant temperature 
profile can be used to indicate the HCSG tube inside fluid level.  The developed dynamic 
simulation model provides a platform to test the developed robust subspace model based 
dynamic fault diagnosis algorithm.  
Chapter 4 presents a complete procedure and algorithm for sensor placement for 
fault diagnosis.  The minimum sensor requirement is first determined for process fault 
diagnosis based on cause effect analysis.  To ensure reliable process fault diagnosis, the 
minimum sensor requirement is then determined such that the related measured variables 
can still be reconstructed based on plant-scale mass balance and heat balance equations 
even if these sensors fail due to instrument faults.  Finally, data reconciliation is used as a 
generic approach to perform the sensitivity analysis of a plant variable in the balance 
equations. 
Chapter 5 presents PCA approach for steady state fault diagnosis.  Reconstruction 
based PCA is first applied to deal with joint sensor and process fault diagnosis and 
determine the fault detectability and identifiability.  Robust PCA model based algorithm 
is then developed to decouple the fault effects on the measurements from the model 
uncertainties.  In order to improve the sensitivity of fault detection and interpretability of 
fault isolation, hybrid PCA approach is developed to incorporate the available system 
knowledge into PCA modeling.   
Chapter 6 develops a robust subspace model based dynamic fault diagnosis 
algorithm.  The theory of subspace identification is presented to determine a low order 
linear state space model from simulation data.  A robust dynamic residual generator 
design algorithm is developed without directly identifying the model uncertainty.  
Finally, the developed algorithm is demonstrated through the application to IRIS HCSG 
systems for transient fault diagnosis. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the dissertation and draws conclusions, along with 
recommendations for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Basic Theory of Model Based Fault Diagnosis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Model based fault diagnosis is conceptually divided into two stages — residual 
generation and decision-making, as shown in Figure 2.1 (Chen and Patton, 1999).  
Residual generators transform the fault symptoms from measurement space to a lower 
dimensional feature space.  Three major algorithms of residual generation are observer-
based approaches, parity space approaches, and parameter estimation approaches.  
Decision-making performs appropriate statistical testing on the generated residuals to 
make a decision on fault diagnosis.   
In this Chapter, a critical review is performed on the technical elements of model 
based fault diagnosis.  The necessary conditions of fault detectability and isolatability are 
emphasized.  It is shown that the performance of fault diagnosis is a strong function of 
the fidelity of models used for residual generation.  In order to fulfill the requirements of 
fault diagnosis for an engineering system, robust data driven model based fault diagnosis 
approach is motivated to combine data driven modeling and fault diagnosis theory. 
 
2.2 System Representation 
 
In general, most of the components in an engineering process are operating in 
closed control loops.  Figure 2.2 shows a standard closed-loop control system.  In order to 
detect and isolate sensor faults, actuator faults, and process faults, mathematical models 
need to be developed to simulate the behavior of these process components and control 
devices. 
 20
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Diagram of model based fault diagnosis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Fault diagnosis for a closed-loop control system. 
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As shown in Figure 2.2, a fault diagnosis system is not related to the controller 
design because the fault diagnosis system involves only the actuator input (or controller 
output) and the process output.  If the actuator input is measured, an open loop system 
model is sufficient for fault diagnosis even if the physical system may operate in closed-
loop conditions.  However, if the actuator input is not available, a closed-loop model 
must be used, which involves the reference setpoint to calculate the error signal.  
Fortunately, the controller output is always known for a digital control system.  In fact, 
the use of an open loop model can decouple the fault diagnosis from controller design 
and simplify fault diagnosis significantly (Chen and Patton, 1999).   
For a linear dynamic system, the process dynamics is given by: 
 
)(*)()(*
)(*)()(
tDutCxty
tButAxtx
+=
+=
        (2.1) 
 
where 
)(tx  = the state vector. 
)(* ty  = the true system output. 
)(* tu  = the actuator output. 
DCBA ,,,  = system matrices. 
 
In model based fault diagnosis, the fault effects on the physical system are 
explicitly represented by appropriate fault models.  This explicit representation of fault 
effects facilitates fault diagnosis such that the generated residuals will behave as 
designed.  In fact, this is also the fundamental difference between model based fault 
diagnosis and signal based fault diagnosis such as spectral analysis and pattern 
recognition.  For signal based fault diagnosis, fault signatures need to be extracted from 
representative fault data, which are difficult to obtain in most situations.  
If the sensor dynamic is ignored, the fault model for a sensor fault is given by: 
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)()(*)( tftyty s+=         (2.2) 
 
where  
)(ty  = the measured output. 
)(tf s  = the sensor fault vector. 
 
If the actuator dynamics is ignored and the actuator output )(* tu  is simplified to 
be equal to the actuator input )(tu , the fault model for an actuator fault is given by: 
 
)()()(* tftutu a+=         (2.3) 
 
where 
)(tu  = the actuator input signal generated by controller output. 
)(tfa  = the actuator fault vector. 
 
Obviously, the actual mapping between the actuator input )(tu  and the actuator 
output )(* tu  can be easily represented by changing Equation (2.3) accordingly. 
If a system input )(* tu  is not a manipulated variable for control while it is a 
measured variable, the fault model for the input sensor is given by: 
 
)()(*)( tftutu is+=         (2.4) 
 
where 
)(tu  = the measured value of the system input )(* tu  which is not used for control. 
)(tfis  = the input sensor fault vector. 
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If a process fault results in a change in the system parameters, the model for the 
fault is given by: 
 
)()(*)()( tftButAxtx c++=        (2.5) 
 
where 
)(tfc  = the process fault vector. 
 
Considering all the possible sensor/actuator and process faults, the fault model 
can be given by: 
 
)())()(()()()(
)())()(()()()(
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tftftfBtButAxtx
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+−++=     (2.6) 
 
where  
)(tu  = the process input variables including both the controller output and the measured 
input not used for control. 
 
In Equation (2.6), the input and output of the dynamic system are all measured 
and the fault effects on the system dynamics are explicitly represented.  
In general, the state space representation with different types of faults is given by: 
 
)()()()(
)()()()(
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where 1R  and 2R  are known fault entry matrices which represent the fault effects on the 
dynamic system (Chen and Patton, 1999). 
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2.3 Concepts of Residual Generator Design 
 
Residual generation plays an important role in model based fault diagnosis.  The 
residuals are generated from a model covering the entire operation regime.  Therefore, in 
the absence of faults, the residuals are only due to noise and disturbances and the 
magnitudes are small.  In the presence of faults, the residuals should capture the 
inconsistency between the measured variables and the mathematical model for fault 
detection.  Moreover, the generated residuals should respond to different faults in 
different manners for fault isolation.  In fact, it is through appropriate residual generation 
that model based fault diagnosis is able to eliminate the shortcomings of traditional fault 
diagnosis methods, where operation condition dependent signal characteristics (e.g. 
amplitude, variation rate, and frequency) are used for fault diagnosis.   
The simplest approach to residual generation is the parallel simulation scheme.  
The mathematical model used for residual generation is simply a simulation model of the 
physical system and the generated residual is nothing but the difference between the 
simulation output and the measured output.  Because such a simulation model belongs to 
an open-loop architecture, the simulation output may become unstable if the physical 
system is unstable (Chen and Patton, 1999). 
In general, model based fault diagnosis uses both the system input and the system 
output to generate residuals.  The mathematical representation of residual generation is 
given by (in the Laplace domain): 
 
)()()()()( sysHsusHsr yu +=        (2.8) 
 
where 
)(sHu  = a linear transformation acted on the system input. 
)(sH y  = a linear transformation acted on the system output. 
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If input-output representation is used, the dynamics of the linear system with 
possible faults in Equation (2.7) is given by: 
 
)()()()()( sfsGsusGsy fu +=        (2.9) 
 
where )(sGu  and )(sG f  are the matrix transfer functions between the system output 
and the system input and between the system output and the system fault, respectively.  
The two transfer functions are given by: 
 
DBAsICsGu +−= −1)()(         (2.10a) 
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1)()( RRAsICsG f +−= −        (2.10b) 
 
Combining Equations (2.8) and (2.9), the evolution of residual dynamics is as 
follows: 
 
)()()()())()()(()( sfsGsHsusGsHsHsr fyuyu ++=     (2.11) 
 
 2.3.1 Residual Generation for Fault Detection 
 
Because residuals are used to check the consistency between the measurements 
and the system model, they must satisfy the following condition: 
 
0)( =tr   if and only if    0)( =tf   (2.12) 
 
To make the generated residuals decoupled from the operation conditions, all the 
residual generators must be able to produce a zero residual vector for fault free 
conditions.  Based on Equation (2.8) and (2.9), a necessary condition of residual 
generation for fault detection can be obtained as follows (Chen and Patton, 1994): 
0)()()( =+ sGsHsH uyu         (2.13) 
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In the meantime, the generated residual vector must be sensitive enough for fault 
detection.  The dynamic response of a residual generator satisfying Equation (2.13) is as 
follows: 
 
)()()()()()( sfsGsfsGsHsr rffy ==       (2.14) 
 
where 
)(sGrf  = the transfer function between the fault and the residual response. 
 
Therefore, the fault detectability condition is that the transfer function between a 
fault and the residual response is not zero.  To avoid the fault effects on the residual 
vector from disappearing when a fault still exists, it is necessary to define a stronger fault 
detectability condition, which is given by (Chen and Patton, 1994):  
 
0)0( ≠rfG           (2.15) 
 
Considering an output sensor fault with Ι=)(sG f , if the residual generator is 
simply designed as Ι=)(sH y , and )()( sGsH uu −= , the steady state gain of the 
transfer function between the residual response and the sensor fault will then be 1.  
Therefore, this simple residual generator design has strong fault detectability for output 
sensor faults. 
Chen also proved that it is not always possible to design a residual generator to 
detect actuator faults (Chen and Patton, 1994).  If an actuator fault has the fault transfer 
matrix )()( sGsG uf = , then the transfer function matrix between the fault and the 
residual response )()()( sGsHsG uyrf =  according to Equation (2.14).  Again, 
according to the condition of residual generator for fault detection given by Equation 
(2.13), we must have )()()( sHsGsH uuy −= .  Therefore, if the transfer matrix 
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)(sHu  is not well designed, there will be no physically realizable solution to )(sH y  
for this residual generator design because the solution might be noncausal. 
 
2.3.2 Residual Generation for Fault Isolation 
 
Multiple residual generators need to be designed for fault isolation.  The designed 
residual generators have the property of fault isolation only if they respond to all the 
considered faults in different characteristic manners. 
Structured residual design is one approach to residual generation for fault 
isolation.  In this approach, each residual generator is designed such that it is sensitive to 
a subset of faults while insensitive to the remaining faults.   
For structured residual design, the first step is to design an incidence matrix for 
fault isolation.  Table 2.1 shows an example of incidence matrix design to isolate three 
faults.  The columns of the incidence matrix correspond to the desired residual patterns 
for individual faults.  The rows of the incidence matrix correspond to the responses of 
each residual generator to the considered faults.  A “1” element of the incidence matrix 
indicates that the residual element of the residual generator is affected by the 
corresponding fault while a “0” indicates that it is not.   
 
Table 2.1.  Incidence matrix design for fault isolation 
101Residual generator  2
0
1
Fault 3
1
1
Fault 2
1
0
Fault 1
Residual generator  1
Residual generator  3
Residual generator
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The simplest incidence matrix is that both the columns and the rows are 
canonical.  For such an incidence matrix, the rows have equal numbers of zeros with 
different patterns and the columns have equal number of zeros with different patterns, 
too.  The advantage of this canonical structure is that partial firing of one residual 
generator will not result in fault misclassification.  Given that there are µ  outputs of a 
system, ρ  considered faults, a square incidence matrix with ρ  residual generators and 
µ -1 zeros in each column always provides a solution to the canonical structured 
incidence matrix (Gertler, 1998). 
The second step is to design residual generators such that the fault responses 
follow the designed incidence matrix.  In this step, different residual generation 
techniques such as observer based approach and parity space approach may be used. 
Fixed direction residual vector is an alternative approach to residual generation 
for fault isolation.  In this approach, the residual generators are designed such that a 
directional residual vector lies in a fixed fault specific direction.  Fault isolation is 
achieved by comparing the generated residual vector with the prespecified fault direction 
in residual generator design. 
Considering sensor faults only, according to Equation (2.14), the residual 
generator sensitive to all faults but the ith sensor fault can be designed simply by making 
the ith columns of )(sH y  equal to zero. 
If actuator faults are considered, just like in the case of fault detection, because of 
the additional constraint )()()( sGsHsH uyu −= , it is not always possible to find a 
realizable solution to )(sH y  if the ith column of )(sHu  is chosen to be zeros such that 
the residual generator is sensitive to all faults but the ith actuator fault.  Therefore, 
actuator faults are not always isolatable (Chen and Patton, 1994).   
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2.4 Residual Generation Techniques 
 
To generate residuals with the desired properties for fault detection and isolation, 
different residual generation techniques have been developed in the last two decades.  
Although these techniques are related to each other and become equivalent in certain 
cases, they do have very different characteristics in terms of the complexity, flexibility, 
and applicability.  Three most representative residual generation methods, observer based 
approach, parity space approach, and parameter estimation based approach, are 
summarized in this section.  
 
2.4.1 Observer Based Residual Generation 
 
The basic idea behind observer based residual generation is to estimate the system 
output using Luenberger observers in a deterministic setting (Frank, 1990) or Kalman 
filters in a stochastic setting (Basseville, 1988).  The weighted output estimation error is 
then used as residuals for fault detection and isolation (Chen and Patton, 1999).   
For the purpose of fault diagnosis, only the output estimation is required while the 
state estimation is unnecessary.  Therefore, a Lunenburger observer can be used for 
residual generation, which is given by: 
 
)()()()(
)()()()(
321 tuLtyLtzLtr
tJutKytFztz ++= ++=
        (2.16) 
 
where )(tz  is the state vector of the observer, and 3,21,,,, LLLJKF  are matrices of 
appropriate dimensions.   
The generated residual vector )(tr  in Equation (2.16) is related to the output 
estimation error.  To be used for fault detection, the residuals must be zero in 
asymptotical sense for any initial states for a fault free system defined in Equation (2.1), 
that is: 
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0)(lim =∞→ trt           (2.17) 
 
To obtain zero residuals in asymptotical sense with a full order observer, the 
matrices involved in the observer design must satisfy the following conditions (Chen and 
Patton, 1996).  : 
 
DLL
CLL
KDBJ
KCAF
txtz
23
21
)()(
−=
−= −=
−= =
          (2.18) 
F  must have stable eigenvalues. 
 
If the residual generator, defined in Equation (2.16), is applied to the fault system 
defined in Equation (2.7), the residual dynamics can be derived as follows: 
 
)()()(
)()()()(
)()()(
222
21
tfRLtCeLtr
tfKRtfRtFete
txtzte
+−=
+−=
−=
        (2.19) 
 
The observer based residual generator exists for any dynamic system although 
stable state observer may not exist (Chen and Patton, 1996).  Through appropriate choice 
of the matrices 2L  and K  in Equation (2.19), the designed full order observers may 
generate residuals with a predetermined fault direction for fault isolation (Park et al., 
1994a), (Park et al., 1994b).  A Dedicated Observer Scheme (DOS) was suggested for 
sensor fault isolation in (Chen and Patton, 1994).  In this scheme, multiple residual 
generators are designed with each observer excited by a single output.  Therefore, each 
residual generator is sensitive to only one sensor fault.  The Generalized Observer 
Scheme (GOS) also uses multiple residual generators for fault isolation.  However, in this 
design scheme, each observer is excited by all the system outputs but one (Wuennengerg, 
1990).  
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2.4.2 Parity Space Approach 
 
The basic idea of parity space approach is to check the consistency of 
measurements for the monitored system in terms of some process constraints.  The 
terminology of parity space was originated in digital data transmission using bits for error 
detection.  If two groups of bits are the same, their sum is zero.  If two groups of bits are 
different, a non-zero sum will be generated, which means that some transmission error 
has happened. 
 
2.4.2.1 Parity Space Approach for Static Systems 
 
The parity space approach to fault diagnosis was first proposed for steady state 
operation conditions, where there are more measurements than the number of state 
variables (Daly et al., 1979).  An algebraic equation can be used to describe a general 
steady state system, which is given by: 
 
)()()()( kwkfkCxky ++=        (2.20) 
 
where 
)(ky  = the system measurements. 
)(kx  = the system states. 
)(kf  = the fault vector. 
)(kw  = the measurement noise. 
 
If the number of measurements m  is greater than the number of independent state 
variables n , there exists a matrix 0V , which satisfies: 
 
00 =CV           (2.21) 
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where TV0  has nm −  columns of vectors that span the null space of TC .  In fact, 
Equation (2.21) consists of nm −  redundant equations relating the m  measured 
variables. 
The redundant equations in Equation (2.21) can be directly used as parity 
relations to generate residual vector )(kr , which is given by: 
 
))()(()()( 00 kwkfVkyVkr +==       (2.22) 
 
The generated residual vector is independent of the system states.  The space 
spanned by the columns of the matrix 0V  is called parity space.  A fault of the ith sensor 
will result in the largest magnitude along the direction of the ith column of the matrix 0V .  
Therefore, the m  columns of the matrix 0V  can be directly used as the directional fault 
signatures of the m  sensor faults for fault isolation. 
 
Example 1.:  Consider a system with four measured variables [ ]Tyyyy 4321  and 
two state variables [ ]Txx 21 , which satisfies the following algebraic measurement 
equation: 
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To design a residual generator for fault detection, the generated residuals must be zero-
valued for any values of state variables if there is no fault occurring in the system.  The 
residual generator can be designed according to Equation (2.21) with a linear 
transformation on the measured vector, which is given as follows: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−= 0.00.10.10.1 0.10.00.10.10V  
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The two rows of the matrix 0V  are the two left singular vectors corresponding to zero-
valued singular values when singular value decomposition is performed on the original 
system matrix.  In this example, the obtained left singular matrix, U , and the singular 
values matrix, S , are as follows: 
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It can be easily verified that the generated residual of the ith sensor fault lies in the 
direction of the ith column of the matrix 0V .  For instance, if the first measurement has a 
bias fault of magnitude fm  and the measurement noise is negligible, then the fault vector 
is as follows: 
[ ]Tfmf 000=  
According to Equation (2.22), the residual vector is given by: 
fmkr ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−−= 0.1 0.1)(  
Obviously, the generated residual vector is in the direction of the first column of the 
matrix 0V .   
 
Example 2.:  Consider a system with four measured variables [ ]Tyyyy 4321  and 
two state variables [ ]Txx 21 , which satisfies the following algebraic measurement 
equation: 
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In order to design a residual generator for fault detection, the generated residual 
vector must be zero-valued for any values of state variables [ ]Txx 21 if there is no fault 
occurring in the system.  The most obvious nonlinear residual generators can be designed 
by substituting the two unmeasured state variables, 1x  and 2x , with the two measured 
variables, 1y  and 2y  in the third and the fourth measurement equations, which is as 
follows: 
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For normal operation conditions, the two residual generators 1r  and 2r  must 
generate zero residuals.  However, it is very challenging to design nonlinear residual 
generators satisfying this requirement.  If data driven modeling techniques such as neural 
networks and group method of data handling are used, a dataset with a combination of 1y  
and 2y  each of which should cover its operational space must be obtained such that the 
generated data driven models will not produce non-zero residuals in the possible 
operational state space.  It is not arguable that routine operation data do not contain such 
rich information.  If first-principle models are used, the developed models must be 
accurate enough.  If there is significant model uncertainty, the residual generators will 
cause false alarms even if there are no faults occurring in the system. 
Let’s further examine the property of the generated residuals.  If the first 
measurement has a bias fault of magnitude fm  and the measurement noise is negligible, 
then the fault vector is as follows: 
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It can be observed that the generated residual vector does not have fixed fault 
direction.  The fault direction depends on the operation state 1x  and the fault magnitude 
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fm .  Therefore, this residual generator design scheme based on prediction error is not 
appropriate for fault isolation of the considered system. 
In general, residual generator design for fault diagnosis should not be simplified 
as a prediction error problem.  In this example, if perfect modeling is available, the 
following four residual generators based on generalized transformations of the measured 
variables can be designed for fault isolation: 
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The four residual generators 1r , 2r , 3r , and 4r  can now be dedicated to the fault 
isolation of 1y , 2y , 3y , and 4y , respectively, because only the dedicated residual 
generators will generate zero-valued residuals and the other three residual generators will 
generate nonzero residuals if a fault occurs in the system. 
However, the assumption of this residual generator design scheme that perfect 
modeling is achievable may be too much for a real world problem.  We believe this 
design strategy can solve a class of problems for small systems such as heat exchangers, 
but we are not going to perform further study on this method in this dissertation because 
such residual generator design will be very much problem dependent. 
 
Comments on the two examples: Because nonlinear residual generator design for fault 
diagnosis will not always be able to produce directional fault signatures, most of the 
nonlinear fault diagnosis methods do not have solid theoretical basis.  In order to develop 
a fault diagnosis method with more general application perspectives, linear fault 
diagnosis methods will be pursued in this dissertation focusing on robust residual 
generator design to avoid false alarms due to model uncertainty.  It is understandable that 
nonlinear techniques will not be able to deal with model uncertainty. 
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2.4.2.2 Parity Space Approach for Dynamic Systems 
 
If the number of measurements m  is not greater than the number of independent 
state variables n , the left null space of the matrix C  (the null space of TC ) given in 
Equation (2.20) becomes empty.  This means that the measurements do not have 
adequate redundant information for model based fault diagnosis.  Unfortunately, most 
process systems do have more states than the measurements, which constrains the 
application of spatial redundancy based parity space approach to fault diagnosis. 
The other dimension of redundancy in a technical process is temporal redundancy.  
The parity space approach to fault diagnosis can significantly extend its application when 
temporal redundancy is utilized (Patton and Chen, 1991).   
With a time window of length 1+s , the temporal redundancy relationship for a 
linear dynamic system defined in Equation (2.7) is given by: 
 
)()()()( kMfskxkuHky sssss +−Γ=−       (2.23) 
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If the number of stacked rows 1+s  is chosen larger than the number of states n , 
there always exists a matrix 0V  such that,  
 
00 =ΓsV           (2.24) 
 
Therefore, the residual vector can then be calculated as follows: 
 
))()(()( 0 kuHkyVkr sss −=        (2.25) 
 
Correspondingly, the dynamics of the residual vector is given by: 
 
)()( 0 kfMVkr s=          (2.26) 
 
The residuals generated by dynamic parity space approach can further be 
processed to have the properties for fault isolation.  The method to generate structured 
residuals and directional residuals for fault isolation is given in (Gertler, 1997).   
 
2.4.3 Parameter Estimation Approach 
 
The basic idea behind parameter estimation approach is to estimate the model 
parameters on line and relate the model parameters to physical parameters for fault 
detection and isolation. 
If the model structure of a physical system is known, the empirical model of the 
system can be derived in the following form: 
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θTtty )()( Ψ=          (2.27) 
 
where 
θ  = the set of model parameters. 
)](),...,1(),(),....,1([ mtutuntytyT −−−−=Ψ  
 
The least square estimate of θ  can be computed as follows: 
 
yTT ΨΨΨ= −1)(θ          (2.28) 
 
After the model parameters are identified, they may be converted back to the 
physical parameters for fault isolation.  However, because the model parameters are 
generally related to the physical parameters via a complicated function, it may be 
extremely difficult to perform this conversion (Doraiswami and Stevenson, 1996).  A 
very interesting example of parameter estimation based approach to fault diagnosis is to 
identify modal parameters from vibration data for structural damage detection and 
localization using multivariate autoregressive moving average modeling (Bodeux and 
Golinval, 2003). 
 
2.5 Residual Evaluation Techniques 
 
In a real process, the measured signals always contain noise.  In addition, some 
unmeasured disturbance may play a part in the system dynamics.  If the measurement 
noise and the unmeasured disturbance are assumed to be white Gaussian, the generated 
residual consists of two components, which is given by: 
 
)()()()()()()( tqGqHtfqGqHtr yfy νν+=      (2.29) 
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where 
q  = the back shift operator operated on time. 
νG  = the transfer function between the noise/disturbance and the system output. 
)(tν = the noise/disturbance vector. 
 
In Equation (2.29), the first term is time varying and deterministic, which 
represents the fault induced contribution, while the second term is stochastic, which 
represents the noise/disturbance induced contribution.  
If structured residual design is used for fault detection and isolation, the residuals 
generated by each residual generator can be tested against certain threshold.  If the 
threshold is exceeded, the response of this residual generator is determined to be “1” and 
“0” otherwise.  The obtained responses of all the residual generators are then compared 
with the fault patterns defined by the columns of the designed incidence matrix for fault 
isolation.   
The threshold used for statistical testing can be determined based on the selected 
false alarm rate.  Depending on how the residual generators are designed, the statistical 
testing can be performed for vector residual, vector time series, or the window average of 
vector time series (Gertler, 1998). 
The m -dimensional vector residual )(tr  follows a multivariate normal 
distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix rΦ .  The statistics 
)()()( 1 trtrt r
T −Φ=ω  obeys 2χ  distribution with m degrees of freedom.  Therefore, the 
decision rule can be given as follows: 
 
if 2 ,αχω m≥  , then the residual generator is fired. 
if 2 ,αχω m<  , then the residual generator is not fired. 
 
where α  is the significance level. 
 
 40
The m-dimensional vector residual )(tr  can also be stacked into a vector time 
series for statistical testing.  This vector )(tR  is ms  dimensional if s time instants are 
used in the stack.  If the vector time series follow a multivariate normal distribution with 
zero mean and covariance matrix RΦ .  The statistics )()()( 1 tRtRt RT −Φ=ω  obeys 2χ  
distribution with ms degrees of freedom.  Therefore, the decision rule can be given as 
follows: 
 
if 2 ,αχω ms≥  , then the residual generator is fired. 
if 2 ,αχω ms<  , then the residual generator is not fired. 
 
where α  is the significance level. 
 
 
2.6 Robust Data Driven Model Based Fault Diagnosis  
 
The success of model based fault diagnosis strongly depends on the fidelity of the 
mathematical models developed for the monitored system.  If the developed 
mathematical models are not accurate enough to represent the fault free system, the 
model uncertainty will induce significant residuals resulting in false alarms and the 
generated residuals may not follow the designed residual patterns resulting in incorrect 
fault isolation.  Evidently, both false alarms and incorrect fault isolation have adverse 
consequences when real-time fault diagnosis is applied to a safety critical system, such as 
a nuclear power system.  Therefore, it is mandatory to address the robust issues such that 
the fault diagnosis algorithms are insensitive to model uncertainties and remain highly 
sensitive to incipient faults. 
 
2.6.1 Motivation 
 
In general, the mathematical models used for model based fault diagnosis can be 
categorized as follows: 
• First-principle models. 
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• Causal data driven models identified from well-designed experiments. 
• Statistical data driven models developed from historical data. 
 
First principle models are usually not appropriate for direct use in model based 
fault diagnosis for a complex system, such as a nuclear power plant.  On the one hand, 
first principle models always have some inevitable uncertainties because of inherent 
assumptions made for model development.  For an engineering process, distributed 
parameterization and empirical relationships used will also contribute to uncertainty.  The 
last but not the least source is the uncertainty of parameters used for modeling.  On the 
other hand, because the developed physical models are usually very complicated, it is 
very difficult to use them directly to design appropriate schemes for fault detection and 
isolation.   
Just like in the case of model based control, data driven models are much more 
popular than first principle models for fault diagnosis.  In practice, there are two 
fundamentally different data driven modeling approaches.  System identification 
approach identifies empirical models using data obtained from well-designed 
experiments.  Historical data driven modeling approach develops a model from routine 
operation data saved in a historical database.  The data driven models developed from 
system identification techniques are usually causal models because of the careful control 
of experiments.  On the contrary, historical data driven models are usually not causal 
models because they can only capture the correlations among the variables contained in 
the historical data. 
The two types of data driven modeling techniques and the corresponding fault 
diagnosis techniques have very different properties. 
Causal data driven models can facilitate fault detection and isolation by testing the 
consistency of measured variables with the input-output causal relationships.  Because 
the fault effects on the system behavior is explicitly formulated in the developed causal 
models, fault isolation can be achieved by structured residual design or fixed fault 
direction residual design.  If appropriate causal models are available for a large system, 
the network structure of cause-effect relationship between the measured variables can 
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even be explicitly searched for fault isolation (Montmain, 1997), (Montmain, 2000), 
(Zhao, 2002). 
Historical data driven models can only characterize the process variations of the 
collected data (Ogunnaike and Ray, 1994).  Historical data driven model based fault 
diagnosis performs fault detection by testing the correlation structure of the measured 
variables against that of the historical data, which are presumed to represent normal 
operation conditions.  In order to avoid false alarms, the historical data must contain all 
sources of normal variations (Russell, Chiang, and Braatz, 2000).  However, this 
requirement is quite stringent for a technical process such as nuclear energy systems.  
One of the reasons is that the normal data variation is not repeatable for the same power 
level because of component degradation and routine operation adjustments.  The second 
reason is that the signal-noise ratio may be low at steady state operation conditions, so the 
data collected at a single power level may not be able to reveal the correlation among the 
plant variables. 
The comparison between causal data driven modeling and historical data driven 
modeling clearly shows that model based fault diagnosis needs to use causal data driven 
models.  Unfortunately, causal data driven model based approach to fault diagnosis is not 
well studied for technical processes because people consider it unrealistic to perform 
experiments designed in such a manner that all the requirements of system identification 
are satisfied.  Nevertheless, they have ignored the fact that it is indeed pragmatic to 
identify a model from large-scale simulation software.  In nuclear system design, 
simulation models are actually indispensable to safety analysis and system design.  With 
simulation models at hand, plant tests necessary for system identification can be replaced 
by simulation runs.   
Robust data driven model based approach is developed in this dissertation for 
fault diagnosis.  In this approach, data are generated from the developed first principle 
models with well-designed simulation calculations.  Because data are generated with 
adequate input-output excitation, the developed data driven models are able to reveal the 
cause-effect relationships between the input-output data.  After the causal models are 
developed, the model uncertainty is identified on-line from plant measurements.  The 
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characteristics of the identified model uncertainty can then be studied to design robust 
fault diagnosis schemes using available techniques, which are described in the remainder 
of the section, to avoid false alarms and incorrect fault diagnosis.   
 
2.6.2 Robust Parity Space Approach to Fault Diagnosis 
 
Many robust fault diagnosis techniques have been developed to deal with model 
uncertainty based on disturbance decoupling.   
Unknown Input Observer (UIO) was systematically studied by Frank’s research 
group (Wuennengerg, 1990).  In this method, an UIO observer is designed through 
appropriately choosing the state feedback gain and the observer matrices such that the 
state estimation error approaches zeros asymptotically regardless of model uncertainty.  
Because the residuals are generated as a linear combination of the state estimation error, 
the residuals are then independent of the disturbances.  A unified design method of UIO 
observers was presented in (Hou and Muller, 1994).   
Eigenstructure assignment provides an alternative approach to the decoupling of 
residuals from model uncertainty (Duan et al., 1998).  In this method, the left or right 
eigenvectors of the observer are assigned to be orthogonal to the directions of model 
uncertainty.  The advantage of this method is that the residuals are decoupled from model 
uncertainty directly although the state estimation error may not.  The disadvantage of the 
method is that the number of sources of model uncertainty must be smaller than the 
number of independent measurements in order to achieve the decoupling (Chen and 
Patton, 1999).   
Robust parity space approach is the most commonly accepted robust residual 
generation technique because of its simplicity in implementation (Chen, 1995).  Without 
loss of generality, the system dynamics with model uncertainty and possible faults are 
given as follows: 
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where 
1E  = the uncertainty distribution matrix related to the state vector. 
2E  = the uncertainty distribution matrix related to the system output. 
d  = the uncertainty vector. 
 
The model given in Equation (2.30) clearly shows that model uncertainty and 
possible faults affect the system dynamics in a similar fashion.  The only difference is 
that the uncertainty distribution matrices 1E  and 2E  are different from the fault 
distribution matrices 1R  and 2R .  If the uncertainty distribution matrices are similar to the 
fault distribution matrices, the distinction between system faults and the disturbances will 
become impossible no matter how large the fault magnitude is.  Therefore, in order to 
have a sensitive fault detection algorithm for all the possible faults, it is necessary to have 
an accurate model. 
The temporal redundancy relationship for a linear dynamic system defined in 
Equation (2.30) is given by: 
 
)()()()()( kMfkdGskxkuHky ssssss ++−Γ=−     (2.31) 
 
where 
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The robust residuals for fault detection can be generated as follows: 
))()(()( 0 kuHkyVkr sss −=        (2.32) 
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To decouple the residuals from model uncertainty and initial states, the residual 
generator must satisfy the following two conditions 
 
00 =ZV           (2.33) 
00 ≠MV  
 
where 
[ ]ss GZ Γ=  
 
2.6.3 Estimation of Model Uncertainty 
 
It is necessary to know the uncertainty distribution matrix for robust fault 
diagnosis although the magnitude behavior of model uncertainty may be unknown.  The 
application of robust fault diagnosis methods was very limited until uncertainty 
distribution matrix could be estimated from plant measurements.   
Although it is possible to lump parameter uncertainty, system non-linearity, 
measurement noise, and model reduction together to describe the model uncertainty, this 
kind of explicit formulation of model uncertainty is usually not adequate to deal with a 
real world complex system.  For a real world complex system, the characteristics of 
model uncertainty may be completely unknown due to insufficient knowledge about the 
physical system and the complex interaction between subsystems.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to estimate model uncertainty directly from plant measurements based on a 
reasonably accurate mathematical model. 
The estimation of uncertainty distribution matrix was accomplished by Patton and 
Chen in 1991 (Patton, 1991b).  Their work has received worldwide attention both in the 
field of fault diagnosis and robust control design.  The estimation follows a two-step 
procedure.  The first step is to determine model uncertainty vector and the second step is 
to derive uncertainty distribution matrix using singular value decomposition.   
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2.6.3.1 Determination of Model Uncertainty Vector 
 
The discrete formulation of model uncertainties for a linear dynamic system is 
given as follows: 
)()()(
)()()()1( 1
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++=+       (2.34) 
 
where )(1 kd  accounts for all the modeling uncertainties.   
 
The objective is to estimate the uncertainty vector )(1 td  based on the nominal 
system matrices DCBA ,,, , the actual system input )(ku , and the actual system output 
)(ky . 
If we can assume that the uncertainty vector is slowly time varying, the system 
model can be rewritten in the state augmentation form given by: 
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The estimation of the uncertainty vector is then simplified as a deterministic state 
estimation problem given the system matrices and the measurement.  Standard algorithms 
such as Kalman filtering and de-convolution algorithm (Patton, 1991b) are available to 
obtain the sequence of uncertainty vectors. 
 
2.6.3.2 Determination of Model Uncertainty Distribution Matrix 
 
The uncertainty decoupling method for robust fault diagnosis only uses the 
information about uncertainty distribution matrix while the magnitude of model 
uncertainty is irrelevant.  To extract the uncertainty distribution matrix from the 
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uncertainty vector, the estimated uncertainty vector is organized as a matrix given as 
follows: 
 [ ])(ˆ......)2(ˆ)1(ˆ 111 Mddd=Ω       (2.36) 
where 
M  = the number of identified uncertainty sequences. 
 
If the estimated uncertainty vectors do not change directions, the uncertainty 
distribution matrix is reduced to one column vector, which can be given by: 
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To extract l  most linearly independent directions out of the M  uncertainty 
vectors, singular value decomposition (SVD) can be performed on Ω , which is given by: 
 
TUSV=Ω           (2.38) 
 
If l  most significant singular values are retained, the matrix Ω  can be 
approximated by: 
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The estimated uncertainty distribution matrix can be constructed by the first l  
columns of the matrix U .   
 48
Although the above algorithm is developed to extract the uncertainty distribution 
matrix, it can also be used to determine the fault distribution matrix from fault data.  
Because fault distribution matrix is used to characterize the feature of a fault in model 
based fault diagnosis, this algorithm has not only theoretical but also practical 
significance in fault diagnosis.  
 
2.7 Summary 
 
A critical review on model based fault diagnosis is presented in this chapter.  
After the basic theory of observer approach, parity space approach and parameter 
estimation approach was described, it was emphasized that the performance of model 
based fault diagnosis is a strong function of the fidelity of the models used for residual 
generation.  This chapter concluded the review with the motivation of robust data driven 
model based approach to combine the strength of data driven modeling and the 
theoretical sophistication of residual generation and residual analysis derived from linear 
system theory for fault diagnosis.  In the proposed robust data driven model based 
approach, data are generated from first principle models with well-designed simulation 
calculations.  Because the data are generated with adequate input-output excitation, the 
developed data driven models can reveal the cause-effect relationships among variables.  
After causal models are developed, model uncertainty is identified from plant 
measurements.  The characteristics of the identified model uncertainty can then be 
studied to design robust fault diagnosis schemes to avoid false alarms and incorrect fault 
diagnosis.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Modeling and Simulation of the IRIS Helical Coil Steam 
Generator System  
 
In order to demonstrate the performance of the procedures and algorithms to be 
developed, both a steady state model and a dynamic model are developed for the IRIS 
(International Reactor Innovative and Secure) HCSG systems in this chapter.  The steady 
state simulation study shows that the profile of the primary coolant temperature can be 
used to indicate the secondary fluid level inside the HCSG tubes.  The developed 
dynamic simulation model is used to generate data such that a linear state space model 
can be identified using a subspace identification technique and test the robust data driven 
dynamic model based fault diagnosis algorithm developed in Chapter 6.  The developed 
physics model is also used to study optimal sensor placement design. 
 
3.1 System Description 
 
International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) is one of the next generation 
nuclear reactor designs for near term deployment.  The IRIS reactor is an integral light-
water reactor (LWR), a schematic of which is shown in Figure 3.1 (Carelli et al., 2003).  
The reactor coolant systems including steam generators, pumps, and pressurizer are all 
integrated inside the reactor vessel.  This integral design eliminates the possibility of 
large loss of coolant accidents.  The reactor has eight Helical Coil Steam Generators 
(HCSG) connected to four steam lines and four feed water lines.  The long lifetime core 
is achieved by means of 5 percent enriched uranium for the first reactor core and 9 
percent enriched uranium for successive reactor cores.  The reactor refueling is needed 
only at the end of the first five years, and afterwards once every eight years.  Because of 
the high burnup, less nuclear waste per unit of reactor power is produced than that in 
currently operating reactors.   
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Figure 3.1.  IRIS integral design. 
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Figure 3.2.  IRIS steam generator layout. 
 
The HCSG systems are major contributors to the safety and economy of the IRIS 
reactor design.  The size of steam generators can be reduced through the helical coil 
design.  The heat transfer of the coiled configuration is much more efficient than straight 
tubes because of the larger heat transfer area per unit volume and the secondary flow 
induced by the coil geometry.  The probability of steam generator tube rupture can be 
reduced because secondary fluid flows inside SG tubes and thus the tube walls 
experience compression force from the outside, reducing the likelihood of stress 
corrosion cracking.  In addition, these steam generators produce superheated steam, 
which avoids the need to install a steam-water separator in the steam generator  
In the IRIS reactor design, eight steam generators are installed in four pairs in the 
annular space between the core barrel and the reactor vessel (RV) wall, which is shown in 
Figure 3.2 (Carelli et al., 2003).  On the primary side, each Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 
is dedicated to discharge primary coolant into one steam generator.  Therefore, each 
RCP+HCSG module constitutes a separate flow path.  On the secondary side, a common 
feed water supply line splits at the vessel and goes to two steam generators.  Similarly, 
the steam discharge lines from two steam generators join to create a common steam line.  
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This pairing of steam generators reduces the number of feed water and steam lines, and 
the number of penetrations into and out of the containment, but it has an unfavorable 
consequence on individual steam generator monitoring in terms of its thermal 
performance and the secondary flow rate.  Figure 3.3 shows a schematic of one pair of 
steam generators. 
In this chapter, the helical coil steam generators are simulated to study the system 
responses for steady state and transient operation conditions.  The simulation model 
provides an application case for the verification of the developed performance monitoring 
and fault diagnosis methods.  In addition, the steady state analysis has demonstrated the 
proposed method to monitor the secondary fluid level inside the HCSG tubes through 
measuring the primary fluid temperature profile.   
 
3.2 Description of HCSG Heat Transfer Mechanism and a Novel 
Approach to Level Measurement 
 
In the HCSG system, the nominal parameters of which are shown in Figure 3.4, 
the primary fluid flows downward from the top to the bottom on the shell side.  The 
primary side heat transfer is sub-cooled forced convection along the entire steam 
generator height and the secondary fluid flows upward inside the coiled tubes from the 
bottom to the top of the steam generator.  The feed water flows into the sub-cooled region 
of the steam generator.  In the sub-cooled region, the heat transfer is mainly due to single-
phase turbulent and molecular momentum transfer and the pressure loss is mainly due to 
wall friction.  The saturated region begins when the bulk temperature becomes saturated.  
The heat transfer in the saturated boiling region is dominated by nucleate boiling, which 
is much more efficient than single-phase liquid or steam heat transfer.  In the saturated 
boiling region, the generated bubbles do not disappear in the liquid core and the pressure 
loss is not only due to the wall friction but also due to the interfacial drag between the 
bubbles and the liquid.  The saturated boiling region ends when critical heat flux is 
reached.  After the steam quality becomes greater than 1.0, the liquid evaporation ceases 
and the steam becomes superheated.   
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Figure 3.3.  A schematic of one pair of steam generators. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.  HCSG design parameters at full power condition. 
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The inherent HCSG heat transfer characteristics enable us to use the shell side 
fluid temperature profile to measure the steam generator level inside the tubes.  The 
secondary fluid flows upward inside the tubes experiencing sub-cooled region, saturated 
boiling region, and superheated region.  Because the heat transfer coefficient in the tubes 
decreases significantly from the saturated boiling region to the superheated region, a 
sharp breakpoint of the shell side fluid temperature profile can be observed and used as a 
practical measure of the water level inside the coiled tubes.   
In fact, many types of multiple-point level detectors have been developed based 
on the principle that the heat transfer coefficient in water is much larger than the heat 
transfer coefficient in steam (Wang et al., 1998).  These designs are common in that a 
heating rod is embedded into the center of the level detector and a set of thermocouples 
are installed to measure the temperature profile of the liquid near the inside wall of the 
level detector.  At the level between the steam and the liquid in the measured medium, 
the measured temperature will show a sharp change. 
As is evident, the physical principle of the proposed HCSG level measurement is 
the same as that of the multiple-point level detector.  In the case of HCSG, the heat 
transfer mechanism is inherent in the system, so it provides an efficient solution to 
individual steam generator level monitoring. 
 
3.3 Development of HCSG Steady State Model 
 
A detailed steady state model is developed to investigate the feasibility of the 
proposed tube inside level measurement and prepare the initialization parameters for the 
dynamic model.   
The developed model is based on a straight channel analysis and the helical 
features are represented implicitly by some correction factors with respect to the friction 
factor and the heat transfer coefficient.  Different empirical correlations associated with 
the sub-cooled region, saturated region, and superheated region are used to characterize 
the axially changing pressure losses and heat transfer.  In addition, functional steam and 
water properties are used (Garland and Hoskins, 1988), (Garland and Hoskins, 1989), 
(Garland and Hoskins, 1992). 
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3.3.1 Computation Algorithms 
 
The overall computation starts from the bottom of the steam generator and 
advances upward to the top.  For a given cell, the steady state calculation is achieved 
based on the following iterative algorithm (Lee and Akcasu, 1981): 
 
• Initialize the cell-averaged pressure and enthalpy with the outlet values of the 
previous cell.  
• Iterate over the heat transfer rate and the pressure drop until convergence.  
o Calculate the heat transfer coefficients and the friction factors using the cell 
averaged thermal properties. 
o Calculate the heat transfer rate from the primary side to the secondary side and the 
pressure loss within the cell.  
o Calculate the values of the outlet enthalpy and the outlet pressure. 
o Update the cell averaged pressure and enthalpy of the cell. 
• End the iteration. 
 
The steady heat balance between the primary coolant and the secondary coolant is 
governed by: 
s
s
p
p
W
qH
W
qH
∆=∆
∆=∆
         (3.1) 
 
where  
H  = the specific enthalpy. 
q  = the heat transfer rate. 
W = the mass flow rate. 
s , p  = the subscript or superscript denoting the secondary side and the primary side, 
respectively. 
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If the acceleration pressure drop due to the change of cross section and density is 
ignored, the total pressure drop P∆  at steady state conditions is dominated by the 
frictional pressure drop and gravitational pressure drop, which is given by: 
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where 
ρ  = the density. 
g  = the gravity acceleration. 
A  = the flow cross section. 
f  = the friction factor. 
L∆  = the flow length. 
D  =the hydraulic equivalent diameter. 
 
The heat transfer rate from the primary side to the secondary side with tube length 
L∆  is given by: 
 
LTTURq spo ∆−=∆ )(2π         (3.3) 
 
where the overall heat transfer coefficient U  is given by: 
pi
o
M
o
si
o
hR
R
K
R
hR
RU 1ln
1
++
=         (3.4) 
T  = the temperature. 
oR  = the tube outside radius. 
iR  = the tube inside radius. 
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h  = the convection heat transfer coefficient. 
MK  = the thermal conductivity of the tube metal. 
 
3.3.2 Heat Transfer Correlations  
 
In the single-phase water and single-phase steam region, the heat transfer 
coefficient can be calculated using Dittus-Boelter correlation (Kuridan and Beynon, 
1997), which is given by: 
 
coolingNu
heatingNu
3.08.0
4.08.0
PrRe023.0
PrRe023.0
=
=       (3.5) 
 
where 
Nu  = the Nusell number. 
Pr  = the Prantl number. 
Re  = the Reynolds number. 
 
In the saturated boiling region, the two-phase convection heat transfer coefficient 
on the secondary side can be calculated using Thom’s correlation (Kuridan and Beynon, 
1997), which is given by: 
 
02253.0
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where 
''q  = the heating rate. 
P  = the fluid pressure. 
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3.3.3 Pressure Drop Correlations 
 
Colebrook equation is employed to compute the single-phase friction factor spf , 
which is given by (Smith, 1996): 
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where 
ε  = the average tube roughness. 
sp = the subscript denoting single phase. 
 
In order to take into account the effect of coiled geometry, the same ratio of the 
coil to the straight tube is used for both heat transfer coefficient and friction factor, which 
is given by (Lee, 1978): 
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where  
ccf  =the friction factors for tube coil. 
ssf  = the friction factor for straight tubes. 
CR  = the coil radius. 
 
Modified Chen’s correlation is used to calculate the boiling two-phase flow 
fiction factor in helical coiled tubes given by (Chen 1982): 
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where  
2
10Φ = the two-phase multiplier. 
x = the steam quality. 
crP  = the critical pressure for water. 
lρ  = the liquid phase density. 
gρ  = the vapor phase density. 
 
3.4 Steady State Results 
 
The developed model was tested with the IRIS HCSG design data.  The calculated 
temperature profiles of the primary fluid and the secondary fluid are shown in Figure 3.5.  
The calculated lengths of the sub-cooled region, the saturated boiling region and the 
superheated region are 4.5 m, 21.5 m, and 6.0 m respectively.  The calculated steam 
outlet temperature and the primary inlet fluid temperature are 317.1 C and 327.9 C, 
respectively, which are 317.0 C and 328.4 C obtained by RELAP (Westinghouse, 2002).  
The calculated results are within 0.25% error as compared with the results obtained from 
a more sophisticated code RELAP.  
Figure 3.5 clearly shows the break point of primary fluid temperature when the 
saturated boiling heat transfer transits to the superheated heat transfer at the tube length 
26.0 m.  This break point can be directly used as an indicator to the steam generator water 
inventory. 
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Figure 3.5.  Fluid temperature versus tube length at 100% full power. 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the heat transfer coefficients on the primary side and the 
secondary side.  The heat transfer coefficient on the primary side almost maintains at a 
constant level.  The effective heat transfer is dominated by the boiling heat transfer on the 
secondary side.  The average heat transfer coefficient in the boiling region is about four 
times greater than that in the sub-cooled region and seven times greater than that in the 
superheated region.  The local heat transfer coefficient in the boiling region increases 
linearly with the axial height.  An abrupt increase and an abrupt decrease in heat transfer 
can be observed from the sub-cooled region to the saturated boiling region and from the 
saturated region to the superheated steam region respectively. 
Figure 3.7 shows the steam quality of the secondary fluid.  It is clear that the 
steam quality can be well approximated as a linear function of the axial coordinates along 
the tube.  Based on this observation, a single node with average thermal properties such 
as density can be used to describe the behavior in this region if only quasi-steady state 
transients are to be studied. 
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Figure 3.6.  Fluid heat transfer coefficients on the primary side and the secondary side at 
100% full power. 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  Steam quality versus tube length at 100% full power. 
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Figure 3.8.  Pressure drop versus the tube length on the secondary side at 100% power. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the pressure drop on the secondary side.  The major portion of 
the pressure drop occurs in the saturated boiling region.  The total pressure drop is 0.32 
MPa.  This result is within 10% error of the result obtained from a more sophisticated 
code RELAP.  The figure also shows that one pressure can be used to characterize the 
entire superheated region. 
In conclusion, a steady state thermal analysis model of HCSG has been 
successfully developed.  The developed model can be used for fault diagnosis under 
steady state condition and to provide a basis to develop a dynamic process model.  The 
steady state analysis demonstrates that the primary fluid temperature can be used as an 
indicator to the secondary fluid level inside the HCSG tubes. 
 
3.5 Development of HCSG Dynamic Model 
 
A simplified nodal model is developed to simulate the dynamic behavior of 
helical coil steam generators under the environment of MATLAB/Simulink.  In general, a 
dynamic process should be modeled as a distributed parameter system characterized by a 
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set of partial differential equations.  However, it may become too complicated to solve 
such a time dependent system with spatial variations.  To simplify the numeric 
computation, nodal models are sometimes used for an approximate solution.  Each node 
has the same averaged properties, so the spatial dependence can be represented simply by 
the interaction between adjacent nodes.   
 
3.5.1 Model Assumptions 
 
The overall HCSG model is based on conservation laws of mass, momentum, and 
energy.   As a nodal model, the outlet values of the state variables are used as the nodal 
representative values.  Because the designed FDI system is supposed to work under 
quasi-steady state conditions, it is assumed in the developed simulation model that the 
heat transfer coefficients and pressure losses in each heat transfer regime are constant.   
In addition to the assumptions implied in a nodal model, the other major 
assumptions used to build the dynamic model for the helical coil steam generator systems 
are as follows (Chen, 1976): 
 
• Only one pressure is used to characterize the superheated region. 
• The superheated steam satisfies ideal gas law modified by an expansion coefficient. 
• The temperature of the second node in the subcooled region is equal to the saturated 
temperature. 
• The pressure drop between the superheated region and the saturated region is constant 
during any perturbations. 
• The pressure drop between the saturated region and the subcooled region is constant 
during any perturbations. 
• The steam quality in the boiling region can be assumed as a linear function of the 
axial coordinate so the density in the boiling region can be approximated as a function 
of steam pressure. 
• It is assumed that the steam generation rate is equal to the boiling rate. 
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• It is assumed that the heat transfer coefficients are constant for the superheated 
region, the saturated region, and the subcooled region. 
 
3.5.2 Nodalization 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the nodalization scheme to simulate the dynamics of HCSG 
system.  In each of the three heat transfer regimes on the secondary side, two nodes with 
equal length are used to consider the axial temperature changes.  Correspondingly, six 
metal nodes are used to describe the heat transfer from the primary side to the secondary 
side.  For the two nodes of the saturated region on the secondary side, the saturated 
temperature based on the local pressure is superimposed on the fluid.   
 
3.5.3 Primary Side Heat Balance Equations 
 
The primary coolant temperature can be determined based on the heat balance 
equations given by: 
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Figure 3.9.  Schematic of the nodalization for a helical steam generator. 
 
Tp1,Tp2,Tp3,Tp4,Tp5,Tp6 = Temperature of the primary coolant. 
Tw1,Tw2,Tw3,Tw4,Tw5,Tw6 = Temperature of the steam generator tube metal. 
Ts1,Ts2,Tsat,Tsat,Tsc1,Tsc2 = Temperature of the secondary fluid for the superheated 
steam region, the saturated boiling region and the sub-cooled region. 
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sL  = the superheated length. 
bL  = the saturated boiling length. 
scL  = the subcooled length. 
pT  = the primary side temperature. 
wT  = the tube metal temperature. 
pW  = the primary coolant flow rate. 
pC  = the specific heat. 
ρ  = the density of the primary coolant. 
xsA  = the flow area. 
h  = the heat transfer coefficient. 
wP  = the perimeter for heating. 
 
In the above equations, subscript p and w  refer to the primary coolant and the 
tube wall respectively. 
 
3.5.4 Tube Metal Heat Balance Equations 
 
A moving boundary model is used to describe the change of energy distribution in 
the tube metal due to the heat transfer regime change on the secondary side during a 
transient.  The energy balance equations for the ith node of the tube metal is given by: 
 
wiibwiwpibwiwpiwiwp QTZACTZACTZACdt
d +−= −−+ 1,11,, )()())((  ρρρ   (3.11) 
where  
iZ  = the length of the i
th node of the tube metal. 
wiT  = the temperature of the i
th node of the tube metal. 
wpAC )(ρ  = the heat capacity per unit length. 
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wiQ  = the net income of heat due to the effective heat transfer on the primary side and 
the secondary side.  
1, −ibwT , 1, +ibwT = the temperature of the metal node below and above the ith node, 
respectively.  
 
3.5.5 Secondary Side Balance Equations 
 
The state equations of the secondary coolant were derived based on mass and 
energy balance.  Because the pressure waves travel much faster than the fluid velocity, it 
is assumed that a local pressure disturbance will reach anywhere in the system 
simultaneously.  The exit steam pressure is related to the steam temperature through a 
further assumption that the superheated steam satisfies the ideal gas law modified by an 
expansion coefficient.   
The mass balance of the steam in the superheated steam nodes, node 1 and node 
2, are given by: 
 
ss WWM −= 211          (3.12a) 
212 WWM bs −=          (3.12b) 
 
where 
sM = the steam mass in the superheated region. 
sW = the steam flow rate to turbine, which is an external constraint imposed by the 
controller. 
21W = the steam flow rate flowing from the steam node 1 to the steam node 2. 
bW = the steam production rate. 
 
The heat balance equations of the two superheated steam nodes, node 1 and node 
2, are given by: 
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where 
sM = the steam mass in the superheated region. 
sP = the steam pressure in the superheated region. 
sV = the steam volume in the superheated region. 
sH = the specific enthalpy of the steam. 
gH = the specific enthalpy of the saturated steam. 
21 , ss QQ = the heat transfer rate to the two superheated nodes. 
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where 
wsP = the heating perimeter in the superheated steam region. 
 
Assuming the pressure loss in the superheated steam region is small, we have: 
 
21 sss PPP ==          (3.15) 
 
Since specific enthalpy is a function of temperature and pressure, then we have: 
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Combining the mass balance equations and the expansion of the specific enthalpy, 
the energy balance equations (Equations (3.13a) and (3.13b)) can be rewritten as follows: 
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The steam pressure in the superheated region can be described by compressibility 
adjusted ideal gas law, which is given by: 
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The time derivative of the steam pressure can then be determined by the following 
equation: 
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where 
stmM = the mole mass of steam. 
*
sZ = the steam expansion coefficient. 
R = the universal gas constant. 
 
Two-phase averaged density is used in the mass and energy balance equations for 
the saturated boiling region.  It is assumed that the steam quality in this region is a linear 
function of the axial coordinate, so the two-phase averaged density bρ  is given by: 
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where 
x  = the steam quality. 
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fv  = the specific capacity of the saturated water. 
gv  = the specific capacity of the saturated steam.   
 
Because both fv  and gv  are dependent only on steam pressure, bρ can then be 
represented as a function of steam pressure. 
The saturated boiling length is determined by the mass balance equations 
involving the boiling rate, the steam flow rate leaving the saturated boiling region into the 
superheated region, which is given by: 
 
bdbbsb WWLAdt
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where 
dbW  = the flow rate leaving the subcooled region for the saturated boiling region. 
 
If we notice 
 
dt
dP
dP
d
dt
d sat
s
bb ρρ =          (3.24) 
then 
bdbsatbbsbbs WWPKLALA −=+ ρ       (3.25) 
 
where 
P
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In the operation pressure range, we have the following empirical relationship 
between the two-phase average density and the steam pressure (Chen, 1976): 
 
ssb PP 00552445.061594.1)( +=ρ       (3.26) 
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Therefore,  
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For not a severe pressure transient, it can be assumed that the boiling rate is equal 
to the steam generation rate bW , which is given by (Chen, 1976): 
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where 
fgh  = the vaporization heat. 
In analogy to the saturated boiling region, the mass balance equation for the 
subcooled region can be given as follows: 
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fwW = the feed water flow rate. 
fwρ = the feed water density. 
fρ = the density of saturated water. 
 
The heat balance equation for the subcooled region 1 is given by: 
 
)()(
)(
12151
1
scdbscscpscscwscwscwscscsc
scp TWTWCTTLPhPV
dt
TMCd −+−=−   (3.30) 
 
Since the outlet temperature of the subcooled region 1 can be approximated by the 
saturated temperature (Chen, 1976), then 
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where 
P
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scW  = the flow rate from the subcooled region 2 to the subcooled region 1. 
 
The temperature of the subcooled region 2 can be determined using the heat 
balance equation, which is given by: 
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If we assume 21 scsc MM  = , then we have: 
 
)(5.0 dbfwsc WWW +=         (3.33) 
 
Substituting the expression of scW  and dbW  into the heat balance equation for the 
subcooled region 1, we have (Chen, 1976): 
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Noticing the pressure relationship between scP , satP  and sP , we have: 
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where 
scP  = the pressure in the subcooled region. 
satP  = the pressure in the saturated region. 
tpbP∆  = the two phase pressure loss in the boiling region. 
spscP∆  = the single phase pressure loss in the subcooled region. 
spssP∆  = the single phase pressure loss in the superheated region. 
 
3.5.6 HCSG Pressure Controller 
 
The overall control objective of the HCSG system is to supply adequate amount 
of steam to meet the demand of turbine system.  As power demand changes, the turbine 
throttle valve changes its position to follow the set point changes of turbine header 
pressure.  In the meantime, in order to prevent the carryover of water to the turbine 
system or dry-out of the steam generator tubes, a feedforward controller is used to 
suppress a possible large mismatch between the feed water flow rate and the steam flow 
rate.  The combination of the steam pressure feedback control and the feed water flow 
rate feedforward control is able to effectively control the steam generator pressure.  
Because the steam pressure is tightly related to the saturated boiling length, the system 
stability can be ensured through the steam pressure control during power transients.  
Figure 3.10 shows a schematic of the steam generator pressure control. 
Since the steam pressure is maintained by regulating the steam flow rate, the 
steam flow rate can be determined by the following equation (Guimaraes, 1992): 
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Figure 3.10.  Schematic of the helical coil steam generator control system. 
 
where 
u  = the controller output. 
sτ  = the time constant. 
0sW  = the initial steam flow rate on the secondary side. 
stC  =  the adjustable parameter. 
 
If a PI controller is used, the controller output has both the proportional part 
)(1 tu and the integral part )(2 tu , which is given by (Guimaraes, 1992): 
 
)()(
00
11 P
P
P
Pktu settb −=         (3.38a) 
)()(
00
2
2
P
P
P
Pk
dt
tdu settb −=         (3.38b) 
 
where 
=1k  the proportional gain. 
=2k  the integral gain. 
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Table 3.1.  Model parameters and steady state performance of dynamic HCSG modeling. 
 
Process Variable Heat Balance Model Results 
Saturated boiling length (m) 21.5 22.36 
Sub-cooled length (m) 4.5 4.42 
Cold leg temperature (oC) 292.1 291.98 
Steam temperature (oC)  317.1 316.59 
 
 
tbP = the turbine header pressure. 
setP = the turbine header pressure setpoint. 
0P = the nominal turbine header pressure. 
 
In summary, twenty-one state variables, each of which corresponds to one 
differential equation, are actually used in the developed simulation model.  They include 
the temperatures of the six nodes on the primary side, the temperatures of the six tube 
metal nodes, the temperatures of the two superheated steam nodes, the temperatures of 
the two secondary side sub-cooled nodes, the steam pressure, the saturated boiling length, 
the sub-cooled length, the steam flow rate, and the controller output.  Matlab/Simulink 
built-in algorithms are available for the solution to these coupled differential-algebraic 
equations.   
 
3.6 HCSG Transient Results 
 
A steady state analysis is performed using the developed dynamic model for full 
power operation.  A comparison with the heat balance results is shown in Table 3.1.  The 
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calculated lengths of the sub-cooled region, the saturated boiling region and the 
superheated region are 4.42 m, 22.36 m, and 5.22 m, respectively.  The calculated steam 
outlet temperature is 316.59 oC and the primary outlet fluid temperature is 291.98 oC.  
The calculated results are in good agreement with the heat balance results for all the 
measured variables.   
Figures 3.11 (a) and Figure 3.11 (b) show the open-loop responses of the cold leg 
temperature and the steam outlet temperature due to the hot leg temperature step increase 
of 1oC and the feed water flow rate 1% step increase, respectively.  During the hot leg 
temperature transient, the disturbance moves from the top to the bottom.  The steam 
pressure first increases as the steam temperature increases.  The increased steam pressure 
causes the saturated temperature in the saturated boiling region to increase.  When the 
disturbance of the hot leg temperature moves to the saturated boiling region and the sub-
cooled region, the saturated boiling length and the sub-cooled length will decrease.  As a 
result, the superheated length becomes longer and the steam temperature continues to 
increase.  The entire transient stops when the steam pressure goes back to its initial level 
due to the self-regulation of steam pressure when the steam temperature increases and the 
superheated steam length increases.  In the end, the steam outlet temperature increases, 
the cold leg temperature increases, and the saturated boiling length and the sub-cooled 
length decrease. 
During a feed water flow step increase transient, the disturbance moves from the 
bottom to the top.  When the feed water flow rate increases, the sub-cooled length will 
increase and the superheated steam length will decrease.  This decrease in the 
superheated steam length explains the initial decrease of the steam temperature.  As the 
disturbance moves to the saturated boiling region, the saturated boiling length will also 
increase and result in further decrease in the superheated steam length, which will lead to 
additional decrease in the steam temperature and increase in the steam pressure.  The 
entire transient stops when the steam pressure stabilizes at a higher level to maintain the 
balance between the steam flow rate and the feed water flow rate.  The transient ends up 
with a deceased steam temperature, a decreased cold leg temperature, an increased 
saturated boiling length, and an increased sub-cooled length. 
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Figure 3.11 (a).  Steam temperature open-loop responses due to feed water flow and hot 
leg temperature transients. 
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Figure 3.11 (b).  Cold leg temperature open loop responses due to feed water flow and 
hot leg temperature transients. 
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Figures 3.12 (a) and Figure 3.12 (b) show the closed-loop responses of the cold 
leg temperature and the steam outlet temperature due to the hot leg temperature step 
increase of 1oC and the feed water flow rate 1% step increase, respectively.  As compared 
with the open loop responses, the response time has been significantly reduced after the 
steam pressure has been controlled because the HCSG steam pressure is sensitive to the 
system disturbances. 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
A steady state model has been developed for the IRIS helical coil steam generator 
to prepare the initialization parameters for the dynamic model and investigate the 
proposed method of tube inside level detection based on the shell side fluid temperature 
profile.  This model is based on a straight channel analysis with the helical features 
represented implicitly by some correction factors with respect to friction factors and heat 
transfer coefficients.  Different empirical correlations associated with the sub-cooled 
region, the saturated region and the superheated region are used to characterize the 
axially different pressure loss and heat transfer.  The calculated primary outlet 
temperature and the steam outlet temperature are within 0.5% error of the results obtained 
from a more sophisticated code RELAP.  The calculated primary coolant temperature 
profile has also demonstrated that a clear breakpoint exists when the saturated boiling 
heat transfer transits to the superheated heat transfer.  This breakpoint determined from 
the primary fluid temperature measurements can be used to indicate the steam generator 
tube inside water level.   
A dynamic model has also been developed to study the dynamic responses of the 
IRIS helical coil steam generator systems and generate data to study the subspace 
identification technique in Chapter 6.  The developed dynamic model is a nodal model 
based on conservation laws of mass, momentum, and energy.  The steady state 
performance and the typical results of transient analysis have demonstrated that the 
developed dynamic model is able to characterize the dynamic behavior of the HCSG 
system with reasonably good accuracy.  The developed dynamic model can be used to 
study the control and fault diagnosis of IRIS HCSG system. 
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Figure 3.12 (a).  Steam temperature closed-loop responses due to feed water flow and hot 
leg temperature transients. 
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Figure 3.12 (b).  Cold leg temperature closed-loop responses due to feed water flow and 
hot leg temperature transients. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Sensor Placement Design 
 
In this dissertation, performance monitoring is defined as a task to estimate 
performance related parameters using available measurements with measurement noise 
removed for individual components in nuclear power plants.  Fault diagnosis is defined as 
a task to detect and isolate a fault of sensors, actuators, controllers, and equipment.   
Sensor placement is an important issue for both control and design of a 
performance monitoring and fault diagnosis system for nuclear power plants.  Without 
appropriate sensor placement, process performance monitoring and fault diagnosis would 
become very limited in its correctness and reliability.  In order to detect a process fault 
and locate its root cause, sensors must be placed such that the fault effects can be 
observed and the observed symptoms should exhibit different patterns for different faults.  
When process performance is to be monitored, the performance related parameters must 
be inferable from available measurements.  If analytical redundancy is used to monitor 
critical measurements for better process supervision, sensor placement must ensure that 
these critical measured variables can be determined with adequate precision from 
functional relationships. 
The role of sensor placement in performance monitoring and fault diagnosis has 
not been appreciated in nuclear power plant design.  Part of the reason is attributed to the 
lack of communication between research and engineering design.  The engineers in 
industry did not fully understand what analytical redundancy could do for performance 
monitoring and fault diagnosis.  The researchers did not pay enough attention to the full 
picture of performance monitoring and fault diagnosis to achieve the required 
engineering objectives.  However, to design an efficient performance monitoring and 
fault diagnosis system for nuclear power systems, sensor placement is indeed an issue 
that must be addressed in the design phase. 
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Figure 4.1.  Procedure of sensor placement design for fault diagnosis.  
 
A systematic design approach to sensor placement for fault diagnosis is developed 
in this dissertation.  Figure 4.1 shows the procedure of this approach.  After the objective 
of process performance monitoring and fault diagnosis is defined, the cause-effect 
relationships among the involved variables are first studied using causal graph theory to 
determine the minimum set of sensors such that the considered process faults, which are 
represented by some deviation from certain reference values, can be detected and 
isolated.  The reference values are usually calculated by a reliable simulation model using 
the related reference inputs for a given operation condition.   
To determine the deviation from the reference values for reliable process fault 
diagnosis, it is required that the measured variables should have no instrument faults 
associated with them.  Fortunately, because most process faults do not lead to the 
violation of mass balance and energy balance equations, these balance equations can 
actually be used for instrument monitoring without the interference of process faults.  If 
sensor fault diagnosis is based on mass balance and energy balance equations, which is 
assumed in this dissertation, the second step of sensor placement design is to ensure the 
estimatability of the measured variables by performing redundancy and observability 
analysis.   
However, even if a variable can be estimated using balance equations, it is still 
likely that the estimated value may not have enough precision for reliable instrument 
monitoring as well as performance parameter estimation.  It is observed that a measured 
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variable can be validated efficiently only if the related variable is sensitive in the 
corresponding balance equations.  Therefore, it is necessary to perform a sensitivity study 
for efficient sensor fault diagnosis, which is the last step of sensor placement design 
shown in Figure 4.1.  In this dissertation, data reconciliation is introduced as a 
generalized approach to study the sensitivity of a variable in balance equations for sensor 
placement design.   
 
4.1 Guidelines for Sensor Placement 
 
In instrumentation and control system design, the purpose of sensor placement is 
to select appropriate variables to achieve the defined operation requirements.  
Specifically, sensor placement design needs to consider process control, operation 
performance monitoring, and fault diagnosis.  Among the three objectives, only the 
sensor placement design for control is well studied, and very little research is reported for 
performance monitoring and fault diagnosis. 
 
4.1.1 Sensor Placement for Control 
 
The sensor placement for process control is to determine the controlled variables 
and the manipulated variables to achieve the designed control objectives.  In most control 
practices, it is necessary to place sensors to measure the controlled variables and the 
manipulated variables.  However, in some cases, it is also necessary to measure 
additional process variables for tuning controllers and monitoring control loop 
performance. 
The selection of controlled variables is mainly concerned with the process 
requirements.  The general guideline is that the controlled variables should include: (1) 
not self-regulating variables, (2) environment and equipment safety critical variables, (3) 
process performance critical variables, (4) the variables that have strong interactions with 
other control variables, and (5) the variables with favorable static and dynamic 
characteristics (Bagajewicz, 2001). 
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The selection of manipulated variables should ensure that the controlled variables 
be controlled in a satisfactory manner.  The steady state gain between the manipulated 
variables and the controlled variables should be as large as possible and the dynamic 
response of the controlled variables should be as timely as possible. 
The selection of additional measurements is mainly focused on supervising 
operation conditions.  The plant operation conditions are usually defined by a set of state 
variables.  If possible, a direct measurement of these state variables is desired.  If not 
possible, these states also need to be estimated accurately based on functional 
relationships.  In either case, these measurements must be a sensitive function of the plant 
operation conditions. 
 
4.1.2 Sensor Placement for Performance Monitoring and Fault 
Diagnosis 
 
The sensor placement design for performance monitoring is to select appropriate 
variables such that the operation performance parameters can be determined using 
functional relationships.  If the functional relationships of a system are given, the 
selection of variables is to search the best set of measurements such that the performance 
parameters can be inferred most accurately and precisely.   
To select variables for fault diagnosis, it is necessary to distinguish between 
process faults and sensor faults.  A process fault is defined as a deviation from the 
expected normal operation conditions.  One type of process faults is related to the 
deviation of a single process variable from its reference value, one example of which is 
flow abnormality.  For this kind of process faults where mass balance and thermal 
balance equations will not be violated, the selection of variables to detect and evaluate 
theses faults is to ensure that the related variables can be accurately estimated based on 
the given balance equations.   
The second type of process faults is related to the deviation of multiple process 
variables from some reference values.  Inappropriate setting of some process variables for 
a given operation condition is such an example.  In this case, fault symptoms are 
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manifested by abnormal deviation of multiple process variables from the reference values 
for this operation condition.  The selection of variables to detect and distinguish such 
process faults is to ensure the observability of these process variables through adequate 
sensor placement.   
A sensor fault corresponds to malfunction of an instrument either due to a 
transducer problem or due to an electrical circuit problem.  For sensor faults, mass 
balance and thermal balance equations will be violated due to the incorrect measurements 
if the related variables appear in these equations.  The selection of variables to detect and 
rectify sensor faults depends on the functional redundancy and the sensitivity of the 
measured variables in the balance equations.   
It is common that a technical process involves many degrees of redundancy for 
one variable because process variables are related to each other through balance 
equations due to the network architecture of components in a large thermal-fluid system.  
In order to take advantage of this, sensor fault diagnosis should usually be performed 
using plant-wide balance equations.  After the measured variables are validated, process 
fault diagnosis can then be performed using component based simulation models.  The 
component based simulation models, in general, constrain additional degrees of freedom 
due to the limitation on operation states as compared with the balance equations where 
each component is treated as a unit.  To detect and distinguish process faults, component 
based simulation models should be able to determine the reference values of the selected 
variables for process fault detection and isolation. 
Because simulation models always have uncertainty and process parameters are 
always varying throughout the lifetime of a component, component based simulation 
models must be tuned on a regular basis such that the models used for process fault 
diagnosis and performance evaluation can represent the most current operation 
conditions. 
 
4.2 Sensor Placement Design for Process Fault Diagnosis 
 
Directed Graph (DG) based approach was developed in this dissertation to 
determine the sensor placement requirements for process fault diagnosis.  In this 
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approach, directed graph is used to describe the propagation of fault effects and cause-
effect analysis is performed using graph theory to design sensor placement.    
 
4.2.1 Graph Representation of a Process 
 
Signed Directed Graph (SDG) and Directed graph (DG) are two most popular 
graph methods to represent the cause effect relationships among plant variables (Kramer 
and Palowitch, 1987).   
 
4.2.1.1 Sign Directed Graph 
 
In SDG, process variables are represented by individual nodes and the causal 
relationships between the nodes are represented by signed directed arcs.  The states of 
process variables can take qualitative values such as nominal, high or low.  For a 
measured variable, its values can be determined by a comparison with its reference value 
obtained from a simulation model.  A directed arc can take positive or negative sign, 
which corresponds to positive or negative influence, respectively.  A root node in sign 
directed graph is connected with at least one effect node but is not connected to any 
causal nodes.  The fault symptoms of a process fault are characterized by a set of nodes 
that take abnormal values.   
Causal analysis may be ambiguous for SDG representation in several situations 
(Wang and Song, 2002).  If multiple paths from node A to node B exist, the product of 
the arcs along the paths from node A to node B may give different sign products for 
different paths.  For this reason, the directional effects of a change in node A to node B 
may be ambiguous.  If this happens, additional quantitative information is needed to infer 
the directional effect of a fault at node A on node B.   
Another ambiguity may arise for negative feedback control loops (Bhushan and 
Rengaswamy, 2000).  A simple feedback control loop, which is shown in Figure 4.2, 
consists  of a  node  CV  representing the controlled variable, a node  M  representing  the  
 86
 
 
Figure 4.2.  SDG graph of a simple feedback control loop. 
 
measured variable, a node C representing the controller, a node V representing the 
actuation mechanism, and a node W representing the regulated variable.  When a 
disturbance at node F enters the control loop, the disturbance gets into the control loop 
propagating the disturbance to the node controller (C) via the node M.  The resulting 
change in actuation mechanism (V) regulates the variable W.  The node W will have a 
negative feedback effect on and compensate for the disturbance on the node CV.  After a 
new steady state condition is reached, the node CV and the node M will become normal.  
However, the node C, the node V, and the node W will remain at the values, which are 
different from the normal, that have caused CV back to the normal value.   
This analysis shows that the arc from the node M to the node C is not causal.  In 
other words, even if node C (controller) is abnormal, it does not necessarily indicate that 
its preceding node M (measurement of controlled variable) is abnormal.  Therefore, 
owing to the noncausal connection, an abnormal node M may or may not cause an 
abnormal node C. 
The U Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) water level control system in PWR is 
shown as another example to illustrate the ambiguity caused by a feedback control loop.  
This system has a three-element controller to control the water level in the steam 
generator as is shown in Figure 4.3.  The three elements are steam flow, feed water flow, 
and steam generator water level.     The  reference  water  level  is  a  function  of  turbine  
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Figure 4.3.  UTSG water level control system.  
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load and steam dump rate through steam dump valves.  The SG level error signal is the 
reference level minus the measured level.  The flow mismatch error is the fractional 
steam flow rate minus the fractional feed water flow rate.  The combination of the SG 
level error and the flow mismatch error is used as the input to the controller.  The 
controller output is used to manipulate the feed water control valve position.  Because the 
main control purpose of the SG level control system is to control the SG water level, the 
level error has been multiplied by a gain in order to dominate the flow mismatch error 
signal.   
Figure 4.4 shows the SDG for the steam generator system.  The node F is a sensor 
fault that affects the indicated steam generator water level (L_ind).  When the node F is 
abnormal, the disturbance gets into the control loop transmitting the disturbance to the 
node controller (Ctr).  The resulting change in feed water control valve position (FCV) 
regulates the feed water flow rate Wf.  The feed water flow rate change will have a 
negative feedback effect on the true steam generator water level (L_CV) and will 
compensate for the disturbance on the indicated steam generator level (L_ind).   
Once a new steady state is reached, the steam flow rate and the feed water flow 
rate must be equal and the indicated steam generator level is equal to the reference steam 
generator level.  If we notice that the steam generator pressure will not have a significant 
change for an incipient steam generator level sensor fault, the indicated SG level, the 
controller output Ctr, the feed water control valve position FCV, and the feed water flow 
rate Wf will all go back to their normal values at steady state conditions.  However, the 
fault effects can be seen in the node L_CV.   
From this analysis, it is found that the arc from the node L_CV to the node L_ind 
is not causal.  Although the node L_CV is abnormal, the node L_ind can be normal after 
a sensor fault of the SG level measurement occurs.  In other words, owing to the 
noncausal connection, an abnormal node L_CV may or may not cause an abnormal node 
L_ind. 
In fact, in order to observe a SG level sensor fault, it is mandatory to place an 
additional sensor that can observe the change of the true SG level. 
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Figure 4.4.  SDG graph of nuclear UTSG system. 
 
4.2.1.2 Directed Graph 
 
Although SDG provides more information about the studied process in terms of 
the cause effect relationships among variables than Directed Graph, Directed Graph is 
more convenient for sensor placement design.  In reality, it is sufficient to know which 
variable is associated with a process fault and whether the process variable is high or low 
does not provide significant information for fault diagnosis.  Therefore, DG graph 
approach is investigated in this dissertation for sensor placement design. 
The fundamental difference between a SDG graph and a DG graph is that the 
causal relationships represented by them are different.  The arcs in DG graph represent a 
sufficient cause effect relationship.  An arc from node A to node B in a DG graph means 
that an abnormal node A is a sufficient condition to cause an abnormal node B for all the 
considered operation conditions.  On the other hand, an arc from node A to node B in 
SDG graph only represents that an abnormal node A may or may not cause an abnormal 
node B.  For example, in the SDG given in Figure 4.4, node L_CV may be abnormal but 
node L_ind may still be normal if a sensor fault occurs to the node L_ind.  
DG graph can be obtained by a simple reduction of the corresponding SDG graph.  
The SDG graph may consist of noncausal paths and cycles.  When it is reduced to DG 
graph, the noncausal paths and the cycles must be removed and the directional sign of the 
SDG graph is simply ignored. 
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4.2.2 Sensor Placement for Process Fault Detection 
 
The sensor placement for process fault detection needs to locate the minimum set 
of sensors such that all the considered process faults can be observed.  This is equivalent 
to choosing a minimum set of nodes in DG graph such that all of them have connections 
with the root nodes to represent the process faults.  If cyclic nodes are collapsed into 
supernodes in DG graph, the problem can be simplified as finding the minimum subset of 
sensors such that there is at least one directed path from all the root nodes.   
Although a simple enumeration can be made for a small system, a systematic 
approach needs to be used for a large system.  In this approach, the first step is to build a 
“bipartite” graph, which consists of a causal set including all the root nodes and an 
observability set including all the nodes with only input arcs in the DG.  In fact, it can be 
proved that the observability set obtained in this manner contains the key variables that 
are sufficient to observe all the process faults represented by the root nodes in the 
DG.After a bipartite graph is obtained from the DG, a subset of the key variables can be 
chosen from the observability set as the minimum sensor requirements for process fault 
detection based on the Greedy search algorithm developed by Raghuraj et al., 1999.  This 
algorithm is summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Construct a bipartite graph between the root nodes and the key variables in the 
observability set. 
(2) Select one variable among the unmarked key variables that has the largest number of 
input arcs. 
(3) Mark the selected key variable in step (2) and store it in C. 
(4) Find out all the root nodes covered by C (a root node is covered by C if it has at least 
one arc connections with the elements in C). 
(5) If there exist uncovered root nodes,  
delete all the arcs from the root nodes determined in Step (4), 
go to step (2). 
else 
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output the set C and stop. 
(6) end. 
 
If there are no redundant key variables in the observability set, the basic Greedy 
search algorithm is able to determine the minimum set of sensors for fault detection.  
However, after a variable has been selected, the subsequently selected variables may also 
cover the same root nodes that have already been covered by the previously selected 
variables.  In this case, the selected sensors using the basic Greedy search algorithm will 
contain redundancy for fault observation and thus are not the minimum result.  In order to 
remove the redundant key variables, the location of the minimum set of sensors can be 
performed using the improved algorithm developed by Raghuraj et al., 1999.  The 
improved algorithm is summarized as follows: 
(1) Initiate C and G as empty sets. 
(2) Construct a bipartite graph between the root nodes and the key variables in the fault 
observability set. 
(3) Select a variable among the unmarked key variables based on the largest number of 
incident arcs.   
(4) Mark the selected key variable in step (2) and store it in C. 
(5) Find out all the root nodes covered by C. 
(6) If there exist uncovered root nodes,  
delete all the arcs from the root nodes covered by the selected variable to all the 
previously marked key variables, 
store in a buffer set G all the arcs from the root nodes covered by the selected variable to 
the unmarked key variables . 
go to step (3). 
else 
remove the variables from C that do not have arcs incident on them based on the arcs 
stored in G. 
output the set C and stop. 
(7) end. 
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The number of incident arcs used in Step (3) is defined as the difference between 
the actual number of arcs incident on a key variable and the number of arcs incident on 
the same key variable that have been stored in the buffer set G.  After the algorithm is 
completed, the same set of key variables can be obtained in C as is obtained from the 
Greedy search algorithm.  However, the redundant key variables will be stored by 
tracking the arcs stored in the buffer set G that do not have a connection with the marked 
key variables.  To determine the minimum set of sensors, the redundant key variables 
must be removed from the obtained key variables stored in C. 
 
Example:  Consider a simple example with the bipartite graph shown in Figure 4.5 to 
illustrate the Greedy search algorithm to determine the minimum set of sensors for 
process fault detection (Adapted from Raghuraj et al., 1999).  In this example, there are 
six root nodes, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6 and there are four variables M1, M2, M3, and 
M4 in the observability set.  
Based on the basic Greedy search algorithm, M1 will be selected as the first 
marked variable for the first iteration because it has the largest number of incident arcs, 
which is three in this case.  For the following three interactions, M2, M3, and M4 will be 
sequentially selected as the marked variables.  In the end, the entire observability set 
including M1, M2, M3, and M4 will be selected to observe the six root nodes.  
Obviously, a simple examination of the bipartite graph shows that the minimum set of 
variables to observe all the root nodes is M2, M3, and M4.  The reason why the basic 
greedy search algorithm fails is that the key variables in the observability set have 
redundant information. 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
M1 M2 M3
R6
M4
 
 
Figure 4.5.  An illustration of the improved Greedy search algorithm. 
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According to the improved Greedy search algorithm, for the first iteration, M1 
will also be selected as the first marked variable and stored in set C because it has the 
largest number of incident arcs, which is three in this case.  Meanwhile, the arcs from R1 
to M2, R2 to M3, and R3 to M4 will be stored in set G because R1, R2, and R3 are 
covered by the selected variable M1 and the variables M2, M3, and M4 still have not 
been marked yet at this stage.  After the following four iterations, the entire observability 
set, including M1, M2, M3, and M4, will be stored in set C and set G will contain the arcs 
from R1 to M2, R2 to M3, and R3 to M4.  As a result, M1 is a marked variable in set C 
that does not have an arc stored in set G incident on it.  Therefore, M1 should be removed 
from the set G and the minimum set of variables to observe all the root nodes only 
contain M2, M3, and M4.  This result is in agreement with the simple examination of the 
bipartite graph. 
 
4.2.2 Sensor Placement for Process Fault Isolation 
 
The objective of locating sensors for process fault isolation is to determine a set of 
variables in the corresponding DG graph that can distinguish the effects of all the process 
faults.  For a set of root nodes, let iA  denote the set of nodes connected to the ith root 
node.  The optimal set of sensors C  should be a minimum subset of the set ii AO ∪=  
such that the subset iC  of C  that are connected to the ith root node is different from the 
subset jC  of C  that are connected to the jth root node for any one pair of root nodes.  In 
addition, the optimal set should still ensure the fault observability. 
A bipartite graph also needs to be built before a graph theory based algorithm can 
be used for sensor placement design for process fault isolation.  The causal set of this 
bipartite graph includes a set of pseudonodes ijB , each of which denotes a pair of root 
nodes i and j to be distinguished.  The corresponding observability set includes the key 
variables that can distinguish each pair of the process faults represented by the 
pseudonodes. 
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The minimum set of sensors for process fault isolation can also be determined 
using the algorithm developed by Raghuraj et al., 1999.  This algorithm is summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Determine the set of key variables consisting of the different members of iA  and jA  
that covers the pseudonode ijB , which denotes the resolution of the root nodes i and the 
root node j 
(2) Construct a bipartite graph between the set of pseudonodes and their observability set. 
(3) The individual root nodes are added to the causal set of the constructed bipartite 
graph. 
(4) Apply the algorithm in Section 4.2.1 to determine the minimum set of variables that 
can cover all the root nodes and the pseudonodes. 
The selected variables based on this algorithm can ensure that the specified 
process faults can be detected and distinguished. 
 
4.3 Redundancy and Observability Analysis 
 
Process fault diagnosis is reliable only if the related measurements do not have 
instrument faults, so an integrated fault diagnosis system must also address sensor 
placement design for sensor fault diagnosis. 
If sensor faults are diagnosed based on analytical redundancy, no matter what 
specific diagnostic methods are used, a malfunctioning sensor can be detected, identified, 
and rectified only if the related variable can be estimated using functional relationships.  
Therefore, in sensor placement design for sensor fault diagnosis, it is necessary to 
analyze the redundancy and observability of variables in the functional relationships. 
For nuclear power systems, the most commonly used functional relationships are 
steady state conservation equations, which are considered as the basis for sensor 
placement design for sensor fault diagnosis in this dissertation.  The basic steady state 
conservation equations include mass balance, energy balance, and momentum balance, 
which are given as follows: 
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where  
inG  = the inflow mass flow rate. 
outG  = the outflow mass flow rate. 
inh  = the specific enthalpy of the inflow fluid. 
outh  = the the specific enthalpy of the outflow fluid. 
inP  = the inlet pressure. 
outP  = the outlet pressure. 
1∆ , 2∆  = the correction terms for heat loss and additional pressure loss. 
a  = a factor dependent on geometry and fluid condition.   
ρ  = the fluid density. 
g  = the gravity acceleration. 
z  = the vertical difference between the inlet and the outlet. 
 
In the design phase, the correction terms can be ignored.  During plant operation, 
the correction terms and the coefficient terms can be determined using standard 
regression methods based on available operation data. 
For a nuclear power plant, the sensor configuration becomes a sensor network 
with the measured variables coupled by functional relationships given in Equation (4.1).  
Among a given set of sensors, these equations will provide information about whether a 
sensor is deemed redundant from analytical redundancy point of view and whether an 
unmeasured variable is observable from the available sensors. 
In this section, the redundancy and observability analysis for sensor placement 
design is presented as a variable classification problem.  Although sensor placement 
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design is method dependent, variable classification gives a theoretical solution to the 
design.  
 
4.3.1 Variable Classification for Linear Systems 
 
For linear systems, sophisticated methods exist to classify unmeasured variables 
as observable and unobservable, and classify measured variables as redundant and non-
redundant.  An easy implementation algorithm is orthogonal transformation based on Q-
R decomposition (Sanchez and Romagnoli, 1996).  
For steady state conditions, a linear system equation representing functional 
relationships is given as follows: 
 
cBuAx =+           (4.2) 
where 
x  = the set of measured variables. 
u  = the set of unmeasured variables. 
A, B, c= the compatible matrices and vector. 
 
In order to decouple the measured variables x  from the unmeasured variables u  
in Equation (4.2), Q-R decomposition can be performed on the matrix B , which is given 
by: 
 
uuu RQBE =           (4.3) 
 
where 
uE = a column permutation matrix on B  and Ι=Tuu EE . 
 
[ ]21 uuu QQQ =          (4.4) 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= 00 21 uuu
RRR          (4.5) 
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where 1uR  is a square and non-singular upper triangular matrix of the same dimension as 
the rank of B . 
Because the matrix uQ  is orthonormal, if Equation (4.2) is left multiplied by 
T
uQ , 
we have: 
 
[ ] cQuERRAxQ TuTuuuTu 1211 =+        (4.6) 
cQAxQ Tu
T
u 22 =          (4.7) 
 
Because 1uR  is a nonsingular matrix with its rank ur  equal to the rank of matrix 
B , the first ur  unmeasured variables ruu  with the row permutation 
T
uE  acted on the 
original column vector can be determined by: 
 
)( 211
1
1 runu
T
u
T
uuru uRAxQcQRu −
− −−=       (4.8) 
 
where  
n  = the number of unmeasured variables.   
 
Equation (4.8) indicates that the set of unmeasured variables in runu −  are 
unobservable.  The unmeasured variables are all observable only if nru =  when the last 
term disappears in the equation.  In addition, if a variable in the set ruu  is observable, the 
corresponding row of matrix 2
1
1 uuIU RRR
−=  must be equal to zero. 
Equation (4.7) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
bGx =           (4.9) 
 
where 
AQG Tu 2=           (4.10) 
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cQb Tu 2=           (4.11) 
 
Equation (4.9) implies that a measured variable is not redundant if the 
corresponding columns of the matrix G  are all zeros.  This is because such variables will 
not participate in the derived balance equations.   
A simple example is shown here to illustrate how Q-R decomposition is used for 
variable classification of a linear system.  Given a system, shown in Figure 4.6 (adapted 
from Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000), three constraint equations of mass balance are 
defined as follows: 
 
G1+G2-G3=0 
G3-G2-G4=0 
G4+G5-G6=0 
 
where  
G1, G4, G5 = measured flow rates. 
G2, G3, G6 = unmeasured mass flow rates. 
 
Step 1: Let us represent the balance equations in two terms corresponding to the 
measured and the unmeasured variables respectively.  For the case problem, the two 
matrices are as follows: 
 
5
1
3 4 6
2
Measured flow rate
Unmeasured flow rate
 
Figure 4.6. Example system for variable classification. 
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⎛ −=
110
010
001
A     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−=
100
011
011
B  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
5
4
1
G
G
G
x      ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛=
6
3
2
G
G
G
u  
 
Step 2: Perform a Q-R decomposition, which gives the related matrices as follows: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
0.10
07071.0
07071.0
1uQ    ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
0
7071.0
7071.0
2uQ  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= 0.10 04142.11uR    ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 04142.12uR  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
010
100
001
E  
 
Then the unmeasured variables can be partitioned into the first subset ruu  and the 
second subset runu −  based on the following permutation: 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 62GGuru      ( )3Gu run =−  
 
Therefore, G3 is definitely unobservable because it cannot be estimated from the 
available measurements.   
 
Step 3: Determine the redundant relationship among the measured variables, which is as 
follows: 
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Therefore, we can conclude that both the measurements G1 and G4 are redundant 
and G5 is nonredundant based on the coefficient matrix. 
 
Step 4: Determine which unmeasured variables in the subset ruu  are observable based on 
the matrix IUR . 
If we calculate 2
1
1 uuIU RRR
−= , the result is as follows: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= 01IUR  
Because the second row of IUR  is zero while the first row is non-zero, we 
conclude that 2G  is unobservable and 6G  is observable. 
In conclusion, the observability analysis shows that G2 and G3 are unobservable 
and G6 is observable and the redundancy analysis shows that G1 and G4 are redundant 
and G5 is non-redundant.  If Figure 4.6 is examined, the results indeed have meaningful 
physical interpretation. 
 
4.3.2 Variable Classification for Bilinear Systems 
 
Although nonlinear balance equations can be linearized around some operation 
points, the variable classification algorithm for linear systems may give incorrect results 
of observability and redundancy analysis.  If we notice that thermal conservation 
equations are essentially bilinear because the temperature variable and the flow variable 
appear in terms of products, it is useful to extend the QR algorithm to deal with bilinear 
systems for variable classification. 
In the bilinear variable classification algorithm developed by Sanchez, 1996, the 
first step is to classify the pair of variables (F, T) into three categories of energy flow 
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based on which component is measured, where F represents flow rate and T represents 
temperature.   
 
Category I: both the temperature and the flow rate are measured.   
Category II: the temperature is measured but the flow rate is not measured.   
Category III: the temperature is not measured.   
 
After the energy flow rate is categorized, the heat balance equations can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 
0321 =++ νBVdBfB         (4.12) 
 
where  
f  = the enthalpy flow rate of category I. 
d  = the specific enthalpy of category II enthalpy flow. 
ν  = the enthalpy flow rate of category III. 
V  = the unmeasured mass flow rate of category II enthalpy flow. 
 
Since the specific enthalpy of category II enthalpy flow can be calculated from 
the measured temperature, it can be decomposed into two components as follows: 
 
ddd ~ˆ +=           (4.13) 
 
where 
dˆ  = the specific enthalpy consistent with the measured temperature. 
d~  = the correction term of the specific enthalpy, which is to be determined such that the 
energy balance equations will be satisfied. 
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Let’s introduce a new variable dV~=θ , which corresponds to the correction term 
of enthalpy flow rate, and then we have: 
 
dVBBVdB ˆ222 += θ         (4.14) 
 
If we separate the mass flow rate into the measured part MF  and the unmeasured 
part UF , the heat balance equation given by Equation (4.12) can be further rewritten as 
follows: 
[ ] 00 3521 =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
ν
θ
U
M
F
f
F
BBBB        (4.15a) 
where 
dBB ˆ25 =  
 
At this step, Equation (4.15a) can now be rewritten through adjusting the related 
matrices to incorporate the mass balance equations and is given by: 
 
[ ] 03521 =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
ν
θ
U
M
F
f
F
BBBBO        (4.15b) 
where the matrices O  and 5B  have been adjusted to include mass balance equations and 
the matrices 1B , 2B  and 3B  have been modified accordingly by adding appropriate 
zeros. 
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For a set of mass flow rate and temperature measurements, i.e., MF , f , and dˆ  
are known, Equation (4.15b) indicates that the measurements can be adjusted through 
appropriate correction terms 
MF
δ , fδ , and θ  such that the specified mass balance and 
heat balance equations are strictly satisfied.  The correction terms satisfy the following 
equation: 
 
[ ] [ ] e
f
FBOF
t
BBB MU =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
ˆ
ˆ
13511 ν
     (4.16) 
where  
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
θ
δ
δ
f
FM
t      ( )2111 BBOB =  
 
The second step of bilinear variable classification is to eliminate the unmeasured 
variables in Equation (4.16).  This can be done by a successive QR decomposition on the 
matrix 5B  and 3B , which results in the following equations: 
 
eQFBQtBQ TBU
T
B
T
B 2,352,3112,3 =+        (4.17) 
 
where 
032,3 =BQTB  
 
Let 52,3 BQD
T
B= , and a QR decomposition can be further performed for the 
matrix D , which gives the following equation: 
 
[ ] eQFFRRQQtBQ TBUUDDDDTB 2,3212,1,2,1,112,3 00 =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡+     (4.18a) 
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eQQtBQQ TB
T
D
T
B
T
D 2,32,112,32, =         (4.18b) 
 
where 
02, =DQTD  
 
All the unmeasured variables have been eliminated in Equation (4.18b) using two 
successive QR decompositions.  Let 112,32, BQQG
T
B
T
D= , the zero columns of G  
correspond to the variables that cannot be estimated from the other measured variables 
and the nonzero columns of G  correspond to the variables that can be estimated from the 
other measured variables.  At this stage, the redundancy analysis of mass flow rate MF  
has been completed. 
It can also be seen from Equation (4.18a) that the set of unmeasured mass flow 
rate 2UF  are not observable and the set of unmeasured mass flow rate 1UF  are observable 
if the corresponding rows of 2,
1
1, DDIF RRR
−=  are all zeros. 
The unmeasured mass flow rates UF  have now been partitioned into the 
observable set UoF  and the unobservable set UiF .  Given this knowledge, Equation (4.16) 
can be written as follows: 
 
[ ] eRRQQFBFBtB BBBBUiUiUoUo =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡+++ 212,31,32,31,32211 00 νν   (4.19) 
 
According to Equation (4.19), it can be stated that the set of unmeasured enthalpy 
flow 2ν  are not observable.  Moreover, the set of unmeasured enthalpy flow 1ν  are 
observable if the corresponding rows of 2,3
1
1,3 BBIV RRR
−=  are all zeros and if the 
corresponding rows of Ui
T
BBIF BQRR 21,3
1
1,32
−=  are all zeros. 
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The necessary condition that the temperature variables can be estimated is that the 
corresponding terms of ν  is observable and the corresponding mass flow rates are 
measured or observable.  If a temperature variable can be estimated and is measured, then 
this temperature variable is redundant.  If a temperature variable can be estimated and is 
not measured, then this unmeasured temperature variable is observable. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Sensor Placement 
 
Sensitivity analysis is discussed in this section for sensor placement design in 
terms of efficient sensor fault diagnosis.  In this dissertation, data reconciliation is 
proposed as a generalized approach to study the sensitivity of a variable in balance 
equations.  The presentation of this section includes a background description of data 
reconciliation, a mathematical formulation of data reconciliation, and how data 
reconciliation can be used for sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.4.1 Data Reconciliation 
 
Data reconciliation was originally developed to adjust process data such that the 
adjusted values strictly satisfy constraint equations.  Aside from other techniques such as 
neural networks, principal component analysis, and partial least square methods, data 
reconciliation is one of the major data processing methods for operation monitoring, 
performance analysis, maintenance planning, and fault diagnosis.  This technique was 
first proposed in the early 1960s, and since then has been successfully applied in 
chemical and petroleum industries.  However, it has hardly received any attentions in the 
nuclear industry until the 1990s.  The current research on the application of data 
reconciliation to nuclear power plants is carried out mainly in Europe.  It is reported by 
German researchers that data reconciliation is the best possible quality control 
mechanism for identifying serious measurement errors in nuclear power plants and a 
necessary data-preconditioning step for process monitoring, process optimization, and 
maintenance optimization (Grauf, Jansky, and Langenstein, 2000), (Svein and Øivind, 
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2003).  Two significant applications of data reconciliation to nuclear plant instrument 
monitoring are as follows: 
 
(a) Reactor coolant temperature monitoring 
 
Reactor coolant temperature is an important controlled variable in nuclear power 
systems.  Because reactor coolant temperature must not reach the designed maximum 
value, the incorrect indication of reactor coolant temperature may force the reactor to 
operate at a lower power level.  Therefore, if a reconciled reactor coolant temperature 
instead is used for plant power control, better operation performance may be achieved. 
 
(b) Feed water flow rate measurement 
 
Feed water mass flow rate is used to calculate reactor thermal power.  If the 
measured feed water flow rate suffers from instrument bias fault, the reactor will be 
forced to operate at a derated condition.  Therefore, if the reconciled feed water flow rate 
is used, the reactor thermal power output can be estimated based on the reconciled value 
and significant operation cost due to the feed water flow measurement fault can be saved. 
 
4.4.2 Basic Algorithm of Data Reconciliation 
 
For a given system, the variables involved in the constrained equations can be 
categorized as the measured variables x  with the covariance matrix of presumably 
Gaussian measurement error Ψ  and the unmeasured variables u .  The overall task of 
data reconciliation can be stated as a weighted least-squares estimation problem, which is 
given by: 
 
)()(min 1
),(
xyxy T
ux
−Ψ− −         (4.20) 
 
with the steady state mass balance and heat balance equations as follows: 
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0),( =uxϕ           (4.21) 
 
It is possible to solve the above minimization problem using nonlinear 
programming techniques such as sequential quadratic programming and reduced gradient 
methods.  Although these techniques are more general, they need a large amount of 
computation time and may obscure which variable can be derived from the others.  
Therefore, a successive linearization algorithm is used in this dissertation to solve the 
above problem. 
Successive linearization is based on the idea that the nonlinear constraints defined 
in Equation (4.21) can be successively linearized around their approximate operation 
points until these nonlinear constraints are satisfied with some specified tolerance 
(Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2002), (Pai and Fisher, 1998).  The algorithm can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Step 1.  Give an initial guess about the estimates ),( 00 ux  based on the measured value 
of y . 
 
Step 2.  Solve for an estimate ),( ** ii ux  by minimizing the objective function defined in 
Equation (4.20) with the constraint equations linearized around the estimates ),( ii ux , 
which is given by: 
 
cBuAx =+           (4.22) 
 
where 
 
),(| ii uxx
A ∂
∂= ϕ  
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),(| ii uxu
B ∂
∂= ϕ  
),( iiii uxBuAxc ϕ−+=  
 
The solution to the minimization problem with the objective function given in 
Equation (4.20) and the constraint equations given in Equation (4.22) can be obtained by 
performing QR decomposition on the matrix B. 
 
)()( 1* bGxGGGxx i
TT
ii −ΨΨ−= −       (4.23a) 
)( *11
1
1
*
i
T
u
T
uui AxQcQRu −= −         (4.23b) 
 
where G , b , 1uQ , and 1uR  are the related matrices defined in Equation (4.10), Equation 
(4.11), Equation (4.4), and Equation (4.5), respectively. 
 
Step 3.  Update the estimates ),( 11 ++ ii ux  by minimizing the constraint error.  This can be 
accomplished by searching for a constant t  between 0 and 1 such that  
 
)( *1 iiii xxtxx −+=+         (4.24) 
and 
),( 11 ++ ii uxϕ  is minimal. 
 
Step 4.  If the estimation is convergent and the nonlinear constraint equations are 
satisfied, then stop.  Otherwise, go to Step 2. 
 
Although the above algorithm is simple, it has provided a general solution to the 
reconciliation of measured data such that the specified constraint equations, in linear or 
nonlinear form, are strictly satisfied. 
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4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis Procedure 
 
In the design phase, plant-scale balance equations can be developed to reveal the 
functional relationships among variables.  Through investigating the observability and 
redundancy of variables in the balance equations, the variable classification algorithm 
presented in section 4.4.2 provides a theoretical solution to sensor placement design for 
sensor fault diagnosis.   
However, sensitivity analysis must also be studied to ensure the diagnostic 
performance during sensor placement design.  Analytical redundancy based fault 
diagnosis uses equation error for fault detection and isolation.  For a given functional 
relationship, some of the related variables may be more sensitive to generate equation 
errors than the other variables.  An incipient sensor fault can be detected only if the 
related variable is sensitive in the functional relationships (constraint equations). 
In this dissertation, sensitivity analysis is transformed to a precision design 
problem and is solved using data reconciliation.  If a variable is sensitive in the functional 
relationships, it is expected that data reconciliation algorithm will lead to an estimation 
with good precision after data reconciliation is performed.  Figure 4.7 shows a schematic 
of the proposed procedure of sensitivity analysis.  
At steady state conditions, the constraint equations that the measured variables y  
should satisfy may be given by: 
 
0),( =uyϕ           (4.25) 
 
where u  is the unmeasured variables. 
The nominal values of measured variables *y  can be determined easily from 
balance equations.  In order to study the sensitivities of the involved variables, a 
perturbation such as a Gaussian noise vector ε  is artificially added to the nominal values, 
which is given by: 
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Figure 4.7.  Sensitivity analysis using data reconciliation. 
 
ε+= *yy           (4.26a) 
)cov(ε=Ψ           (4.26b) 
 
where y  is a perturbed vector, *y  is the nominal values, and Ψ  is the covariance 
matrix of the additive perturbation. 
 
To evaluate the sensitivity of a variable due to the constraint equations, the 
measured variables are estimated by solving an optimization problem formulated as 
follows: 
 
)ˆ()ˆ(min 1
)ˆ,ˆ(
yyyy T
ux
−Ψ− −         (4.27) 
s.t. 
0)ˆ,ˆ( =uyϕ  
where 
yˆ  = the estimated value. 
The sensitivity of a variable iy  in the constraint equations can be quantified by a 
d-factor defined in this dissertation, which is given by: 
 
)var(
)ˆvar(1 *
*
ii
ii
i yy
yyd −
−−=         (4.28) 
Evidently, a large value of the d-factor given in Equation (4.28) means that the 
variable is sensitive in the constraint equations.  In order to detect a slight fault, the d-
 111
factor must be greater than some critical value.  For instance, the d-factor of a variable 
would become zero if it does not participate in the constraint equations.   
The optimization problem defined above is a standard data reconciliation 
problem.  Successive linearization algorithm or standard nonlinear programming 
techniques may be used to obtain solutions in general cases.   
It should be mentioned that the proposed strategy for sensitivity analysis is not 
dependent on whether the system is linear or nonlinear.  For nonlinear system, the 
calculated d-factor varies at different operation points, a worst case design may be 
necessary after the d-factor is calculated for all the anticipated operation conditions. 
 
4.5 Gross Error Detection and Identification 
 
To determine performance parameters accurately or perform process fault 
diagnosis, the measured variables must have sufficiently high precision.  Data 
reconciliation provides a means to improve the precision of measured variables based on 
analytical redundancy by adjusting the measurements such that the balance equations are 
strictly satisfied.  However, this adjustment is valid only if there is no gross error with 
respect to the balance equations.  If a sensor fault occurs, the faulty sensor must be 
detected, identified, and reconstructed to avoid the estimated process parameters from 
misleading the performance monitoring and avoid misdiagnosis of process faults.   
 
4.5.1. Gross Error Detection 
 
The most popular method of gross error detection is to check the validity of the 
balance equations.  In the absence of gross error, the measurement vector x  can be 
written as follows: 
 
ε+= *xx           (4.26) 
 
where ε  represents a random error vector with zero mean and covariance matrix Ψ . 
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For a linear system, after the unmeasured variables are eliminated through QR 
decomposition, the equation residual r  can be written as follows: 
 
εGbGxr =−=          (4.27) 
 
where G  and b  are defined in Equations (4.10) and (4.11), respectively. 
 
Based on the assumption that the measurement error is random, if there is no 
gross error in the measurements, the residual will satisfy the following properties: 
 
0][ =rE           (4.28a) 
TT GGrrE Ψ==Φ ][          (4.28b) 
 
However, when a gross error occurs in the system, a systematic error will appear 
in the residual.  Therefore, gross error detection can be accomplished by testing the 
following statistics: 
 
rrT 1−Φ=τ           (4.29) 
 
If G  has a full row rank m, the derived statistics τ  in Equation (4.29) will follow 
a 2χ  distribution with m degrees of freedom.  Therefore, a gross error can be detected if 
the calculated statistics τ  is greater than a critical value at the specified error probability. 
 
4.5.2 Fault Identification 
 
For a large-scale system, many sensors may have more than one degree of 
redundancy for estimation.  Even if one sensor is faulty and a gross error has been 
detected, it is still possible to reconstruct the measured value to estimate performance 
parameters or perform process fault diagnosis after the source of gross error is identified 
and eliminated through a systematic procedure.   
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A serial elimination strategy was developed by Romagnoli to identify the 
measurements with gross error (Sanchez and Romagnoli, 1994).  The basic idea of this 
strategy is to compare the effect on data reconciliation when individual measurements are 
eliminated one at a time.  If only single faults are considered, a single measured variable 
is eliminated each time and correspondingly the equation errors are estimated.  The 
variable, whose elimination results in the most significant reduction in the estimate of the 
equation errors, is considered as a faulty sensor. 
If one sensor has gross error, the G matrix in Equation (4.27) can be separated 
into two parts as follows: 
 [ ]cg GGG =          (4.30) 
 
where gG  and cG  are the columns of G  matrix corresponding to the sensors not 
suspected of gross error and the sensors suspected of gross error, respectively. 
 
Correspondingly, the covariance matrix of the measurement error can be 
partitioned into two parts as follows: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∆Ψ+Ψ
Ψ=Ψ
cc
g
0
0
        (4.31) 
where c∆Ψ  corresponds to the increase in the variance of the measurement due to the 
suspected gross error. 
The covariance matrix of the equation error nΦ  after the effect of gross error is 
taken into account can be related to the covariance matrix of the measurement error 
without gross error Φ  as follows (Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000): 
 
T
cccn GG )(∆Ψ+Φ=Φ         (4.32) 
where Φ  is defined in Equation (4.28b) when there is no gross error in the system. 
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Because both nΦ  and c∆Ψ  are nonsingular, 1−Φ n  can be calculated as 
follows(Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000): 
 
1111111 ])()[( −−−−−−− Φ∆Ψ+∆ΨΦ−Φ=Φ TcTcccccn GGGG    (4.33) 
 
Now we can compare the contribution of each measured variable to the equation 
error and identify the source of gross error.  The contribution of the ith sensor to the 
equation error can be measured by the objective function given by: 
 
rrJ in
T
i
1
)(
−Φ=          (4.34) 
 
where 1 )(
−Φ in  can be calculated based on Equation (4.33) with the corresponding )(ic∆Ψ  
specified as infinity.  Apparently, if )(ic∆Ψ  corresponding to the ith sensor is specified as 
infinity, it is equivalent to the elimination of the ith sensor from the total contribution of 
the equation error. 
If only single sensor fault is considered, the objective function given in Equation 
(4.34) can be calculated for each measured variable when it is eliminated.  The measured 
variable whose elimination results in the smallest value of the objective function will 
have the largest contribution to the equation error.  Therefore, this measured variable is 
identified as the measurement with a gross error. 
 
4.5.3 Fault Estimation 
 
After a sensor fault is identified based on the algorithm described in section 4.5.2, 
it is desirable to estimate the fault magnitude and reconstruct the incorrect measurements 
for use in process fault diagnosis and performance parameter estimation.  If this fault 
reconstruction is reliable, the reconstructed value can still be used even if a gross error 
has occurred. 
For an identified sensor fault, the fault effects on the measurements are given by: 
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brmExx ++= ε*          (4.35) 
 
where  
rE  = the fault distribution matrix, which is one column of the identity matrix for sensor 
faults. 
bm = the fault magnitude. 
The problem of fault magnitude estimation is stated as follows: 
 
εεε 1min −ΨT           (4.36a) 
s.t. 
0)( =−− br mExG ε         (4.36b) 
 
The solution to the minimization problem defined in Equation (4.36) is given as 
follows (Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000): 
 
GxGGPPGGPm TTbb
T
bb
111 )(])([ −−− ΨΨ=      (4.37) 
where  
rb GEP =  
Therefore, the reconstructed measurement is given by: 
 
bb
TTTT mPGGGGxGGGxx 11 )()(ˆ −− ΨΨ−ΨΨ−=     (4.38) 
 
Equation (4.38) shows that the reconstructed value of the measurement with a 
gross error consists of three terms.  The first term is the original measured value, the 
second term corresponds to the correction on measurement noise due to the constrained 
minimization, and the third term corresponds to the correction due to the identified gross 
error. 
 
4.6 Application to HCSG system 
 
In the IRIS reactor design described in Chapter 3, eight steam generators are 
installed in four pairs in the annular space between the core barrel and the reactor vessel 
 116
(RV) wall.  A common feed water supply line splits at the vessel and goes to two steam 
generators.  Similarly, the steam discharge lines from two steam generators join to create 
a common steam line.  This pairing of steam generators has reduced the number of feed 
water and steam lines, and thus the number of penetrations into and out of the 
containment, but it has caused an unfavorable consequence on individual steam generator 
monitoring in terms of the thermal performance and the secondary flow rate.  A 
schematic of one pair of IRIS helical coil steam generators is given in Figure 3.3. 
According to an engineering analysis, the HCSG fault diagnosis system needs to 
monitor the following process faults: 
 
(1) Thermal performance degradation of each individual steam generator. 
(2) Secondary flow rate abnormality for the pair of steam generators. 
(3) Reactor pump flow abnormality. 
(4) Feed water temperature abnormality. 
(5) Primary side inlet temperature abnormality. 
(6) Feed water flow rate abnormality. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the Directed Graph of one pair of the HCSG systems.  In this 
figure, T and W denote temperature and mass flow rate, respectively.  The numeric 
number appended to T or W denotes the location on the HCSG system configuration.  
The yellow colored nodes represent the root nodes of the system, each of which 
corresponds to a process fault.  For example, the yellow nodes denoted by W2 and W4 
represent the faults associated with the two reactor main pumps pumping the flow into 
the primary side of SG-A and SG-B, respectively.  The DG has clearly illustrated the 
cause-effect relationships among the involved variables and the propagation pathways 
from the root node to the other nodes.  For instance, if the thermal performance of SG-A 
has degraded, the node T3 on the primary side and the node T11 on the secondary side 
will be affected.  In other words, SG-A degradation is a sufficient condition to cause 
abnormal symptoms on the nodes T3 and T11. 
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Figure 4.8.  The Directed Graph of one pair of HCSG system. 
 
To locate the minimum set of sensors that can observe the considered process 
faults, the first step is to find out all the nodes that have only input arcs in the DG.  A 
simple examination shows that the nodes having only input arcs are T3, T5, T9, T11, and 
W12, which should be selected as the members of the fault observability set.  Obviously, 
this observability set is able to detect all the considered process faults.   
Figure 4.9 gives the bipartite graph between the root nodes and the observability 
set {T3, T5, T9, T11, and W12}.  The left side of the bipartite graph includes all the 
considered process faults, which are also the root nodes in the DG graph.  The right side 
of the bipartite graph includes all the process variables in the observability set.  The 
directed arcs in the bipartite graph are determined from the DG graph. 
Figure 4.10 (a) shows the bipartite graph when T3 is selected because all the 
members of the fault observability set cover the same number of root nodes.  Figure 4.10 
(b) shows the bipartite graph after the arcs from the root nodes that have already been 
covered by T3 are eliminated.  As can be seen, either T5 or T9 is able to cover the 
remained process faults.   
In conclusion, the set of T3 and T5 or the set of T3 and T9 is a minimum set of 
sensors for process fault detection. 
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Figure 4.9.  Bipartite Graph of one pair of HCSG system. 
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Figure 4.10.  Determine the minimum set of sensors for fault detection. 
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Table 4.1 shows the fault effect matrix for all the root nodes.  To determine the 
minimum set of sensors for fault isolation, it is necessary to determine a subset of the 
affected nodes such that the fault effects can be distinguished from each other.  Table 4-2 
shows the bipartite graph, which is presented in matrix form for convienience, to 
determine the minimum set of sensors for fault isolation.  Using the algorithm presented 
in section 4.2.2, the minimum set of sensors must include T1, T3, T5, T7, T9, T11, W2, 
W4, and W7 such that the selected faults can be fully isolated.   
Efficient process fault diagnosis also depends on a reliable sensor fault diagnosis.  
However, a sensor fault diagnosis system based on functional relationships can be 
achieved only if the measured variables and process parameters of interest can be 
estimated using analytical redundancy through appropriate sensor placement design. 
For one pair of IRIS HCSG system shown in Figure 3.3, the mass balance and 
heat balance equations are given as follows:  
W1=W2+W4 
W2-W3=0  W4-W5=0 
W6-W3-W5=0    W12-W9-W11= 0 
W10-W11 = 0     W8-W9=0 
W7-W8-W10 = 0  
T1=T2=T4 
T7=T8=T10 
W6h6-W3h3-W5h5=0 
W12h12-W9h9-W11h11=0 
W2h2+W10h10-W3h3-W11h11=0 
W4h4+W8h8-W9h9-W5h5 = 0       (4.39) 
In the above equations, the symbols W, h, and T denote mass flow rate, specific 
enthalpy, and temperature, respectively.  It is assumed that the system pressures are 
constant and the specific enthalpy can be approximated as a function of local fluid 
temperature.  It should be mentioned that these balance equations hold for any operation 
conditions unless the system configuration changes while data driven models hold only if 
the collected data are representative enough to cover the entire operation space.   
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Table 4.1.  Fault effect matrix 
 
Process fault Observabiltiy Set 
Primary inlet temperature fault (B1) A1={T1,T2,T3,T4,T5,T9,T11} 
SG-A primary side pump flow fault (B2) A2={W2,T3,T11} 
SG-B primary side pump flow fault (B3) A3={W4,T5,T9} 
SG-A heat transfer degradation fault (B4) A4={T3,T11} 
SG-B heat transfer degradation fault (B5) A5={T5,T9} 
Secondary flow distribution abnormally (B6) A6={T3,T5,T9,T11} 
Feed water temperature fault (B7) A7={T7,T8,T10, T9, T11,T3,T5} 
Feed water flow fault (B8) A8={W7,W8,W10,T3,T5,T9,T11,W12} 
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Table 4.2.  Bipartite matrix to determine the minimum set of sensors for fault isolation. 
 
Pseudonode Sensor Set for Fault 
Resolution 
Pseudonode Sensor Set for Fault Resolution
B12 {T1,T2,W2,T4,T5,T9} B35 {W4} 
B13 {T1,T2,T3,W4,T4,T11} B36 {W4,T3,T11} 
B14 {T1,T2,T4,T5,T9} B37 {W4,T3,T7,T8,T10,T11} 
B15 {T1,T2,T3,T4,T11} B38 {W4,W7,W8,W10,W12,T3,T11}
B16 {T1,T2,T4} B45 {T3,T5,T9,T11} 
B17 {T1,T2,T4,T7,T8,T10} B46 {T5,T9} 
B18 {W7,W8,W10T1,T2,T4,W12} B47 {T5,T7,T8,T9,T10} 
B23 {W2,W4,T3,T5,T9,T11} B48 {W7,W8,W10,W12,T5,T9} 
B24 {W2} B56 {T3,T11} 
B25 {W2,T3,T5,T9,T11} B57 {T3,T7,T8,T10,T11} 
B26 {W2,T5,T9} B58 {W7,W8,W10,W12,T3,T11} 
B27 {W2,T5,T7,T8,T9,T10} B67 {T7,T8,T10} 
B28 {W2,W8,W10,T7,T5,T9,W12} B68 {W7,W12} 
B34 {W4,T3,T5,T9,T11} B78 {W7,W8,W10,W12,T7,T8,T10} 
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To analyze the observability and redundancy of variables in the balance 
equations, the bilinear variable classification algorithm described in section 4.3.2 is used 
to classify the related variables for the following measurement set: 
Case A: {W2, W4, W7, W12, T1, T3, T6, T7, T9, T12} 
After the enthalpy flow of category III described in section 4.3.2 is eliminated 
from the heat balance equations and a Q-R decomposition is performed on the coefficient 
matrix of the unmeasured flow rate vector, which is given in Equation (4.18), the vector 
2UF  is empty and the vector 1UF  includes all the unmeasured mass flow rate variables 
(W1, W6, W8, W9, W10, W11).  Meanwhile, the matrix IFR  is also empty.  Therefore, 
they are all observable.  That W1 and W6 are observable can be easily verified from 
Figure 3.3.  As for W8, W9, W10, W11, they are all observable.  The unmeasured mass 
flow rate W8 and W9 are observable because the heat transferred by each steam 
generator can be determined from the heat balance equations and T9 is measured.  Now 
that W8 and W9 are observable, W10 and W11 can be determined simply by W7 minus 
W8.  
After the unmeasured mass flow rate variables are partitioned according to 
Equation (4.19), Q-R decomposition is then performed on the coefficient matrix of the 
unmeasured enthalpy flow of category III.  The enthalpy flow vector 1ν  in Equation 
(4.19) includes the enthalpy flow variable at location 5 and the enthalpy flow variable at 
location 11 while the enthalpy flow vector 2ν  is empty.  Because the corresponding 
matrices IVR  and 2IFR  in Equation (4.19) are both empty, the enthalpy flow variables at 
location 5 and location 11 are observable. 
On the other hand, since the mass flow rate variables at locations 5 and 11 are 
observable, the temperature measurements at the two locations are then observable. 
The G matrix obtained from the bilinear variable classification algorithm is 
tabulated in a table to show the relationships among variables.  The zero-valued columns 
correspond to the enthalpy flow variables that do not participate in redundant 
relationships.  In addition, the columns proportional to each other indicate that the sensor 
faults of these variables will not be distinguishable in terms of equation residuals.  Table 
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4.3 shows that the temperature sensors T3 and T9 are not redundant.  This result can be 
verified because the heat transferred by SG-A or SG-B could not be determined if either 
T3 or T9 is eliminated from the set of temperature measurments. 
Table 4.4 shows the G matrix obtained from the variable classification algorithm 
for the linearized functional relationship.  From this matrix, we can see that T3 and T9 
will not participate in the reduced redundant relationship.  Therefore, these two sensors 
are not redundant.  This shows that the linearized variable classification algorithm gives 
the same results of variable classification as the bilinear variable classification algorithm 
for the HCSG application. 
In order to make the measurements T3 and T9 redundant, T5 and T11 are 
measured in Case B, which includes the following measurements: 
Case B: {W2, W4, W7, W12, T1, T3, T5, T6, T7, T9, T11, T12} 
Table 4.5 shows the G matrix obtained from the variable classification algorithm 
for linearized functional relationship.  As compared with Case A, T3 and T9 are 
redundant in Case B.  This result can be easily verified because either T3 or T9 can still 
be estimated from the other variables even if it is eliminated.  In fact, all the variables are 
redundant and can be obtained from the other measurements based on mass and energy 
balance equations.  The G matrix given in Table 4.5 also has many columns proportional 
to each other, which means that the sensor faults of these variables will not be 
distinguishable in terms of equation residuals.  These columns correspond to the 
following three groups: 
 
(1) Group I: {W2, W4, T1, T7}; 
(2) Group II: {T3, T5};  
(3) Group III: {T9, T11}. 
 
Therefore, for the sensor placement of Case B, it is not possible to distinguish the sensor 
faults within each group of the variables because they will generate the same residual 
pattern. 
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Table 4.3.  G matrix based on bilinear variable classification 
to determine the redundant relationship between the measured variables (Case A) 
 
W2 W4 W7 W12 f2 f4 f7 f12 θ1 θ3 θ6 θ8 θ9 θ10 
-.56 -.56 0.22 0.22 0.51 0.51 0.01 0.01 -.52 0.0 -.52 -.11 0.0 -.11 
0.11 0.11 -.34 -.34 -.02 -.02 0.19 0.19 -.17 0.0 -.17 -.40 0.0 -.40 
0.60 0.60 -.31 -.31 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -.27 0.0 -.27 
0.07 0.07 -.12 -.12 0.38 0.38 -.24 -.24 -.14 0.0 -.14 0.55 0.0 0.55 
0.27 0.27 -.08 -.08 0.14 0.14 -.32 -.32 0.18 0.0 0.18 -.33 0.0 -.33 
 
Table 4.4.  G matrix based on linearized variable classification 
to determine the redundant relationship between the measured variables (Case A) 
 
W2 T1 T3 W4 T6 W7 T7 T9 W12 T12 
0.0075 0.268 0.0 0.0075 -0.22 -0.464 0.0205 0.0 0.394 -0.015 
-0.074 -2.64 0.0 -0.074 2.17 -0.381 -0.202 0.0 1.066 0.147 
 
Table 4.5.  G matrix based on linearized variable classification 
to determine the redundant relationship between the measured variables (Case B) 
 
W2 T1 T3 W4 T6 W7 T7 T9 W12 T12 T11 T5 
0.031 1.104 -0.29 0.031 -0.32 -.007 0.084 0.024 -0.28 -0.11 0.024 -.29 
0.053 1.907 -0.31 0.053 -0.94 -.110 0.145 -.024 -0.38 -0.06 -0.02 -.31 
0.037 1.337 0.69 0.037 -2.47 0.480 0.102 0.004 -0.83 -0.08 0.004 0.69 
0.048 1.709 -1.72 0.048 2.04 0.398 0.130 -.004 -0.84 -0.09 -.004 -1.72 
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Let us examine the above results from the physical point of view.  The energy 
balance equations cannot distinguish a measurement fault in T1 and T7 because they 
always participate in the same set of energy balance equations.  If the measurement T7 is 
eliminated, it will not be possible to estimate T1 from the remaining measured variable.  
The result is the same if T1 is eliminated.  On the other hand, let’s look at the 
measurement T6 and T12.  If T6 is eliminated, the remaining measured variables can still 
be used to estimate the variable T12.  Therefore, the sensor faults of the variables T6 and 
T12 can be distinguished. 
Based on the comparison analysis of the influence of measured variables on the 
equation error, it can be concluded that physical redundancy is needed to distinguish 
some of the sensor faults in Case B.  Three physically redundant sensors are needed to 
distinguish the sensor faults of W2, W4, T1, and T7, one redundant sensor is needed to 
distinguish the sensor faults of T3 and T5, and one redundant sensor is needed to 
distinguish the sensor faults of T9 and T11.  Considering that additional redundant 
relationships exist if the analysis is extended beyond the pair of HCSG systems, T1 and 
T7 can be assumed redundant.  However, hardware redundancy of T3 or T5 and hardware 
redundancy of T9 or T11 are necessary to distinguish the sensor faults associated with 
them.  In the analysis, T5 and T9 are chosen to have physically redundant sensors. 
In the sensor placement design, an additional issue is to ensure that the sensors of 
interest can be estimated with enough precision using functional relationships.  In other 
words, the corresponding sensor faults should be detectable with adequate sensitivity.  
Table 4.6 shows that the d-factors for W2, W4, T7, T9, and T11 are very small after data 
reconciliation.  This indicates that these three variables are not sensitive to the balance 
equations.  Therefore, a sensor fault of these variables may not be detectable if the fault 
magnitude is small and the fault magnitude may not be accurately reconstructed when a 
fault is detected. 
Let us take W2 as an example to show why W2 is not sensitive to the equation 
error.  The mass flow rate W2 satisfies the following energy balance equation at nominal 
condition: 
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Table 4.6.  Physical redundant sensor placement based on sensitivity study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1]. Standard deviation of the measured values. 
[2] Standard deviation of the reconciled values without physical redundant sensors. 
[3]. d-factor without redundant sensors. 
[4]. d-factor with redundant sensors for T5, T7, T9, T11, W2, W4. 
 
 W2 T1 T3 W4 T6 W7 T7 T9 W12 T12 T11 T5 
Std [1] 1.82 0.27 0.25 1.85 0.28 0.42 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.25 
Std [2] 1.82 0.15 0.22 1.85 0.14 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.25 0.22 
d [3] 0.01 0.43 0.11 0.01 0.52 0.28 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.41 0.07 0.11 
d [4] 0.38 0.52 0.11 0.38 0.52 0.32 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.59 0.32 0.36 
 127
W2(h2-h3)=W10*(h11-h10)   h2= 0.0066*T2-0.6519 
h3= 0.0054*T3-0.2826   h11= 0.0034*T11+1.8763 
h10= 0.0047*T10-0.0822   W2_nominal=582.5 kg/s 
W10_nominal=62.85kg/s   h2_nominal=1.5129 E6 J/kg 
h11_nominal=2.9541 E6 J/kg   h10_nominal=0.9706 E6 J/kg 
h3_nominal=1.2942 E6 J/kg        (4.40) 
 
If we linearize Equation (4.40) around the nominal operation point, we have:  
3.8445*dT2-3.1455dT3+0.2187dW2=0.2135dT11-0.2952dT10+1.9835dW10 
Considering that T2 has a measurement error of 1 oC, the corresponding equation 
error is equivalent to about 4% measurement error of W2 and 5% measurement error of 
T10.  This analysis indirectly proves that the d-factor indeed is able to represent the 
sensitivity of the involved variables to the equation error.  Based on the results of 
sensitivity analysis given in Table 4.5, W2, W4, T7, T9, and T11 need to have physically 
redundant measurements such that a sensor fault can be detected with enough sensitivity.   
Combining the sensitivity analysis and fault isolation capability, the sensor 
placement is chosen to be as follows: 
Case C: {W2, W4, W7, W12, T1, T3, T5, T6, T7, T9, T11, W2-2, W-4, T5-2, T7-2, T9-
2, T11-2}. 
where W-2, W-4, T5-2, T7-2, T9-2, T11-2 indicate physical redundant sensors for W2, 
W4, T5, T7, T9, and T11, respectively.   
Figure 4.11 (a) shows the gross error detection statistics defined in Equation 
(4.29) as a comparison with the detection limit based on 2χ  distribution to detect a 
sensor fault of W2 with a bias fault magnitude of 2% nominal value when redundant 
measurement for W2 exists.  It is clear the fault can be detected immediately when the 
fault at the 150th sample.  On the contrary, if there is no physically redundant 
measurement of W2, Figure 4.11 (b) shows that the fault cannot be effectively detected.   
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Figure 4.11 (a).  Fault detection of W2 measurement error with redundant measurement. 
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Figure 4.11 (b).  Fault detection of W2 measurement error without redundant 
measurement. 
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Figure 4.12 (a) and Figure 4.12 (b) show a comparison of fault reconstruction of 
W2 measurement fault without and with the physically redundant measurement of W2.  
Because W2 is not constrained tightly by the energy balance equations as is shown by the 
sensitivity analysis, a measurement fault can be reconstructed only if physical 
redundancy exists.  For the W2 measurement fault, the faulty measurement W2 is 594.6 
kg/s with the true value being 582.52 kg/s.  If there is no physical redundant 
measurement for W2, the reconstructed value is 593.64 kg/s based on the fault 
reconstruction algorithm introduced in section 4.5.3.  It is clear that the fault cannot be 
reconstructed correctly.  However, if a physical redundant measurement for W2 is placed, 
the reconstructed value is 582.50 kg/s.  The fault effects can be identified correctly based 
on the algorithm introduced in section 4.6.2, and completely compensated using the fault 
reconstruction algorithm.   
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Figure 4.12 (a).  Fault reconstruction of W2 measurement error without redundant 
measurement 
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Figure 4.12 (b).  Fault reconstruction of W2 measurement error with redundant 
measurement.  
 
Figure 4.13 shows the secondary side mass flow rate using bilinear data 
reconciliation algorithm for Case A sensor placement.  In the Figure, the secondary mass 
flow rate of SG-A begins to decrease and the secondary mass flow rate of SG-B begins to 
increase at the 100th sample.  The bilinear data reconciliation algorithm is able to track 
the change of secondary mass flow rate with very good precision.  It demonstrates that 
parameter estimation is an efficient approach to monitor process faults when the 
measurements have been reconciled using data reconciliation algorithms. 
Figure 4.14 shows the estimated heat transfer rate using bilinear data 
reconciliation algorithm for Case A sensor placement.  The brute force estimate of the 
heat transfer rate of SG-A is calculated directly from the measured primary flow rate and 
primary side inlet and outlet temperature while the brute force estimate of the heat 
transfer rate of SG-B is calculated by the total heat transfer rate minus the heat transfer 
rate of SG-A.  Because of the mass flow rate has been added with 1% measurement noise 
and the temperature has been added with 0.025% measurement noise, the calculated total 
heat transfer rate has a significant variance for SG-B.  However, if data reconciliation is 
performed on the measured data, the precision of the estimated heat transfer rate can be 
significantly improved.   
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Figure 4.13.  Bilinear data reconciliation result of HCSG secondary flow rate. 
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Figure 4.14.  Bilinear data reconciliation result of heat transfer rate.  
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4.7 Summary 
 
Sensor placement design has been studied for performance monitoring and fault 
diagnosis in this Chapter.  The sensor placement design for process fault diagnosis is 
solved by studying the cause-effect relationships among process variables using causal 
graph theory.  If mass balance and energy balance are used to determine performance 
parameters and for sensor fault diagnosis, then orthogonal projection algorithm would be 
implemented to perform redundancy and observability analysis for sensor placement 
design.  Finally, it is observed that a sensor fault can be detected and reconstructed 
efficiently only if it is sensitive in the corresponding balance equations, and data 
reconciliation provides a generalized approach to sensitivity analysis in sensor placement 
design for efficient sensor fault diagnosis.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Fault Diagnosis during Steady State Conditions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Steady state fault diagnosis is an essential part of the integrated approach to 
performance monitoring and fault diagnosis for condition-based maintanance of nuclear 
power systems.  Although many techniques, mainly data driven model based as reviewed 
in Chapter 1, have been developed, none of them is sophisticated enough for the 
application to nuclear power systems.  To address the stringent requirements in nuclear 
power systems, the most recent progress in data driven model based fault diagnosis with 
an emphasis on how the FDI capability is dependent on data is presented.  Robust PCA 
model based approach and hybrid PCA approach are developed as two new techniques 
with improved performance for steady state fault diagnosis in this chapter. 
Reconstruction PCA model based approach is proposed as the baseline algorithm 
for steady state fault diagnosis because of its explicit representation of fault detectability 
and identifability.  In this approach, the fault effects are characterized by the subspace 
spanned by the fault measurements so that both process faults and sensor faults can be 
dealt with in a unified manner.  The number of principal components is chosen to achieve 
the best reconstruction of all the measured variables.  This method of choosing the 
number of principal components is also unique in that it can determine which measured 
variables have a low correlation with the other variables and thus should be eliminated 
for model development.  The reconstruction PCA model based approach to fault isolation 
is performed by comparing the reconstruction errors when each candidate fault is 
assumed.  The fault along the direction for which the reconstruction error reaches the 
minimum is considered as the true fault.  Because this fault isolation logic follows the 
philosophy of assumption-based methods, it can give more conclusive results of fault 
isolation than other approaches. 
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A hybrid PCA approach is developed in this dissertation for steady state fault 
diagnosis.  In this approach, certain prior knowledge is explicitly incorporated into the 
developed PCA model.  The prior knowledge may include the information about the 
source of major variation contained in the collected data and the partially available 
material and energy balance equations.  The developed hybrid PCA approach is more 
sensitive in detecting minor faults after some large variations are removed through 
appropriate decomposition of the variation contained in the data. 
Robust PCA model based approach is developed for steady state fault diagnosis in 
this dissertation.  In this approach, PCA models are developed from the data generated 
from reliable simulation models, therefore, the assumption that the collected data must 
cover the entire possible operation modes can be easily satisfied with well designed 
simulation calculations.  Meanwhile, model uncertainties are identified from plant 
measurements and explicitly formulated in the fault diagnosis algorithm.  Therefore, false 
alarms and misdiagnosis of traditional model based approach to fault diagnosis due to 
model uncertainty can be avoided. 
 
5.2 Principal Component Analysis for Fault Diagnosis 
 
The basic idea of fault diagnosis using multivariate statistical methods such as 
PCA is to project the collected data onto a low-dimensional space where the regions of 
normal operation and abnormal operation can be characterized by fewer state variables.   
Because PCA model represents the variation of normal operation data in a 
reduced dimensional space, it has better performance of generalization than when the 
entire measurement space is used.  PCA modeling separates the entire measurement 
space into a model subspace capturing the variation of state variables and a residual 
subspace containing random variations.  The separate characterization of the two 
subspaces can provide further insights in terms of the changes in operation conditions.  In 
addition, the linear model extracted by PCA enables us to determine which variables are 
most affected by a fault and which variables are most responsible for the fault. 
 135
5.2.1 Motivation of Statistical Modeling 
 
A formal analysis was performed by Qin, 2003, to investigate the theorectical 
basis to extract process models from measurement data using statistical methods.  This 
analysis is important to understand the requirement of data quality in developing 
statistical models for fault diagnosis.  
For an engineering process, the steady state constraints imposed by balance 
equations are given by: 
 
0* 21 =+ dBxB          (5.1) ε+= *xx           (5.2) 
 
where 
*x  = the true values of the measured vector. 
x  = the m  dimensional measurement vector. 
d  = the unmeasured state vector. 
ε  = the measurement noise vector. 
21 , BB  = the related matrices. 
 
If we premultiply Equation (5.1) by ⊥2B , the orthogonal complement of 2B , then 
we have: 
 
0**)( 12 ==⊥ CxxBB T         (5.3) 
 
The above equation indicates that *x  must live in the null space of C.  If the rank 
of C  is q, *x  can be represented by a linear combination of qm −  independent factors 
given by: 
 
Gsx =*           (5.4) 
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where the qm −  columns of G  spans the null space of C .   
 
Correspondingly, 
 
ε+= Gsx           (5.5) 
 
Equation (5.5) shows that the measured data can be projected onto a lower 
dimensional space without loss of information.  The variation of the measured data can 
be totally explained by the variation of the independent factors if all of them are 
incorporated.  From the physical point of view, the number of independent factors is 
equal to the number of independent measured disturbances, independent unmeasured 
disturbances, and the setpoint changes, which exist in a system.  In order to have an 
efficient model capable of characterizing all the possible normal operation conditions, it 
is necessary to fully excite the process system with all the modes of independent factors 
being excited.  If the collected normal data do not contain all the modes, the developed 
model will not be able to distinguish the difference between a new operation mode and an 
actual fault in the system. 
The above formal analysis has motivated the development of statistical methods 
to extract process models from measurement data and pinpointed the requirement of data 
quality for model development.  
 
Example:  For the system given in Figure 4.5, the matrices 1B  and 2B , related to the 
mass balance equations, are given as follows: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
110
010
001
1B     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−=
100
011
011
2B  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
5
4
1
G
G
G
x      ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
6
3
2
G
G
G
u  
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The orthogonal complement of 2B  and the C  matrix are as follows: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⊥
0
7071.0
7071.0
2B     ( )07071.07071.0 −=C  
 
where the rank of C  is 1.  If we choose the matrix G  such that each column of G  is the 
basis of the null space of C , then matrix G  has the form: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
10
07071.0
07071.0
G  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded from Equation (5.5) that there are only two independent 
factors in the system and any measurement vector can be represented by a linear 
combination of these two independent factors, which is given by: 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
2
1
10
07071.0
07071.0
5
4
1
s
s
G
G
G
 
 
Obviously, this result can be verified by examining the flowchart given in Figure 4.5. 
 
5.2.2 PCA Algorithm 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was originally developed by Pearson, 1901, 
as a statistical method of dimensional reduction while preserving the variation of data.  
The PCA algorithm will be derived in the context of process monitoring in this section. 
For a measurement vector mRx ∈ , in general, it can be represented in m 
dimensional space as follows: 
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∑
=
= m
i
ii ptx
1
          (5.6) 
where 
ip  = the basis vectors of the m dimensional space, which are orthonormal. 
it  = the component of the vector x  when projected onto the basis vector ip . 
 
Apparently, since the basis vectors are orthonormal, it  can be given by: 
 
i
T
i pxt =           (5.7) 
 
If the true dimensionality of the measurement vector is l , where ml < , then the 
projection can be separated into two parts, which is given by: 
 
∑ ∑
= +=
+= l
i
m
lj
iiii ptptx
1 1
~~         (5.8) 
where the second term represents the random vectors obtained by projecting the vector x  
onto the remaining ( lm − ) dimensional space. 
 
The objective of PCA algorithm is then to determine the true number of 
components directly from the measured data such that the second part of Equation (5.8) 
behaves purely random.  This is equivalent to determining l  principal components such 
that the mean squared error of the approximation, given by Equation (5.9) is minimized. 
][2 εεε TE=           (5.9) 
 
The PCA algorithms can be developed either by the NIPALS procedure (Wold, 
Esbebsen, and Geladi, 1987) or by eigenvalue decomposition procedure (Russell, Chiang, 
and Braatz, 2000).  The eigenvalue decomposition procedure is presented here for its 
simplicity. 
Given a data matrix X associated with n observations and m measured variables 
when the mean values are removed, the first principal component is obtained by finding 
out a basis vector 1p  such that the score vector 1t  of the original data along this direction 
has maximized variance, which is given by: 
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11
11
1
11
max)])[var({max
pp
pptE T
T
pp
Σ=        (5.10) 
with the constraints 
Ι=11 ppT  
where 
XX T=Σ  
 
The solution of Equation (5.10) is actually the eigenvector of Σ  corresponding to 
its maximum eigenvalue, that is: 
 
111 )( pp λ=Σ          (5.11) 
where 
1λ  = the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix. 
 
Correspondingly, the variance of the original data along the first principal 
component is then given by: 
 
11 )][var( λ=tE          (5.12) 
 
In order to obtain the thj principal component, the following constraints must be 
satisfied (Jackson, 1991): 
 
k
T
k
k
T
k
pkp pp
pptE
kk
Σ= max]}[{max        (5.13) 
such that  
Ι=kTk pp  
kp  is orthogonal to jp  for 1....2,1 −= kj  
and 
the score vector of kt  is orthogonal to the score vector of jt  for 1....2,1 −= kj  
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The solution of Equation (5.13) can also be obtained by solving the eigenvalue 
problem of the scatter matrix Σ , which is given by: 
 
kkk pp λ=Σ )(          (5.14a) 
kktE λ=)}{var(          (5.14b) 
 
Obviously, the above PCA algorithm has chosen the eigenvectors of the 
covariance matrix of the measured data as the basis vectors for projection.  The far-
reaching implication of the projection in this manner is that the variation of the measured 
data can be separated into the variation in the principal component subspace and the 
variation remained in the residual space.  The PCA decomposition of the original 
measurement data is given by: 
 
TT PTTPX ~~+=          (5.15) 
 
where 
P  = the loading matrix whose columns span the principal component space (PCS) and 
consist of the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest l eigenvalues of the matrix Σ . 
P~  = the loading matrix whose columns spans the residual space (RS) and consist of the 
eigenvectors corresponding to the smallest lm −  igenvalues of the matrix Σ . 
 
For a measurement vector x , the PCA algorithm estimates the true value by a 
projection onto the PCS and filter out the random component, which is given by: 
 
xPPx T=ˆ           (5.16) 
 
The estimation error of the approximation is given by: 
 
xPPxx T~~ˆ =−=ε          (5.17) 
 
The expectation of the mean squared error is given by: 
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TTTTT TTExPPPPxEE
1
2 ]~~[]~~~~[][ λεεε     (5.18) 
The above equation shows that the mean squared error is equal to the sum of the 
least significant eigenvalues of the covariance matrix.  This also indicates that the choice 
of the number of principal components is to abandon the eigenvectors as the basis vectors 
for expansion that correspond to the least significant eigenvalues of the covariance matrix 
of the original measured data. 
 
5.2.3 Selection of the Number of Principal Components 
 
Many approaches have been proposed to determine the number of principal 
components for different applications.  An excellent survey paper by Valle, Li, and Qin, 
1999, summarized these methods and proposed the variance of reconstruction error 
criterion for process monitoring. 
Information criteria such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974), 
Minimum Description Length (MDL) (Rissanen, 1978), and Imbedded Error Function 
(IEF) (Malinowski, 1977) were used in signal processing literature to determine the 
number of independent sources by selecting the number of principal components.  These 
criteria have solid statistical foundation with the assumption that the independent 
measurement noise components have equal variance corresponding to the smallest lm −  
eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the original signal.  This assumption is valid for 
covariance matrix based PCA when all the signals have equal variance of measurement 
errors.  However, for correlation matrix based PCA, which is most commonly used in 
process monitoring, the measurement errors usually do not have the same variance and 
the eigenvalues corresponding to the smallest lm −  eigenvalues are usually quite 
different. 
In the field of chemometrics, the most commonly used criteria are Cumulative 
Percent Variance, Scree Plot, Average Eigenvalue, and Cross Validation.  Cumulative 
percent variance method selects the number of principal components by setting a 
subjective threshold of cumulative percent variance.  Scree plot method is based on the 
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plot of the fraction of variance explained by each principal component.  The plot orders 
the principal components from the one that explains the largest amount of variation to the 
one that explains the least amount of variation.  This method considers the beginning 
point of the Scree as the most reasonable number of principal components.  Average 
eigenvalue method assumes that all the components whose corresponding eigenvalues are 
less than the average value should be discarded.  When cross validation method is used to 
determine the number of principal components, the original data are randomly divided 
into N blocks, the cross validation error is computed as the residual sum of squares (RSS) 
for one block of data with the PCA model built using the other blocks of data.  The 
number of principal components is chosen to be the one beyond which the RSS begins to 
increase (Wold, 1978).   
The cross validation method is the best available method to determine the number 
of principal components when large amount of data are available and when the objective 
of modeling is for prediction. 
Qin and Dunia originally developed an algorithm to determine the number of 
principal components specifically for process monitoring (Qin and Dunia, 1998).  This 
algorithm determines the number of principal components such that the best 
reconstruction of measurement error can be achieved. 
Considering that the measured data are corrupted with additive sensor faults, the 
measurement vectors are given by: 
 
ifxx ξ+= *           (5.19) 
 
where 
iξ  = the fault direction of the ith sensor fault. 
*x  = the noise containing measurement vector at normal operation condition. 
 
The reconstructed value ix  of a given measured vector x  , which is an estimate 
of *x , along the fault direction iξ  is given by: 
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iii fxx ξ−=           (5.20) 
 
The best reconstruction needs to find the fault magnitude if  such that the 
reconstruction error is minimized.  The reconstruction error is defined as the distance 
between ix  and the projection onto the model space, which is given by (Dunia and Qin, 
1998): 
 
222 ||~~||||~||||*|| iiiii fxxxxSPE ξ−==−=       (5.21) 
 
where the symbol ~ represents a projection onto the residual space which is induced by 
the pre-multiplication operator of TPP ~~ . 
 
To minimize the reconstruction error, the derivative of iSPE  with respect to if  
should be zero.  That is: 
 
0)~~(~2)( =−= iiTi
i
i fx
df
SPEd ξξ        (5.22) 
 
Therefore, the fault magnitude can be determined as follows: 
 
i
T
i
T
i
i
T
i
T
i
i
xxf ξξ
ξ
ξξ
ξ
~~
~
~~
~~
==          (5.23) 
 
The reconstructed value of the measurements along the fault direction iξ  can now 
be obtained by: 
 
xfxx
i
T
i
T
i
iiii )~~
~
( ξξ
ξξξ −Ι=−=        (5.24) 
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Because the measured data contain noise, there always exists a portion of 
unreconstructable error.  The variance of the unreconstructed variation along the fault 
direction iξ  is then given by: 
 
2)~~(
~*)cov(~]~~
*~var[]var[)]*(var[
i
T
i
i
T
i
i
T
i
T
i
ii
T
ii
T
ii
xxfxxu ξξ
ξξ
ξξ
ξξξξ ===−=   (5.25) 
 
Equation (5.25) is obtained by noticing that the fault magnitude f  in Equation (5.19) is 
zero for normal operation data and thus *xx =  in Equation (5.24). 
The optimal number of principal components needs to ensure that a reliable 
reconstruction can be achieved for normal operation data independent of the direction 
chosen for fault reconstruction.  In other words, the criterion to determine the number of 
principal components can be formulated to minimize the normalized variance of 
reconstruction error (VRE) in terms of the number of principal components k , which is 
given by: 
 
∑
=
= m
i
T
i
i
x
ukVRE
1 )var(
)( ξ         (5.26) 
 
Dunia and Qin proved that the normalized VRE could always achieve a minimum 
(Dunia and Qin, 1998b).  Intuitively, the VRE in the residual space will monotonically 
decrease with respect to k  because the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix decreases.  
Meanwhile, the variance of the reconstruction error in model space will go to infinity 
when k  approaches m, because iξ~  in the denominator of Equation (5.25) tends to be 
zero.  In combination, the VRE can reach a global minimum. 
Dunia and Qin have also revealed the relationship between the method of the 
VRE approach and the cross validation approach to determine the number of principal 
components (Valle, Li, and Qin, 1999).  The VRE approach is equivalent to cross 
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validation approach when the noise variances are not too much different and the variance 
of the signal is larger than the variance of the noise. 
One of the uniqueness of VRE approach is that it is able to optimally choose the 
number of principal components in order to have the best fault reconstruction.  In 
addition, this approach can determine which measured variables have a low correlation 
with the other variables.  If the VRE is greater than the variance of the original data, the 
model prediction will be worse than the simple average of the raw measured data.  
Therefore, these variables should not be included in the PCA model for process 
monitoring. 
 
5.2.4 Fault Detection 
 
Fault detection can be performed by monitoring the change of the correlation 
structure of the measured data.  Because the variation of data is separated in the principal 
component space and the residual space, two statistics, 2T  statistics and Q statistic are 
defined to measure the variation in the two spaces, respectively.  If a new observation 
exceeds the effective region in the PC space defined by the normal operation data, a 
change in operation regime can be detected.  If a significant residual is observed in the 
residual space, a special event, either due to disturbance changes or due to changes in the 
relationship between variables, can be detected. 
 
5.2.4.1 2T Statistics 
 
The 2T  statistics measures the variation in the PC space, which is given by: 
 
ttT T 12 −Σ=           (5.27) 
where 
Σ  =  the sample variance matrix of the training data. 
t  =  the score vector. 
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If the measured data at normal operation conditions follow a multivariate normal 
distribution, 2T  statistics is related to an F distribution, which is given by: 
 
αα ;,
2 )1(
mNmFmN
NmT −−
−=         (5.28) 
where 
m  = the number of  variables. 
N  = the number of observations. 
α  = the significance level. 
 
During normal operation conditions, the 2T  criterion is given as follows: 
 
22
αTT <           (5.29) 
 
T2 statistics may be oversensitive when some of the eigenvalues of the correlation 
matrix are close to zeros.   
Another limitation of T2 statistics arises from the assumption that the raw data 
follows multivariate normal distribution.  The assumption is true only when the normal 
operation data are collected at one operation condition.  However, the normal operation 
data are usually collected under different operation conditions for an engineering process 
where many operation modes are possible.  Therefore, it should be cautious when T2 
statistics is used for process monitoring. 
 
5.2.4.2 Q Statistics 
 
The Q statistics measures the variation in the residual space, which is defined as 
the sum squared error (SSE) given by: 
 
εε TQ =           (5.30) 
 
where  
 147
xPP T~~=ε  
 
A fault is detected if the Q statistics exceeds a threshold given by: 
 
αQQ ≥           (5.31) 
 
If the residual vector follows multivariate normal distribution, the threshold of Q 
statistics is given by (Jackson and Mudholkar, 1979): 
 
dcbaQ )( αα +=          (5.32) 
 
where 
α  = the critical value for standard normal distribution at a given significance level. 
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Because the assumption that the residual vector follows multivariate normal 
distribution is much more relaxed than multivariate normal distribution of the original 
measured data, Q statistic is more appropriate than 2T  statistics for process monitoring. 
 
5.2.4.3 Conditions for Fault Detectability 
 
In general, the fault effects on measurements are multi-dimensional.  One-
dimensional fault is a simple fault whose effect shows only in one measured variable 
 148
while a multi-dimensional fault shows its effects in multiple measurements.  A sensor 
fault outside any control loops is one-dimensional.  Most process faults such as fouling of 
heat exchangers and pipe leakage are multi-dimensional.  In the presence of feedback and 
feedforward control, even a sensor fault may become multi-dimensional because the fault 
effects may be propagated to many other variables (Yoon and MacGregor, 2001). 
The fault effects of a multi-dimensional fault can be uniformly represented as 
follows: 
 
Efxx += *           (5.33) 
where 
E  = the fault distribution matrix. 
f  = the fault magnitude vector. 
 
If a fault occurs, the SSE will be as follows: 
 
2||~*~|| fExSSE +=          (5.34) 
 
where 
EPPE T~~~ =  
 
The necessary condition for fault detectability is that 0~ ≠fE .  In other words, a 
fault can be detected only if the projection of fault distribution matrix onto the residual 
space, E~ , is not empty, and the fault magnitude vector f  is not orthogonal to the space 
spanned by E~ .  This result is understandable because a detectable fault must have 
significant effects on residuals that are used as fault signatures for fault detection. 
The sufficient condition for fault detection has also been derived by Dunia and 
Qin, 1998b, which is written as follows: 
 
αδ2||~|| >fE           (5.35) 
where 
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ααδ Q=  
 
The above condition cannot be used directly in real practice.  We are here to 
derive a more specific condition for practical use. 
Since ||||)~(||~|| min fEfE σ≥ , a more restrictive condition for fault detectability 
can then be given by: 
 
)~(
2||||
min E
f σ
δα>          (5.36) 
where minσ  denotes the minimum singular value. 
 
The above derivation assumes that the measured data have been standardized with 
zero mean and unit variance.  In order to guarantee the detectability of a sensor fault, the 
minimum fault magnitude of the measured value is given by: 
 
mm E
f σσ
δα
)~(
2||||
min
≥          (5.37) 
 
where mσ  is the standard deviation of the normal operation data and |||| mf  is the 
minimum fault magnitude. 
 
Three implications can be drawn from Equation (5.37).  The first implication is 
that it is more difficult to detect a fault whose normal operation data has a larger 
variation.  The second implication is that the minimal detectable fault magnitude 
increases when the dimension of the residual space increases.  The third implication is 
that the minimal detectable fault magnitude increases when the signal-to-noise ratio 
decreases since the Q  statistic limit is a sensitive function of the signal-to-noise ratio. 
 
5.2.5 Fault Isolation 
 
Fault isolation is important to locate the root causes after a fault is detected.  If 
there is a large amount of historical data, fault isolation can be simplified as a 
 150
classification problem (Russell, Chiang, and Braatz, 2000).  However, because the same 
fault may have different fault magnitudes and the fault effects on the measured variables 
may vary with the operation conditions, the classification method may become unrealistic 
although it is easy for implementation.  The most popular approach to fault isolation is to 
investigate the contribution of individual measurements to the model residuals.  As 
compared with the classification approach, the advantage is that there is no need to 
prepare fault data.  However, contribution based approach may give inconclusive results 
for fault isolation if two faults are quite similar.  If fault effects are known in terms of 
fault distribution matrix, reconstruction based approach is able to lead to conclusive 
results for fault isolation. 
 
5.2.5.1 Classification Based Approach 
 
The fundamental assumption of pattern classification is that the objects from the 
same class share some common statistical relationship and this commonality can be 
quantitatively measured.  In the context of fault isolation, distance and direction can both 
be candidates to measure the commonality.  However, because possible fault magnitude 
is unpredictable before fault diagnosis is performed, fault direction should be a better 
measure to characterize different faults. 
Standard pattern classification involves two steps.  The first step is feature 
extraction, which transforms measured variables from a high dimensional space to a 
lower dimensional space such that the objects in the same class will cluster and the 
objects in different classes will have separation.  PCA itself is a commonly used method 
for feature extraction.  The second step is to develop a classifier that is able to assign an 
object in the feature space to a specific class such that the total classification error is 
minimum. 
One of the popular algorithms of distance-based classification is the Bayesian 
classifier.  In this classifier, an object is assigned to the ith class if the ith discriminant 
function reaches the maximum value, which is given by: 
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)()( xgxg ji >  for ij ≠        (5.38) 
where  
)|()( xPxg ii ω=  
)|( xP iω  = a posteriori probability, which is the probability that a sample vector x  is 
assigned to class iω . 
If the objects follow multivariate normal distribution with mean vector iµ  and 
covariance matrix iΣ  for the ith class, the discriminant function for the ith class is given 
by (Russell, Chiang, and Braatz, 2000): 
 
)(ln)ln(det(
2
1)()(
2
1)( 1 iiii
T
ii Pxxxg ωµµ +Σ−−Σ−−= −    (5.39) 
where 
)( iP ω  = the prior probability for class iω . 
 
The Bayesian classifier can be performed either for the score vectors or for the 
residual vectors depending on which space contains the vital discriminant information 
(Raich and Cinar, 1997). 
Direction-based classifier compares the similarity of principal components 
between different classes.  Considering two classes of data, the two classes of data will 
produce two PCA models, 1P  and 2P .  The angles kα  between the two sets of PCA 
model directions can be related to the eigenvalues of ks , and is given by: 
 
SLLPPPP TTT =1221         (5.40a) 
2/1)cos( kk s=α          (5.40b) 
 
where L  consists of the consensus coordinates and ks  is the kth largest eigenvalues of 
S , which corresponds to the smallest angle between the kth dimensional coordinate 
subspaces (Krzanowski, 1979). 
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A generalized similarity measure in terms of the PCA model directions can be 
defined as the sum of the cosines of angles between PCA model axes as follows (Raich 
and Cinar, 1995): 
 
∑
=
=
p
k
ksp
f
1
1           (5.41) 
 
where 
p  = the dimensionality in the consensus coordinate systems. 
f  = the similarity factor. 
 
The directional-based classification is most useful to analyze the residual structure 
for fault isolation.  If there is a process fault such as heat exchanger fouling, the generated 
residuals will have certain directional features, the direction-based classification can be 
used to compare the similarity between the new residuals and the predefined residual 
structure. 
A sensitive fault detection algorithm has also been developed by monitoring the 
differences between the reference principal components and the principal components 
representing the current operation conditions.  If the correlation structure is changed, the 
cosine angle between the first reference PC and the first PC at the current condition can 
be directly used for fault detection.  However, if the variances of the first few major 
principal components are similar, the directions of principal components may change 
drastically although the correlation structure indeed does not change.  In this case, it is 
better to monitor the changes of subspace spanned by the principal components with 
similar variance for robust fault detection.  The dissimilarity of the subspace 1P  defined 
by the reference PCA model to the subspace 2P  defined by the current PCA model can 
be measured by the following index mA (Kano, Hasebe, Hashimoto, and Ohno, 2001): 
 
||1 mmA λ−=          (5.42) 
 
where  
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mλ  = the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix 2112 PPPP TT . 
 
 
5.2.5.2 Contribution Based Approach 
 
The contribution-based approach quantifies the contribution of each process 
variable to 2T  statistics and Q  statistic to determine the root causes after a fault 
happens.   
The Q  statistic-based contribution approach decomposes the SSE into individual 
components contributed by each measured variable as follows: 
 
∑
=
= m
i
iSSESSE
1
 
 
where 
2)ˆ( iii xxSSE −=  
ixˆ  = the ith component of the matrix xPP
T . 
 
The contribution of the ith process variable to the Q  statistic is then given by: 
 
SSE
SSECONT ii =          (5.43) 
 
The 2T  statistics based contribution approach first determines which score 
components are out of control.  A score component jt  is considered as abnormal if the 
standardized score is greater than the average 2αT  assigned to each degree of freedom, 
that is: 
 
pj
j
m
Tt 22)( ασ >           (5.44) 
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where  
pm  = the number of principal components. 
The contribution of each variable ix  to the out-of-control score jt , denoted by 
ijCONT ← , is then given by: 
 
)ˆ( iiijij xxPCONT −=←  
 
where ijP  is the ith row of the jth principal component vector. 
The total contribution of the process variable ix  to the out-of-control 
2T  
statistics is given by (Kourti and MacGregor, 1996): 
 
)]ˆ([
1
iiij
n
j j
j
i xxP
t
CONT
t −= ∑
= σ        (5.45) 
 
where in  is the number of score components out of control.   
 
Contribution based approach does not give immediate results of fault isolation 
because these contributions are derived from correlation based models (Yoon and 
MacGregor, 2000).  However, contribution plots do indicate which group of variables are 
highly correlated with a detected fault.  Fortunately, contribution plots work quite well 
for sensor and actuator fault isolation in real practice. 
 
5.2.5.3 Reconstruction Based Approach 
 
Reconstruction based approach to fault isolation belongs to the philosophy of 
assumption based fault diagnosis (Kavuri and Venkatasubramanian, 1992).  A set of 
candidate fault directions are chosen based on prior knowledge or inferred from historical 
data.  Fault identification is performed by comparing the reconstruction error when each 
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candidate fault is assumed.  The fault along whose direction the reconstruction error 
reaches the minimum is considered as the true fault.  
Given an abnormal measurement vector x  with the true fault magnitude if  along 
the fault direction iE , if the candidate fault direction is assumed to be jE , in analogy to 
Equation (5.24), the reconstruction error along this direction is given by (Qin, 2003): 
 
iijjjjjjjjj fEEExEExEEfExx
~)~~(*~)~~(~)~~(~~~ +++ −Ι+−Ι=−Ι=−=   (5.46) 
 
where +jE
~
 denotes the pseudoinverse of jE  which satisfies that jjjj EEEE
~~~~ =+ . 
 
If the assumed fault is the true fault, i.e. ij EE = , using Equation (5.46), the SSE 
is then given by: 
 
2||*~)~~(|| xEEISSE iii
+−=         (5.47) 
 
It is easy to show that the sum square of the reconstructed error is minimal only if 
the assumed fault is the true fault.  This provides the technical basis to determine the true 
fault out of candidate faults with a conclusive result.  Moreover, the sum square of the 
reconstructed error along the true fault direction can always be brought back within the 
Q  statistic limit.   
However, it is also possible that the sum square of the reconstructed error will be 
smaller than the Q  statistic limit even if the reconstruction is not performed along the 
true fault direction.  A sufficient condition to avoid this from happening is as follows 
(Qin, 2003): 
 
)sin(
2|~|
ij
if α
δ>          (5.48) 
where 
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ijα  = the angle between iE~  and jE~ . 
iδ  = the confidence limit of the Q  statistic of the reconstruction error along the ith fault 
direction. 
Equation (5.48) is a very conservative condition for fault identification.  For this 
reason, we do not suggest to relate fault isolation to the Q  statistics.  Instead, fault 
isolation is only based on comparing the reconstruction error.   
In addition, Equation (5.48) holds only when the fault is one-dimensional.  In 
general, in order to ensure that αQSSE j >2||||  if ij ≠ , a sufficient condition is given 
by: 
 
}~)~~{(
2||||
min ijj
i
EEE
f +−Ι> σ
δ
       (5.49) 
 
 
5.3 Application to the IRIS HCSG Systems 
 
The application of reconstruction based PCA approach to IRIS HCSG systems is 
presented in this section.   
 
5.3.1 Data Generation and Model Development 
 
The data were generated for one pair of the steam generators, SG-A and SG-B, to 
simulate the measurements in actual nuclear power plants, where most measurements are 
highly correlated with other measurements.  For this pair of steam generators, it is 
assumed that the available measured variables include: 
• W1: the flow rate into the primary side of SG-A and SG-B. 
• T1: the primary side inlet temperature. 
• T3: the primary side outlet temperature of SG-A. 
• T5: the primary side outlet temperature of SG-B. 
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• T6: the primary side outlet temperature of SG-A and SG-B 
• W6: the flow rate leaving the primary side of SG-A and SG-B. 
• W7: the feed water flow rate into the secondary side of SG-A and SG-B. 
• T7: the feed water temperature. 
• W12: the steam flow rate leaving the secondary side of SG-A and SG-B. 
• T12: the steam temperature leaving the secondary side of SG-A and SG-B. 
• T9: the steam temperature leaving the secondary side of SG-A. 
• T11: the steam temperature leaving the secondary side of SG-B. 
 
The normal operation data was generated by perturbing the feed water flow rate 
W7 ranging from 80% nominal value to 100% nominal value to simulate reactor power 
change using the simulation model developed in Chapter 3.  In the simulation, it is also 
assumed that the two steam generators are at operation in perfect symmetry and the 
primary flow rate and the primary inlet temperature are constant.   
Because the secondary fluid flows inside the helical coil tubes, it is unrealistic to 
install instruments to directly measure the mass flow rate of each steam generator.  
However, it is a realistic postulation that the mass flow rate into the secondary side of the 
steam generator pair may be uneven due to flow path blockage.  This anticipated 
operation condition is selected as a process fault in the analysis.  The fault data were 
generated by linearly increasing the secondary mass flow rate into SG-A from 100% 
nominal value to 120% nominal value while reducing the secondary mass flow rate into 
SG-B from 100% nominal value to 80% nominal value.   
After the data were generated, the temperature data were added with white 
Gaussian noise with three standard deviation of 0.25% nominal value and the mass flow 
rate data was added with white Gaussian noise with three standard deviation of 1% 
nominal value. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the cross correlation coefficients of the simulated measured 
data.  As is expected, the variables W1, W6, T1, and T7 do not have meaningful 
correlations with the other variables.  
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Table 5.1.  Cross correlation coefficients of the generated data 
 
Variables W1 T1 T3 T5 W6 T6 W7 T7 W12 T12 T11 T9 
W1 1.0000 -0.0059 0.0320 0.0382 -0.0162 0.0242 -0.0299 0.0448 -0.0280 0.0220 0.0217 0.0231 
T1 -0.0059 1.0000 0.0206 0.0164 -0.0032 0.0139 -0.0177 0.0334 -0.0177 0.0095 0.0096 0.0084 
T3 0.0320 0.0206 1.0000 0.9836 -0.0068 0.9834 -0.9895 -0.0232 -0.9897 0.9505 0.9500 0.9498 
T5 0.0382 0.0164 0.9836 1.0000 -0.0064 0.9838 -0.9900 -0.0234 -0.9901 0.9519 0.9528 0.9521 
W6 0.0162 -0.0032 -0.0068 -0.0064 1.0000 -0.0075 0.0083 0.0023 0.0065 -0.0052 -0.0077 -0.0126 
T6 0.0242 0.0139 0.9834 0.9838 -0.0075 1.0000 -0.9900 -0.0285 -0.9904 0.9522 0.9520 0.9522 
W7 -0.0299 -0.0177 -0.9895 -0.9900 0.0083 -0.9900 1.0000 0.0227 0.9967 -0.9629 -0.9630 -0.9623 
T7 0.0448 0.0334 -0.0232 -0.0234 0.0023 -0.0285 0.0227 1.0000 0.0280 -0.0239 -0.0249 -0.0270 
W12 -0.0280 -0.0177 -0.9897 -0.9901 0.0065 -0.9904 0.9967 0.0280 1.0000 -0.9633 -0.9633 -0.9627 
T12 0.0220 0.0095 0.9505 0.9519 -0.0052 0.9522 -0.9629 -0.0239 -0.9633 1.0000 0.9871 0.9875 
T11 0.0217 0.0096 0.9500 0.9528 -0.0077 0.9520 -0.9630 -0.0249 -0.9633 0.9871 1.0000 0.9877 
T9 0.0231 0.0084 0.9498 0.9521 -0.0126 0.9522 -0.9623 -0.0270 -0.9627 0.987 0.9877 1.0000 
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In order to give all the measurements the same weights, a PCA model is 
developed using the correlation matrix.  Table 5.2 tabulates the AIC criteria, the variance 
of reconstruction error, and the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix as a function of the 
number of principal components.  The AIC criteria do not give a solution to the number 
of principal components.  This is not because the selected penalty factor in the formula of 
AIC criterion is not appropriate.  Instead, none of information criteria based methods can 
ensure the calculated number of principal components is appropriate because the 
assumption made to derive the likelihood function for use in AIC does not hold.   
When PCA is performed for correlation matrix, the eigenvalues corresponding to 
the several small eigenvalues of the correlation matrix are usually quite different.  This 
contradicts the assumption made to determine the likelihood of the unknown parameters 
for PCA model development.  The variance of reconstruction error has a global minimum 
when the number of principal components is chosen to be three.  Therefore, according to 
the minimum VRE, three principal components should be chosen for PCA modeling.   
According to the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix given in Table 5.2, the 
number of principal components is estimated as seven.  However, it can be seen from 
Table 5.1 that four independent variables have very low correlation coefficients with the 
other variables and thus they should be discarded.  This indirectly shows that the number 
of principal components determined based on the minimum VRE is correct. 
Figure 5.1 shows the ratio of the VRE to the variance of the raw data.  The ratios 
are greater than 1.0 for W1, T1, W6, and T7.  This indicates that the developed model 
cannot give model predictions better than simple averages of the raw data for these 
variables.  If the cross correlation coefficients are examined, they indeed do not have 
physically meaningful correlation with the other variables.  Therefore, it is demonstrated 
that VRE method is able to automatically exclude variables that do not consist of 
significant information for use in the model development.   
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Table 5.2.  Determination of the number of Principal Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
PCs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AIC(1.0E5) 1.08 0.98 0.85 0.63 0.20 0.041 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.014 0.0022 0.0012 
VRE(1.0E4) 1.0 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.077 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.053 0.098 0.53 ∞  
Eigenvalues 35.9 13.3 12.9 12.7 12.3 4.7 1.7 1.73 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.7 
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Figure 5.1.  The ratio of the variance of reconstructed error to the variance of the original 
data. 
 
 
5.3.2 Results of Single Fault Detection and Isolation 
 
Table 5.3 shows the minimum fault magnitudes that can be detected for the eight 
sensor faults.  The minimum fault magnitudes are 1.7 oC for the primary outlet 
temperature sensors, 5.7 kg/s for the secondary flow meters, and 2.2 oC for the secondary 
steam temperature sensors.  Figure 5.2 plots the comparison between the sum prediction 
error and its threshold for T3 sensor fault with the minimum detectable fault magnitude.   
Figure 5.3 shows that the Q statistic can be used to track the progression of the 
uneven secondary flow distribution of the HCSG pair.  The fault can be detected at the 
10th sample when the secondary flow rate of one steam generator has 102% nominal 
value and the secondary flow rate of the other steam generator is 98% nominal flow rate.   
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Table 5.3.  Minimum detectable fault magnitudes for sensor fault detection. 
 
 
[1] Detection Limit=Minimum detectable fault magnitude. 
[2] Percent=Percent of nominal value of the minimum detectable fault magnitude. 
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Figure 5.2.  Detection of a fault with the minimum detectable fault magnitude. 
Variable T3  (C) 
T5 
(C) 
T6 
(C) 
W7 
(kg/s) 
W12 
(kg/s) 
T12 
(C) 
T11 
(C) 
T9 
(C) 
Detection 
Limit[1] 1.7 1.7 1.7 5.7 5.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Percent [2] 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.5 4.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
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Figure 5.3.  Tracking the progression of the uneven flow distribution fault. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the results of isolating the uneven HCSG flow distribution fault.  
The upper subplot gives the fault direction characterizing the fault effects on the eight 
measured variables.  In this case, the fault effects can be characterized as a one-
dimensional vector.  After the fault occurs, the most significant symptom is that one of 
the steam generator will have a primary side outlet temperature lower than the nominal 
value and the other steam generator will have a primary side outlet temperature higher 
than the nominal value.  The lower subplot shows the ratios of the reconstruction errors to 
the thresholds for six snapshots with different severity of uneven flow distribution.  All 
the six snapshots have exactly the same signatures, which is necessary for robust fault 
isolation.  If the reconstruction is performed along the other candidate faults (eight sensor 
faults) except the uneven flow distribution fault, the reconstruction errors are all much 
greater than 1.0.  Only when the reconstruction is performed along the direction of 
uneven flow distribution fault can it be brought back within the predetermined threshold.  
Therefore, the uneven flow distribution fault can be correctly isolated.   
Table 5.4 tabulates the cosine angle between a pair of fault directions projected 
onto the residual space for all the faults.  If two fault directions projected onto the 
residual space are very similar, it will be unrealistic to distinguish their fault effects.  In 
this example, the uneven flow distribution fault is more similar to a T3 sensor fault and a 
T5 sensor fault than the other sensor faults because of a larger value of cosine.   
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Figure 5.4.  Isolation of the uneven flow distribution fault. 
 
 
Table 5.4.  Cosine of the angle between the fault directions projected onto the residual 
space 
 
Variable T3 T5 T6 W7 W12 T12 T11 T9 Process Fault 
T3 1.0 -0.28 -0.28 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.79 
T5 -0.28 1.0 -0.27 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.81 
T6 -0.28 -0.27 1.0 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
W7 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.0 -0.22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
W12 0.24 0.24 0.24 -0.22 1.0 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
T12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 1.0 -0.49 -0.50 -0.01 
T11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.49 1.0 -0.49 -0.01 
T9 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.50 -0.49 1.0 -0.01 
Process 
Fault -0.79 0.81 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.0 
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5.3.3 Results of Dual Fault Detection and Isolation 
 
The reconstruction error based approach can be easily extended to detect and 
isolate multi-dimensional faults such as simultaneous multiple faults because of the 
unified representation of the fault effects.  The application to one pair of HCSG systems 
is presented in this section.  For simplicity without loss of the generality, it is assumed 
here that the possible simultaneous faults are limited to dual faults for all the sensors in 
the system. 
Table 5.5 lists the reconstruction results of simultaneous T3 sensor fault with a 
1% bias and W7 sensor fault with a 3% bias.  The true values of the T3 and W7 are 
299.41 oC and 100.56 kg/s, respectively.  The measured values with sensor faults are 
302.33 oC and 104.33 kg/s, respectively.  The rectified values using reconstruction-based 
approach are 299.32 oC and 100.96 kg/s.  The rectified values using traditional PCA 
approach are 299.78 oC and 99.58 kg/s.  The reconstruction-based PCA approach does 
give better fault reconstruction than traditional PCA approach.   
 
Table 5.5.  Reconstruction of simultaneous sensor faults T3 and W7 
 
Variable T3 (C) 
T5 
(C) 
T6 
(C) 
W7 
(kg/s) 
W12 
(kg/s) 
T12 
(C) 
T11 
(C) 
T9 
(C) 
True value 299.41 299.41 299.41 100.56 100.56 325.27 325.27 325.27
Measured 
Value 302.33 299.23 299.29 104.33 100.50 325.30 325.13 325.41
 Reconstruction 
PCA 299.32 299.23 299.29 100.96 100.50 325.30 325.13 325.41
Traditional 
PCA 299.78 299.75
299.81 99.58 99.55 325.24 325.19 325.19
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Figure 5.5.  Identification of simultaneous dual faults (W7 and T3 sensor faults). 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the ratio of the reconstruction error to the threshold of the sum 
prediction error.  It can be seen that the ratio is greater than 1.0 when the reconstruction is 
performed using any candidate fault distribution matrices other than a dual fault of T3 
sensor fault and W7 sensor fault.  In other words, neither a single T3 sensor fault nor a 
single W7 sensor fault nor the other dual faults are able to fully explain the fault effects.  
The true fault can be correctly identified by the fact that the reconstruction is able to 
bring the reconstruction error back to below the threshold only if the fault distribution 
matrix corresponds to simultaneous T3 sensor fault and W7 sensor fault.  
 
5.4 Hybrid PCA Model Based Fault Diagnosis 
 
5.4.1 Motivation 
 
Historical PCA model based fault diagnosis depends on how data are collected.  
There are two options to collect data and build correlation-based PCA models for nuclear 
power systems.  One option is to collect data around certain operation points and the 
other option is to collect data during operation condition changes such as reactor startup.  
Because signal-to-noise ratio may be too small, the former approach may fail to capture 
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the correlations between measured variables.  In practice, the latter approach is more 
realistic in building statistical models.   
When operation condition changes, many measured variables will have significant 
amount of variation due to the manipulation of a few variables for operation condition 
changes.  However, the large variation due to operation condition changes may conceal 
the correlations between some variables.  The immediate consequence is that the 
developed statistical model will not be sensitive to detect a fault for such variables. 
A simple example is designed to illustrate this problem encountered for fault 
diagnosis.  In this example, two independent white Gaussian signals, u1 and u2, are used 
to excite a hypothetical system consisting of two signals, y1 and y2. 
For Case A, the four signals were generated as follows: 
 
)1,0(1 Nu =  
)1,0(2 Nu =  
22151 uuy +=  
23142 uuy +=  
 
The correlation coefficient of the generated data matrix [u1, u2, y1, y2] for Case 
A is given as follows: 
 
    1.0000   -0.0157    0.9181    0.7753 
   -0.0157    1.0000    0.3819    0.6193 
    0.9181    0.3819    1.0000    0.9622 
    0.7753    0.6193    0.9622    1.0000 
 
For Case B, the data were generated with a larger variation of 2u  in the 
following manner: 
 
)1,0(1 Nu =  
)1,0(*102 Nu =  
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22151 uuy +=  
23142 uuy +=  
 
The correlation matrix of the generated data [u1, u2, y1, y2] for Case B is given 
as follows: 
 
    1.0000    0.0083    0.2556    0.1434 
    0.0083    1.0000    0.9689    0.9908 
    0.2556    0.9689    1.0000    0.9934 
    0.1434    0.9908    0.9934    1.0000 
 
If we compare the correlation matrices for Case A and Case B, it is clear that a 
large variation of the signal u2 has annihilated the correlation between the signal u1 and 
y1 and y2.   
Assuming all the data were added with 0.1% random Gaussian noise, based on the 
algorithm presented in section 5.2, the minimum detectable fault magnitudes were 
calculated for u1, u2, y1, and y2 sensor faults, respectively, which are given as follows: 
 
0.006986, 0.011685, 0.033654, and 0.031368 for Case A. 
0.029867, 0.064126, 0.129584, and 0.191066 for case B. 
 
This result illustrates that a PCA model built from data with a large amount of 
variation for Case B will lead to a worse fault detection capability of the signal u1.  If we 
examine Equation (5.36) carefully, the minimum detectable fault magnitude is 
proportional to the inverse of the minimum singular value of E~ .  However, if a variable 
has very low correlation with the other variables, the resulting residual component 
vectors will have small loadings on this variable and lead to a small minimum singular 
value of E~ .  Therefore, the corresponding minimum detectable fault magnitude would 
then be large. 
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To avoid the difficulties in detecting a slight fault using data collected during 
operation condition changes, one possible solution is to decompose the variation 
contained in the collected data into different components and to perform an individual 
analysis for each components.  For instance, for the above example, if the variation of u2 
is totally removed, the resulting PCA model is able to detect u1, y1, y2 sensor faults with 
a fault magnitude of 0.006242, 0.031206, and 0.024967, respectively, which are much 
smaller than those for Case B. 
A hybrid PCA model based approach is proposed for fault detection and isolation 
with better performance in this dissertation.  The hybrid PCA modeling integrates the 
available knowledge about the system into the developed PCA models.  When data are 
collected during operation condition changes, some of the variation caused by 
independent manipulated variables, or caused by mass balance and energy balance are 
usually known.  Therefore, it is desired to decompose the variation according to their 
sources and remove the variation caused by the known sources.   
 
5.4.2 Constrained PCA Algorithm 
 
Constrained PCA (CPCA) algorithm (Takane and Hunter, 2001) provides the 
mathematical basis to implement hybrid PCA modeling for fault diagnosis.  In CPCA, the 
prior system knowledge is explicitly formulated in the PCA analysis.  CPCA first 
decomposes the data matrix according to the given external information, and then applies 
the traditional PCA algorithm to the decomposed matrices.   
The first step of CPCA involves projecting the original data matrix onto the 
spaces spanned by the matrices of the external information. 
In general, two types of external information exist.  The first one is that some 
constraints are imposed on the columns of the data matrix and the second one is that 
some external information is provided for the rows of the data matrix.  When CPCA is 
applied to fault diagnosis, the row constraints may be the known redundant 
measurements, or mass balance and energy balance equations.  The column constraints 
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may be related to the variables contributing to the large variation that may affect the 
sensitivity of fault detection.   
The potential advantages of incorporating the external information for fault 
diagnosis include: 
(a) Decompose the variation of measured variables so that the fault detection algorithm is 
more sensitive;  
(b) Provide an integrated approach to combining correlation based statistical modeling 
and first-principle based modeling. 
 
Given a data matrix X , the row constraint matrix G , the column constraint 
matrix H , the decomposition of the matrix X  takes the following form (Takane and 
Hunter, 2001): 
 
EGCBHGMHX +++= ''        (5.50) 
 
where the first term is related to the information that can be explained by both G  and 
H , the second term is related to the information that can be explained by H  but not by 
G , the third term is related to the information that can be explained by G  but not by H , 
and the last term is the residual corresponding to what cannot be explained either by G  
or by H . 
The decomposition of matrix X  defined in Equation (5.50) does not have unique 
solution unless the following orthogonal conditions are satisfied: 
 
0' =BG           (5.51a) 
0' =CH           (5.51b) 
 
The least square estimates of M , B , and C  are given by: 
 
11 )'(')'(ˆ −−= HHXHGGGM        (5.52a) 
 
11 )'()(ˆ −−−Ι= HHXHPB G        (5.52b) 
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)'(')'(ˆ 1 HPXGGGC −Ι= −         (5.52c) 
 
where GP  and HP  are orthogonal projection operators onto the space spanned by the 
column vectors of G  and H , respectively.  These two projection matrices are defined as 
follows: 
 
')'( 1GGGGPG
−=          (5.53a) 
 
')'( 1 HHHHPH
−=         (5.53b) 
 
The matrix GP  is the projector onto the column space of G  along the null space 
of 'G  and the matrix GQ  is the projector onto the null space of 'G  along the column 
space of G .  The matrices GP  and GQ  have the following properties (Takane and 
Hunter, 2001): 
 
GG PP =2  and GG QQ =2         (5.54a) 
GGG PPP ='  and GGG QQQ ='        (5.54b) 
0== GGGG PQQP          (5.54c) 
GGPG =  and '' GPG G =         (5.54d) 
0' =GQG           (5.54e) 
 
Similarly, the matrices HP  and HQ  have the same properties. 
 
If we substitute the least square estimates of M , B , and C  into Equation (5.50), 
the following decomposition can be obtained: 
 
'''' HGHGHGHG XQQXQPXPQXPPX +++=      (5.55) 
 
Because the column spaces of the four terms are mutually orthogonal, the trace of 
the original data matrix can be uniquely decomposed into the sum of the traces of the four 
individual components. 
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Prior Knowledge in Terms of Columns 
 
The G  matrix is known in this case.  If Ι=H , then Ι=HP  and 0=HQ .  
Therefore, we have: 
 
XQXPX GG +=          (5.56) 
 
In order to show the incorporation of column information into PCA modeling, an 
illustrating example is designed using the following Matlab code: 
 
x1=randn(2000,1); 
x2= randn(2000,1); 
u1=x1; 
u2=20*x1+2*x2; 
ndata=length(u1); 
y1=5*u1+2*u2; 
y2=4*u1+3*u2; 
Data0=[u1,u2,y1,y2]; 
[ndata,m]=size(Data0); 
Data=[]; 
noi=[0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1]; 
for idata=1:1:ndata 
temp=Data0(idata,:)+noi.* Data0(idata,:).*ndn(1,4); 
Data=[Data;temp]; 
end; 
The minimum detectable fault magnitudes are 0.519547, 10.392210, 23.356498, 
and 33.239751, for u1, u2, y1, and y2, respectively, based on the developed PCA model. 
If it is known that most of the variation of the collected data set arises from the 
variation of x1, we can choose G consisting of a column vector of u1.  Based on the 
algorithm defined in Equation (5.56), the original data matrix can be decomposed into 
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two components.  The first component explains the variation caused by x1 and the second 
components explains the remaining variation.   
After the decomposition, the mean value of the first component is -0.0313, -
0.6212, -1.3976, and -1.9876, and the standard deviation is 0.9828, 19.5311, 43.9392, and 
62.4907, for u1, u2, y1, and y2, respectively.  On the other hand, the mean value of the 
second component is -0.0056, 0.0012, -0.0118, and -0.6212, and the standard deviation is 
2.8624, 6.0906, and 8.8678, for u2, y1, and y2, respectively.  It is clear that the first 
component has contributed to significant portion of the total variation for u2, y1, and y2. 
Figure 5.6 shows a comparison of fault detection between traditional PCA and 
CPCA using column information for a sensor fault of u2 with a bias of 0.75 injected at 
the 1200th sample.  The upper subplot shows the results for CPCA and the lower subplot 
shows the results for traditional PCA.  It is clear that the fault of the given fault 
magnitude can be detected using CPCA while it cannot be detected using traditional 
PCA. 
Figure 5.7 shows the FDI results of a sensor fault of y1 with a bias of 1.5 injected 
at the 1200th sample based on the constrained PCA using column information.  The upper 
subplot shows that the fault can be detected immediately and the lower subplot shows 
that the prediction error can still be used for correct fault isolation. 
 
Prior Knowledge in Terms of Rows 
 
The column constraint matrix H  is known in this case.  If Ι=G , then Ι=GP  
and 0=GQ .  Therefore, we have: 
 
HH XQXPX +=          (5.57) 
 
For the same example as used when prior knowledge is known in terms of 
columns, if the constraint equation is known for the signal y2, the constraint equation can 
be embedded into the developed constrained PCA model with the matrix H  given as 
[ ]1034 −=H  
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Figure 5.6.  Comparison of fault detection between traditional PCA and constrained PCA 
using column information. 
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Figure 5.7.  Fault detection and isolation of y1 sensor fault based on constrained PCA 
using column information. 
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Figure 5.8.  Fault diagnosis of y2 sensor fault with a bias of 1.5 based on constrained 
PCA using row information. 
 
Let’s define 'XHG = , the data matrix can then be decomposed into two 
components.  The first component explains the variation defined by the constrained 
equation given by H and the second component explains the remaining variation.  If the 
second component is examined, we can find that most of the variation contained in the 
original data has been removed by the first decomposed component.  Therefore, we can 
expect that a fault of smaller magnitude can be detected by performing a standard PCA 
on the second decomposed component. 
Figure 5.8 shows a comparison of the fault diagnosis with constrained PCA using 
row information for y1 sensor fault with a bias of 1.5.  The upper subplot shows that the 
fault can be successfully detected.  If we recall that the minimum detectable fault 
magnitudes are 0.519547, 10.392210, 23.356498, and 33.239751, for u1, u2, y1, and y2, 
respectively, for traditional PCA approach, the detectable fault magnitude based on the 
constrained PCA approach is indeed much smaller.  The lower subplot shows the 
prediction error based on the PCA analysis on the second decomposed component.  It is 
clear that the sensor fault can be correctly identified. 
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5.4.3 Application to the HCSG System 
 
The hybrid PCA model based fault diagnosis algorithm is applied to the same data 
set generated for HCSG system and compared with the results presented in section 5.3.   
According to a simple analysis, most of the variation contained in the operation 
data is caused by the variation of the feed water flow rate.  Therefore, a constrained PCA 
model can be developed with the G matrix defined by the column of feed water flow rate.   
A standard PCA is performed for the second component of the decomposed data 
matrix.  Figure 5.9 plots the original data and the first decomposed component for T3 and 
T6 as a function of W7.  As we can see, the decomposed first component is indeed able to 
explain the variation caused by the feed water flow rate.  Figure 5.10 shows the results of 
fault diagnosis of a T5 sensor fault with 0.25% bias based on the constrained PCA 
algorithm using the prior information that feed water flow rate is predominant on the 
variation of the collected data.  Compared with the minimum detectable fault magnitude 
given in Table 5.3, the sensitivity of the fault detection has improved significantly 
through incorporating prior knowledge into the constrained PCA algorithm.  
By imposing a constraint on the feed water flow rate and the steam flow rate, a 
constrained PCA was performed with the following constraints: 
 
[ ]00011000 −=H  
 
A standard PCA is performed over the second component of the decomposed data 
matrix.  Figure 5.11 plots the original data and the first decomposed component for W12 
as a function of W7.  As we can see, the decomposed first component satisfied the 
specified constraint equation that the steam flow rate is equal to the feed water flow rate.  
Figure 5.12 shows the results of fault diagnosis of a T3 sensor fault with 0.25% bias 
based on CPCA using the constraints W7=W12.  Compared with the minimum detectable 
fault magnitude given in Table 5.3, the sensitivity of the fault detection can also be 
improved significantly through incorporating prior knowledge into the constrained PCA 
algorithm. 
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Figure 5.9.  Component decomposition of constrained PCA analysis using column 
information. 
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Figure 5.10.  Fault diagnosis of a T5 sensor fault with 0.25% bias based on constrained 
PCA using column information. 
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Figure 5.11.  Component decomposition of constrained PCA analysis using row 
information. 
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Figure 5.12.  Fault diagnosis of a T3 sensor fault with 0.25% bias using constrained PCA 
with the constraint W7=W12. 
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5.5 Robust PCA Model Based Approach to Fault Diagnosis 
 
Robust PCA model based approach to steady state fault diagnosis is developed in 
this dissertation.  In this approach, a PCA model is built using data generated from a 
simulation model.  After the uncertainty of the developed PCA model is identified, robust 
residual generators are then designed such that the model mismatch can be decoupled.  In 
this section, the algorithm of robust PCA model based steady state fault diagnosis is 
derived first and then applied to a pair of IRIS helical coil steam generators.  The robust 
PCA model based fault diagnosis approach can relax the stringent requirements of data 
collection for traditional historical data based fault diagnosis methods and will increase 
the potential of using model based approach to fault diagnosis to solve engineering 
problems.  The developed algorithm can be applied to any subsystems in nuclear power 
plants. 
 
5.5.1 Identification of Model Uncertainty  
 
The developed PCA model from simulation data always has a certain degree of 
uncertainty when used to describe the relationships among measured variables in a real 
process.  The model uncertainty can be ascribed to the simplification used in the 
simulation model, the parameter uncertainty for simulation, and the model reduction 
error.  For a complex system such as a nuclear power plant, it might be too difficult to 
know the characteristics of model uncertainty due to incomplete understanding about the 
physical system.  For this reason, the model uncertainty needs to be estimated from plant 
measurements. 
If model uncertainty is considered as an additive unknown disturbance term, the 
system model can be described as follows (Chen and Patton, 1999): 
 
ε++= dEyy d*          (5.58) 
 
where 
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y  = the plant measured values. 
*y  = the estimated value from the developed PCA model. 
ε  = the measurement noise. 
d  = the magnitude of model uncertainty vector. 
dE  = the distribution matrix of model uncertainty. 
 
The estimated value from the PCA model, *y , can be calculated as follows: 
 
MM tPy =*           (5.59) 
 
where MP  is the loading matrix of the developed PCA model and Mt  is the 
corresponding score matrix. 
The uncertainty distribution matrix dE  can be estimated by studying the 
structured properties of the difference between the measured values and the predicted 
values.  Given that the plant measurement data matrix is Y , the difference between the 
plant measurements and the model predictions, 1Ω , is as follows: 
 
YPPY TMM−=Ω1          (5.60) 
 
If the columns of 1Ω  change only due to the measurement noise, it is safe to state 
that the uncertainty distribution matrix dE  is a vector and the magnitude of model 
uncertainty is a scalar function.  In this case, the matrix dE  can be approximated as a 
simple average of the columns of 1Ω .  
In general, the columns of 1Ω  have varying directions and the model uncertainty 
vector lives in a multi-dimensional space.  To extract the dominant directions, the 
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singular value decomposition (SVD) procedure can be performed on 1Ω .  This is given 
by: 
 
TVSU 1111 =Ω           (5.61) 
 
If the diagonal matrix 1S  has dn  dominant singular values, the number of 
dominant directions is then dn  and the matrix 1Ω  can be approximated by: 
 
TVUΛ≈Ω1           (5.62) 
 
where Λ  is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the dn  most dominant 
singular values, U  contains the corresponding dn  left singular vectors and V  contains 
the corresponding dn  right singular vectors.   
The orthonormal matrix U  obtained from the SVD procedure can be directly 
used as the estimated uncertainty distribution matrix dE .  If the developed PCA model is 
able to characterize the major relationships, the column dimension of dE  should be much 
smaller than the number of the measurements. 
 
5.5.2 Robust PCA Based Fault Detection 
 
Different process faults and sensor faults have different effects on the plant 
measurements.  For a simple sensor fault, only one measurement is affected and the fault 
effects can be characterized by a one-dimensional vector.  However, a process fault 
usually affects multiple measurements.  In the presence of feedback, a sensor fault may 
also affect multiple measurements because of fault propagation within and across control 
loops.   
In general, in order to deal with process faults and sensor faults in a consistent 
manner, a multi-dimensional fault distribution matrix should be used to characterize the 
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fault effects on measurements (Dunia and Qin, 1998a).  The measurement vector y  with 
both model uncertainty and fault effects can be described as follows: 
 
ε+++= fEdEtPy fdMM        (5.63) 
 
where fE  is the fault distribution matrix and f  is the fault magnitude vector. 
To design a residual generator for fault detection, 0r , for the system given in 
Equation (5.63), a linear transformation B  needs to be performed on the measured 
variables, which is written as follows: 
 
Byr =0           (5.64) 
 
Because the generated residuals for fault detection should be decoupled from both 
model uncertainty and operation states, the transformation matrix B  must satisfy the 
following condition: 
 
[ ] 0=dM EPB          (5.65) 
 
Therefore, the residual 0r  generated by the transformation matrix B  given in 
Equation (5.65) will be dependent only on the fault magnitude, which is given as follows: 
 
εBfBEr f +=0          (5.66) 
 
If the measurement noise ε  follows certain distribution with covariance matrix 
Ψ , the residual vector 0r  for fault free conditions will follow the same distribution with 
zero-valued expected value and covariance matrix Φ , which is given by: 
 
TBBr Ψ==Φ )cov( 0         (5.67) 
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If the covariance matrix of measurement noise Ψ  is unknown, the covariance 
matrix Φ  can be learned directly from fault free data. 
Because the components of 0r  are usually correlated, it is not convenient to define 
a statistical test on the generated residual for change detection.  For this reason, the SVD 
procedure can be performed on Φ , which is given by: 
 
TUUΛ≈Φ           (5.68) 
 
where U  contains 0n  left singular vectors and Λ  consists of 0n  non-zero singular 
values. 
The SVD of the covariance matrix Φ  allows us to construct a linear 
transformation 2/10
−Λ= UW  such that a new residual vector 0R  will become 
uncorrelated, which is given by: 
 
ByWrWR TT 0000 ==          (5.69) 
 
If the measurement noise ε  follows normal distribution, the transformed residual 
vector 0R  for fault free conditions follows 0n  dimensional multivariate normal 
distribution with zero mean and unit variance (Romagnoli and Sanchez, 2000).  
Correspondingly, the 2-norm of this residual, 220 |||| R , follows a 
2χ  distribution with 0n  
degrees of freedom.  Therefore, for a specified critical value α , a threshold 20δ  can be 
determined for fault detection in terms of 220 |||| R , which is given by: 
 
2
,
2
0
2
20 0
|||| αχδ nR =≤          (5.70) 
 
Based on the transformed 2-norm residual 220 |||| R  and its threshold 
2
0δ , a robust 
fault detection index 0ϖ  can be calculated for fault detection, which is given as follows: 
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2
0
2
20
0
||||
δϖ
R=           (5.71) 
 
If the robust fault detection index 0ϖ  is smaller than 1.0, the system is considered 
as operating at normal operation conditions.  Otherwise, a fault will be detected.   
The robust fault detection index can ensure that no false alarms will be caused by 
model uncertainty if it can be characterized by the specified uncertainty distribution 
matrix dE .  However, in order to detect a fault, the fault direction and the fault 
magnitude must satisfy the following condition: 
2
0
2
20
2
20 ||)(|||||| δε ≥+= BfBEWR fT       (5.72) 
 
It can be observed from Equation (5.72) that a fault is not detectable if the column 
space of the fault distribution matrix fE  lives in the null space of the matrix BW
T
0 .  A 
trivial case is that a fault will not be detectable if fE  lives in the joint column space of 
MP  and dE  because the fault effects are the same as the effects resulted from the model 
uncertainty and the normal operation changes. 
Even if a fault is detectable, the fault magnitude must be large enough to 
distinguish the fault effects from measurement noise.  A sufficient condition for absolute 
fault detectability is given by: 
 
020 2|||| δ≥fBEW fT          (5.73) 
 
If the measurement data were standardized with a standard deviation of mσ , this 
sufficient condition can be further simplified as follows: 
 
1
0min02 ))((2||||
−≥ fT BEWf σδ        (5.74) 
 
where minσ  denotes the minimum singular value. 
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5.5.3 Robust PCA Model Based Fault Isolation 
 
Reconstruction PCA model based approach developed by Dunia and Qin, 1998b, 
is extended for robust fault isolation in this dissertation.  In reconstruction PCA approach, 
a multi-dimensional fault is described by a subspace in which the fault effects are 
characterized.  Fault isolation is achieved by reconstructing the fault measurements in 
different candidate fault subspaces until the fault effects can be fully explained.  For a 
given set of candidate faults, if the reconstruction error can be brought back to the normal 
region for one candidate fault, a decision can then be made that this candidate fault is the 
true fault of the system.  Because this method is assumption based, the fault isolation 
result is more conclusive than contribution-based approach and classification based 
approach (Russell, Chiang, and Braatz, 2000).  In this dissertation, the fault 
reconstruction algorithm will be extended to when there is model uncertainty.   
For a system with the true fault characterized by the fault distribution matrix iE , 
the fault measurement y  can be described as follows: 
 
ε+++= fEdEyy id*         (5.75) 
 
Considering a candidate fault jE , the reconstructed value of the measurement 
vector, jy , in the fault subspace jE  is given by: 
 
jjj fEyy −=          (5.76) 
 
Because jy  is the expected value after the fault effects are eliminated, the best 
estimate of the fault magnitude vector jf  can be determined by minimizing the distance 
between jy  and the joint column space of MP  and dE  (Qin, 2003).  The minimization 
problem is mathematically written as follows: 
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2
2
2
2 ||||min||||min jjfjf fBEByBy jj −=       (5.77) 
 
If the matrix jBE  has full column rank of en , the SVD on the matrix jBE  will 
not have zero singular values, which takes the following form: 
 
T
jjjj VEBE Λ= 0          (5.78) 
where 0jE  and jV  are the left and right singular vectors corresponding to the en  nonzero 
singular values. 
 
After the SVD procedure is performed, the minimum 2-norm solution to Equation 
(5.77) is given by: 
 
)()( 01 ByEVf Tjjjj
−Λ=         (5.79) 
 
According to Equation (5.79), the fault can be completely reconstructed along all 
the en  directions if the matrix jBE  has full column rank.  However, if the matrix jBE  
does not have full column rank, en , the SVD on the matrix jBE  will result in only pn  
nonzero singular values, where ep nn < .  In this case, the fault can still be reconstructed 
according to Equation (5.79), but the fault can only be partially reconstructed along pn  
fault directions that correspond to the non-vanishing left singular vectors (Dunia and Qin, 
1998b). 
The reconstructed error of the measured vector in the candidate fault subspace 
0
jE , jir | , can now be calculated as follows: 
 
 )~)()(())(( 00000| fBEBEEByEEByr i
T
jj
T
jjjji +−Ι=−Ι== ε    (5.80a) 
 
where 
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fVf TiiΛ=~           (5.80b) 
 
If the fault measurement is reconstructed in the true fault subspace, the 
substitution of ij =  into Equation (5.80a) shows that the reconstructed error jir |  will be 
independent of fault magnitude vector f .  Therefore, the reconstructed error jir |  will be 
reduced to within the normal region when there is no fault, which is given by: 
 
 ))(( 00| εBEEr Tiiii −Ι=         (5.81) 
 
In order to define a convenient statistics, similar to robust fault detection, a linear 
transformation iW  can be performed on the reconstruction error jir |  to generate the 
transformed residual  | jiR , which is given by: 
 
 ))(( 00| ByEEWR
T
jj
T
iji −Ι=        (5.82) 
 
The transformed residual  |iiR when the fault measurement is reconstructed in the 
fault subspace iE  can be computed as follows: 
 
 ))(( 00| εBEEWR TiiTiii −Ι=        (5.83) 
 
Given that in  singular values are retained to calculate the transformation iW , the 
transformed residual vector iiR |  follows a multi-dimensional normal distribution with 
zero mean and unit variance if the measurement noise has normal distribution.  
Correspondingly, the norm of the transformed residual 22| |||| iiR  will follow a 
2
,αχ ni  
distribution with in  degrees of freedom.  Therefore, a threshold of 
2
2| |||| iiR  can be 
derived to determine whether the fault measurement is reconstructed in the true fault 
subspace iE , which is given as follows: 
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2
,
22
2| |||| αχδ niiiiR =≤          (5.84) 
 
A robust fault isolation index can also be derived for fault isolation, which is 
given as follows: 
 
2
,
2
2| ||||
αχϖ ni
ji
i
R=           (5.85) 
 
If the fault isolation index iϖ  is less than 1.0, the fault measurement can then be 
fully reconstructed in the assumed fault subspace.  Otherwise, the assumed fault jE  is 
not the true fault iE  that has occurred in the system.  Based on this logic, the fault 
isolation can be successfully achieved if the set of candidate faults is complete.  Once a 
fault is isolated, the fault magnitude vector can be estimated using Equation (5.79). 
However, in order to avoid that a fault jE  would not be isolated as a fault iE , the 
following condition must be satisfied: 
 
22
2
0002
2| ||)
~)()((|||||| ii
T
jj
T
iji fBEBEEWR δε >+−Ι=  for all ij ≠    (5.86) 
 
Because the matrix Tjj EE )(
00−Ι  has eigenvalues of either zero or one, the 
following inequality holds (Dunia and Qin, 1997): 
 
||||||))((|| 00 εε BWBEEW TiTjjTi ≤−Ι       (5.87) 
 
For the same reason, if we denote the statistical threshold of |||| εBW Ti  as 0iδ , 
we have ii δδ ≥0 .  Therefore, one sufficient condition to avoid a fault iE  from being 
identified as fault jE  can be given as follows: 
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0
000 2||)~))((|| ii
T
jj
T
i fBEEEW δ>−Ι  for all ij ≠      (5.88) 
 
This sufficient condition can be further simplified as follows: 
 
1000
min0 )]}]())(([[{2||
~|| −−Ι> iTjjTii BEEEWf σδ      (5.89) 
 
5.5.4 Identification of Fault Distribution Matrix 
 
The robust fault detection and isolation algorithm presented here involves the 
determination of fault distribution matrix fE .  For a simple fault such as sensor faults 
affecting only one variable that is not used for control, the fault distribution matrix fE  is 
nothing but the corresponding column vector of the identity matrix.  However, for a 
complex fault, the fault distribution matrix fE  must be identified either from simulation 
data or from plant measurements. 
If fault data is generated from simulation, the fault distribution matrix fE  can be 
identified directly from simulation data using the same methods as used to identify the 
model uncertainty distribution matrix dE .  
If fault data is obtained from plant measurements, the fault distribution matrix fE  
cannot be identified directly by performing SVD on the difference between the fault data 
and the predicted data because the fault data has included the effects of model 
uncertainty.  Fortunately, as can be seen from Equation (5.82), it is not necessary to know 
fE  if the matrix 
0
fE  can be determined as far as fault isolation is concerned.   
If we combine Equation (5.65) and Equation (5.75), the fault measurements that 
contain model uncertainty satisfy the following equation: 
 
fBEBBy f+= ε          (5.90) 
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Given that the matrix Y  is constructed by N  observations of fault measurements, 
where N  is much larger than the number of measurements, and if the noise effects are 
ignorable, Equation (5.90) can be written in matrix form as follows: 
 
FEFBEBYZ ff
~0===         (5.91) 
where 
[ ])(...)2()1( NfffF =  
[ ])(~...)2(~)1(~~ NfffF =  
 
Because the column rank of fE  and the row rank of F  are assumed equal, the 
matrix F~  should have a row rank that is equal to the column rank of 0fE .  Therefore, the 
column space of 0fE  can be extracted by performing the SVD procedure on the matrix 
Z , which is given as follows: 
 
TVSUZ 111=           (5.92) 
 
where the matrix 1S  is diagonal with only non-zero singular values retained, 1U  is the 
corresponding left singular matrix, and 1V  is the corresponding right singular matrix.   
If the noise effects are considered, the insignificant singular values should be 
discarded in Equation (5.92) although they are not exactly zeros.  
Because the fault distribution matrix 0fE  and the matrix 1U  contain the basis 
vectors of the same column space, 0fE  and 1U  are equivalent within a similarity 
transformation.  This implies that we can simply choose 0fE  to be 1U , which will not 
affect the results of fault isolation based on Equation (5.82). 
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5.5.5 Application to the HCSG System 
 
In order to have a realistic simulation with most measurements correlated with 
each other, one pair of steam generators is analyzed here.  It is presumed that the 
available measurements include: (1) T3: the primary side outlet temperature of SG-A; (2) 
T5: the primary side outlet temperature of SG-B; (3) T6: the primary side outlet 
temperature of SG-A and SG-B; (4) W7: the feed water flow rate into the secondary side 
of SG-A and SG-B; (5) W12: the steam flow rate leaving the secondary side of SG-A and 
SG-B; (6) T9: the steam temperature leaving the secondary side of SG-A; and (7) T11: 
the steam temperature leaving the secondary side of SG-B. 
Both sensor faults and process faults were considered in the HCSG fault 
diagnosis.  The seven considered sensor faults were of the bias type.  Because the 
generated residuals in the developed robust fault diagnosis algorithm were dependent 
only on fault magnitude, the same algorithm can be used to detect a fault of sensor drift.  
The secondary side tube blockage is a process fault considered for the HCSG system.  
When this process fault occurs, the flow rate into the secondary side of each steam 
generator will be different.  However, because the secondary fluid flows inside the helical 
coil tubes, it is unrealistic to directly measure the flow rate into each steam generator and 
the fault effects cannot be directly observed based on the flow rates.  For this reason, the 
fault needs to be monitored from the other measured variables such as the primary outlet 
temperature and the steam outlet temperature. 
The fault distribution matrix is identified from the simulation data for the tube 
blockage fault in the system.  The fault data is generated by linearly increasing the feed 
water flow rate into SG-A from 100% nominal value to 110% nominal value while 
reducing the feed water flow rate into SG-B from 100% nominal value to 90% nominal 
value.  The SVD procedure is performed on the difference between the simulated fault 
data and the PCA model prediction to extract the fault distribution matrix.  One left 
singular vector is retained to characterize the fault direction, which is shown in Figure 
5.13.  As can be seen, T3 and T11 have negative components while T5 and T9 have 
positive components.  The extracted fault direction has clear physical explanation.    
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Figure 5.13.  Fault direction of tube blockage fault.  
 
The thermal degradations of SG-A and SG-B are considered to simulate model 
uncertainty.  During nuclear power plant operations, the gradual thermal degradation of 
steam generators is inevitable.  Any engineering applicable fault diagnosis algorithm 
must be able to distinguish such inevitable disturbances from sensor and process faults.  
In this demonstration study, the steam generator degradation was simulated by reducing 
the effective heat transfer coefficient from the primary side to the secondary side such 
that the steam temperature will decrease by 5 oC during 1000 samples at 100% nominal 
value of the feed water flow rate.  After the data were generated, the temperature data 
were mixed with white Gaussian noise with three standard deviations of 0.25% nominal 
value and the flow rate data were mixed with white Gaussian noise with three standard 
deviations of 1% nominal value.  Figure 5.14 shows the direction of the model 
uncertainty when the thermal degradation was considered as a disturbance.  As can be 
seen, the model uncertainty is characterized by the increase of primary outlet temperature 
T3, T5, and T6, and the decrease of steam outlet temperature T9 and T11, which is in 
agreement with the physical effects of steam generator thermal degradation. 
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Figure 5.14. Direction of model uncertainty due to thermal degradation. 
 
In order to test the developed robust PCA model based fault diagnosis algorithm, 
the tube blockage fault data and the thermal degradation data to simulate model 
uncertainty were generated at 90% nominal value of the feed water flow rate.  Figure 
5.15 shows a comparison of the fault detection with and without model uncertainty 
decoupling.  The upper subplot shows the calculated fault detection index without model 
uncertainty decoupling as the thermal degradation progresses and the lower subplot 
shows the calculated results with model uncertainty decoupling.  If the model uncertainty 
is not decoupled, the fault detection index will be greater than the detection limit, 1.0, as 
the severity of thermal degradation increases.  This means that the model uncertainty due 
to HCSG thermal degradation will cause false alarms.  However, if the model uncertainty 
is decoupled, the robust fault detection index is consistently smaller than the detection 
limit, 1.0, even if the thermal degradation becomes significant.  It is also interesting to 
notice that the robust fault detection algorithm is robust to the changes in operation 
conditions.   Although the model uncertainty distribution matrix is identified at 100% 
nominal value of the feed water flow rate, the robust fault detection algorithm will still 
not cause false alarms when the tube blockage occurs at 90% nominal value of the feed 
water flow rate. 
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Figure 5.15.  Comparison of robust detection algorithm with traditional method. 
 
Figure 5.16 shows the fault isolation index for HCSG tube blockage fault after the 
fault effects are reconstructed in the eight candidate fault subspaces corresponding to 
seven sensor faults and one process fault.  In the Figure, the tube blockage process fault is 
injected after the 200th sample.  It can be seen that the fault isolation index can be 
reduced to be less than 1.0 only if the fault reconstruction is performed in the subspace of 
the tube blockage fault.  Therefore, this fault can be correctly isolated as a tube blockage 
fault.   
Figure 5.17 shows the results of fault estimation for a T3 sensor fault with a bias 
of 1.7 oC when the fault is injected after the 200th sample.  Before the fault is injected, the 
HCSG system is operating at 90% nominal value of the feed water flow rate, so the initial 
temperature of T3 is 295.5 oC instead of 292.0 oC at 100% full opera operation condition.  
The HCSG has the thermal degradation progressing for the plotted 1000 samples to 
simulate model uncertainty.  It can be seen that the fault estimation algorithm described 
in section 5.5.3 is still able to reconstruct the injected sensor faults successfully although 
there is model uncertainty.  In addition, it can be observed that the variance of the 
measured value can also be reduced through the fault reconstruction algorithm before the 
fault is injected. 
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Figure 5.16.  Isolation of HCSG tube blockage process fault 
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Figure 5.17.  Fault reconstruction of a T3 sensor bias fault with a magnitude of 1.7 C. 
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An integrated framework of robust PCA model based fault diagnosis is developed 
developed in this section.  The identification of model uncertainty is achieved by 
performing SVD on the difference between plant measurements and model prediction.  
Robust fault detection algorithm calculates a fault detection index that is larger than 1.0 
only if a fault occurs even if the PCA model has model uncertainty.  Robust fault 
isolation is based on determining a fault isolation index that measures how well the fault 
measurements can be reconstructed when reconstructed in different candidate fault 
subspaces.  Because the fault isolation algorithm is assumption based, a candidate fault is 
confirmed to be the true fault only if the fault effects can be fully explained by the fault 
assumption.  The developed robust fault isolation algorithm is unique in that the fault 
reconstruction will not be affected by model uncertainty.  In addition, two situations are 
separated for identifying the fault distribution matrix.  It is pointed out that it is not 
possible to identify the fault distribution matrix directly from fault measurements if there 
is model uncertainty.  However, it is realistic and sufficient to identify the components of 
the fault distribution matrix living in the null space of model uncertainty for the 
developed FDI method. 
The developed robust PCA model based fault diagnosis algorithm has been 
demonstrated through the application to the IRIS HCSG system.  The steam generator 
thermal degradation is considered as model uncertainty.  Both sensor faults of the 
involved seven variables and the process fault of tube blockage can be correctly detected 
and isolated based on the calculated fault detection index and fault isolation index when 
model uncertainty is considered.  The FDI results also demonstrate that the developed 
methods are robust to operation changes and model uncertainty. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
Fault diagnosis techniques during steady state conditions are studied in this 
chapter.  Reconstruction based PCA was proposed as a baseline approach for steady state 
fault diagnosis of nuclear power systems.  This approach is appropriate when significant 
amount of historical data is available to cover the entire space of anticipated operation 
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conditions.  Because reconstruction model based PCA is an assumption-based approach, 
it can provide more conclusive results of fault isolation than other approaches.  Hybrid 
PCA approach was developed to incorporate prior knowledge into PCA modeling for 
steady state fault diagnosis.  In some cases, it can detect small faults after large variations 
are removed from raw data.  Robust data driven model based approach was derived for 
steady state fault diagnosis.  In this approach, data driven models are developed from 
simulation data and model uncertainties are identified from plant measurements and 
explicitly represented in the robust fault diagnosis algorithm.  This approach is able to 
avoid false alarms caused by the model uncertainty when physical model based methods 
are used or caused by inadequate amount of data when historical data based methods are 
used. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Fault Diagnosis during Transient Conditions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Dynamic model based fault diagnosis is expected to have better robustness than 
steady state fault diagnosis.  For Generation-IV nuclear power plants with load following 
capability, it becomes mandatory to utilize dynamic models for fault diagnosis.  Besides, 
for the purpose of fault tolerant control, reliable and immediate diagnostic information 
during dynamic conditions can only be provided by dynamic model based fault diagnosis.  
As will be explained later, dynamic model-based fault diagnosis also utilizes temporal 
redundancy in addition to spatial redundancy and thus requires fewer sensors for fault 
isolation than steady state fault diagnosis.  
Traditional approach to robust dynamic fault diagnosis consists of three steps.  
The first step is to develop a dynamic model from experimental data or system physics.  
The second step is to identify model uncertainty from real time plant measured data.  The 
last step is to apply robust parity space theory to design dynamic residual generators that 
are robust to model uncertainty for fault detection and isolation. 
Robust data driven dynamic fault diagnosis approach is proposed in this 
dissertation.  In this approach, a low order state-space model was developed using 
subspace identification method from simulation tools used in nuclear system design.  A 
new robust dynamic residual generator design algorithm was developed to combine the 
identification of model uncertainty with robust residual generation into one step.  The 
robust residual generator design was implemented by solving a generalized eigenvalue 
problem. 
The theory of subspace identification is presented first in this chapter.  The one-
step robust dynamic residual generator design algorithm is then described.  Finally, the 
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developed algorithm is demonstrated through the application to IRIS HCSG system for 
dynamic fault diagnosis. 
 
6.2 Theory of Subspace Identification 
 
Subspace identification is the most important contribution in the field of system 
identification in the 1990s. The initial concepts and ideas of subspace identification were 
originated by De Moor, 1988, and the theory and implementation became mature in 1995 
(Van Overschee and De Moor, 1995).  
Subspace identification combines the theory in linear system, statistics, 
optimization, and numerical linear algebra for dynamic system identification.  Subspace 
identification extracts model information from the column space of certain matrices 
obtained from input-output data and Kalman state information from the row space of 
these matrices without knowing the system matrices (Van Overschee and De Moor, 
1995).  The major advantage of subspace identification is that no explicit model 
parameterization is needed and only numerical linear algebra such as singular value 
decomposition and QR decomposition is needed for implementation.  Therefore, 
subspace identification can provide a numerically stable algorithm to develop dynamic 
models from input-output data. 
A linear state space model structure is assumed in subspace identification.  
Although many industrial processes have nonlinearity, this nonlinearity can be handled 
either by recursive updating of a linear model or by using model uncertainty decoupling 
techniques for robust control and fault diagnosis design.  Most importantly, linear state 
space model is the only class of systems tractable with rigorous theory.  The 
mathematical representation of a linear state space model is as follows: 
 
kkkk
kkkk
vDuCxy
wBuAxx
++=
++=+1         (6.1) 
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where ku  is the input vector, ky  is the output vector, kx  is the state vector, and kw  and 
kv  are zero mean white Gaussian noise vectors with the following constant covariance 
structure: 
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⎡ )),([       (6.2) 
 
On the condition that the input and output data are available, subspace 
identification aims at determining (Van Overschee and De Moor, 1995): 
(1) The order of the unknown system. 
(2) The system matrices A , B ,C , D  within a similarity transformation. 
(3) The noise characteristic matrices wΣ , vΣ , and vwΣ . 
 
6.2.1 Block Data Equations 
 
In subspace identification, block Hankel data matrices are used to extract the 
model information and the Kalman state information from data using geometric 
projection.  A block Hankel matrix of a signal has its column vector stacked in rows and 
the stacked column vectors in time sequences arranged in columns.  For instance, the 
block Hankel matrix of the input signal is constructed as follows: 
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where k  denotes the discretized time instant of the first row and first column element, s  
denotes the number of row blocks and N  denotes the number of columns used to 
construct the block Hankel matrix.  The block Hankel matrix skY , 
s
kW , 
s
kV  can be 
constructed similarly for the signal y , w , and v , respectively. 
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The extended observability matrix sΓ  relating the state vector to the stacked 
output vector is defined as follows: 
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The Toeplitz block matrices sH  and sG  are further defined as follows: 
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The concept of Kalman state sequences in system dynamics is emphasized in 
subspace identification.  The key of subspace identification is to identify the Kalman state 
sequences directly from the input-output data without knowing the system matrices.  A 
Kalman state sequence involved in block data equation is defined as follows: 
 
[ ]11 −++= Nkkkk xxxX "        (6.7) 
 
Based on the above matrices, the block data equation can be obtained as follows: 
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In order to identify the Kalman state sequences from the input-output data using 
geometric projection, it is also necessary to build block Hankel matrix of the input and 
output signals for the past block data and the future block data separately.   
Given that the past block matrix and the future block matrix have the same 
number of row blocks 1+s , the past block matrix and the future block matrix of the 
input signal are defined as follows: 
 
s
kp UU =           (6.9a) 
s
skf UU 1++=           (6.9b) 
The past block matrix and the future block matrix of the output signal can be 
defined similarly. 
 
6.2.2 Recovery of System Matrices from State Sequence  
 
Subspace identification technique is deeply rooted in the fact that the Kalman 
state sequence can be identified from input-output data.  If the state sequence has been 
determined from the input-output data without knowing the system matrices, the 
identification problem can be transformed to a least squares estimation problem with 
respect to the system matrices and the process and measurement noise covariance 
matrices.   
Given that two adjacent state sequences 1ˆ +kX  and kXˆ  have been determined, 
they are related to the system matrices A , B , C , and D  in the following manner 
(Gauss-Markov model): 
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The system matrices can then be recovered by solving a least-squares problem 
such that the Frobenius norm of the difference of two sides of Equation (6.10), which is 
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defined as the square root of the sum of the absolute squares of the matrix elements, is 
minimized (Van Overschee and De Moor, 1995). 
Three major subspace identification algorithms N4SID (Numerical algorithms for 
Subspace State Space System Identification), MOESP (Multiple Output-Error State 
Space), and CVA (Canonical Variate Analysis) exist.  These algorithms differ only in 
how the Kalman state sequences are extracted from input-output data and how the system 
matrices are recovered.  Because N4SID has been implemented in the Matlab system 
identification toolbox, the following discussion is based on N4SID algorithm. 
 
6.2.3 Extractability of Kalman State Sequence from Input-output Data 
 
It will be proved that Kalman state sequence can indeed be extracted from input-
output data in this section.  In the next two sections, two techniques are described 
showing how to obtain Kalman state sequence from input-output data. 
 
6.2.3.1 System Decomposition 
 
For an operating system, the state variables and the system output variables are 
excited both by deterministic inputs and by stochastic noises.  In other words, the state 
vector and the measurement vector can be decomposed into two components as follows: 
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where the superscripts d and s correspond to the deterministic component and the 
stochastic component, respectively. 
Because the involved system is linear, the system defined in Equation (6.1) is 
equivalent to the supposition of one deterministic system and one stochastic system.  The 
deterministic subsystem is given by: 
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The stochastic subsystem is given by: 
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To show the equivalency between the original system and the decomposed two 
subsystems, we can prove that for a given deterministic input )(su  and stochastic input 
)(sw , the responses of the dynamic system Equation (6.1) and the dynamic system 
Equation (6.11) are the same.  This is given in the Laplace domain as: 
 
)()()()()()()( 11 svswAsCsDusBuAsCsy +−Ι++−Ι= −−   (6.14) 
 
6.2.3.2 Extraction of Kalman State Vector  
 
Kalman filter theory invented by R. Kalman in 1960 enables us to estimate the 
state vector sequences kx  for the dynamic system given by Equation (6.1) from the 
input-output data (Kalman, 1960).  In subspace identification, we need to design a bank 
of Kalman filters to estimate a Kalman state sequence simply by working on the block 
Hankel matrix of past inputs and past outputs.  In other words, the state estimate of 
Kalman state vector, 1ˆ +kx , needs to be derived from the information up to time instant 
k only.  Because this is the theoretical foundation of subspace identification, we have 
proved that this is indeed true in this dissertation following the procedure to prove the 
Kalman filter equation presented by Becerra, 2004. 
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It is obvious from Equation (6.1) that the estimated mean of the state vector kx  
propagates in the following manner: 
 
00
1
xx
BuxAx kkk =
+=+          (6.15) 
 
where 
0x  = the initial state estimate of the process. 
 
Apparently, the estimated mean of the state vector kx  follows exactly the 
deterministic part of the dynamics defined in Equation (6.1).  However, kx  is different 
from dkx  since the initial state estimate is still a random variable. 
The covariance matrix of the estimation error of the state vector xP  propagates as 
follows: 
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The estimated mean value of the output vector ky  is as follows: 
 
kkk DuxCy +=          (6.17) 
 
The covariance matrix of the estimation error of the output vector yP  propagates 
as follows: 
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The covariance matrix between the state estimate and the output is given by: 
 
T
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In subspace identification, the state estimate of Kalman state vector 1ˆ +kx  is 
determined using only the information up to the time instant k .  This is a one-step 
predictor and is different from the classical Kalman filtering setting where the full input-
output information including the current information is used.  In classical Kalman 
filtering, the information up to the time instant 1+k  is used to estimate the state 1ˆ +kx . 
For this reason, it is assumed that the estimate of the state vector 1ˆ +kx  is a linear 
function of the available system output ky , which is given by: 
 
gKyx kk +=+1ˆ          (6.20) 
 
where K  is a matrix and g  is a vector to be determined. 
 
The optimal state estimate can be obtained by minimizing the objective function 
given by: 
)]ˆ()ˆ[( 1111 ++++ −−= kkTkk xxxxEJ        (6.21) 
The above minimization problem is equivalent to minimizing the following 
objective function: 
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If we notice kk BuxAkkx +=+ )|1(ˆ  and substitute kkkk yyyy +−=  into 
Equation (6.22a), the objective function can be further simplified as follows (Becerra, 
2004): 
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where 
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If we recall the following two formula of matrix derivatives: 
  
HKKHKtr
dK
d T 2])[( =   
and  
TT HDDgHtr
dg
d =])[( ,  
 
the minimal value is reached when the following conditions are satisfied: 
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The solution is then given by: 
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After cumbersome algebra, the non-steady state Kalman state estimate 1ˆ +kx  can 
be obtained by the following recursive formula: 
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The covariance of the state estimation error is given by: 
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           (6.26) 
 
The results obtained here are the same as the results of the combined non-steady 
state Kalman filter given in Van Overschee and De Moor, 1996. 
If the recursive form of Kalman state estimate given in Equation (6.25) is written 
explicitly, the non-steady state Kalman state estimate is as follows: 
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where 1L , 2L , and 3L  are three linear operators acting on the initial state, the past input 
vectors, and the past output vectors, respectively.  
 
Although the derivation of the Kalman state estimate is a natural extension of the 
classical Kalman filter, the theoretical foundation of subspace identification has been 
established, which ensures that the Kalman state estimate kxˆ  can be obtained by 
expressing itself as a linear function of the past 1−k  inputs and outputs as well as the 
initial state estimate. 
 
6.2.3.3 Extraction of Kalman State Sequence  
 
Based on Equation (6.27), the kth block row of the process state, which is kX  
based on the notation of Equation (6.7), can be written in matrix form as follows: 
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⎛
−−=
= −++
p
P
Nkkkk
W
X
LL
xxxX
0
0
11
ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ "
       (6.28) 
where  
0Xˆ  = the estimate of the initial state sequence.   
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
p
p
p Y
U
W  
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Equation (6.28) indicates that the Kalman state sequence can be generated by a 
bank of non-steady state Kalman filters working in parallel on each of the columns of the 
block Hankel data matrix of the past inputs and past outputs.  If the estimate of the initial 
state vector 0xˆ  and the covariance matrix of the initial state estimate error 0,xP  are 
known, the estimate of the state vector kxˆ  can be obtained by an iteration of a Kalman 
filter over k time steps.  The Kalman state sequence kXˆ  can be obtained by running N  
parallel non-steady state Kalman filters simultaneously in the same manner if the estimate 
of the initial state sequence 0Xˆ  is known. 
The last but not the least point of subspace identification is that the estimated 
Kalman state sequence is not unique, which depends on the choice of the initial state 
estimate and the covariance matrix of initial state estimation error.  In other words, the 
recovered system matrices based on subspace identification may not be able to reproduce 
the true system states.  However, through appropriate choice of the initial state sequence, 
the input-output responses of the identified system will be the same as the real system.   
 
6.2.4 Orthogonal Projection Methods 
 
The objective of subspace identification is to recover Kalman states from input-
output data without the knowledge of system matrices.  Subspace identification technique 
achieves Kalman state estimate by exploring the relationship among the spaces of the 
input, output, and state sequences through geometric projection.  In orthogonal projection 
methods, we constrain the row space of the identified Kalman state sequence to be in the 
combined row space of PW  and fU . 
Starting from Equation (6.28), it can be easily proved that an estimate of the 
future output block matrix fY , denoted by fZ , is a linear combination of the past 
information block matrix pW  and the future input block matrix fU , which is given by 
(Van Overschee and De Moor, 1996): 
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⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
f
p
upf U
W
LLZ ),(         (6.29) 
where  
pL  = a linear operator acting on pW . 
uL  = a linear operator acting on fU . 
 
The prediction error of future output can be represented by the Frobenius norm 
given by: 
 
Ff
p
upf U
W
LLY ||),(|| ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−         (6.30) 
 
To make the prediction error minimized with the constraint that the rows of fZ  
lie in the joint row space of PW  and fU , it can be proved that the optimal solution to the 
minimization problem with the specified constraint is to perform an orthogonal projection 
of the row space of the matrix fY  onto the joint row space of matrix pW  and fU  
(Favoreel, De Moor, and Van Overschee, 1998).   
The orthogonal projection of the row space of matrix A  onto the row space of 
matrix B  is computed in the following manner: 
 
BBBABBAC TT 1)(/ −==  
Theorem 6.1: If the deterministic input ku  is uncorrelated with the process noise kw  
and the measurement noise kv ; the input ku  is persistently excited of order 2k; the 
number of measurements goes to infinity ∞→N ; and the process noise kw  and the 
measurement noise kv  are not identically zero, then we have (Van Overschee and De 
Moor, 1996): 
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fsks
f
p
fk UHXU
WYZ +Γ=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ˆ/        (6.31) 
 
Theorem 6.1 shows one way to predict the future output based on the past inputs 
and outputs as well as the current inputs without the information about the system 
matrices.  More importantly, Theorem 6.1 gives the relationship between the Kalman 
state estimate and the input and output in a direct manner assuming that the row space of 
kXˆ  lies in the joint row space of matrix pW  and fU . 
 
6.2.5 Oblique Projection Methods 
 
Although Theorem 6.1 gives the relationship between the Kalman state estimate 
and the optimal prediction of the future output through an orthogonal projection, it is not 
convenient in implementation to recover the Kalman state directly because the future 
input term fU  is involved.  To overcome this difficulty arising from the term fU , an 
oblique projection method can be used to relate the Kalman state estimate to the oblique 
projection matrix with the constraint that the row space of Kalman state sequence lies in 
the row space of matrix pW  such that the future block Hankel matrix fU  will have no 
effects on the obtained projection matrix. 
Starting from the orthogonal projection theory, it is quite intuitive to obtain the 
oblique projection, which is as follows: 
 
kspUf XWY f
~/ Γ=  
 
where kX
~
 is the initial Kalman filter state estimate involved in the oblique projection. 
 
The oblique projection of the row space of matrix A  along the row space of 
matrix B  onto the row space of matrix C  is computed in the following manner: 
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CBCBACA B
+⊥⊥= )/][/[/  
where ⊥BA /  represents the orthogonal projection of the row space of A  onto the 
orthogonal complement of the row space of B .  Obviously, 0/ =CB B .   
 
Theorem 6.2: If the deterministic input ku  is uncorrelated with the process noise kw  
and the measurement noise kv ; the input ku  is persistently excited of order 2k; the 
number of measurements goes to infinity ∞→N ; and the process noise kw  and the 
measurement noise kv  are not identically zero.   
Let kO  be defined as the oblique projection as follows: 
 
pUfk WYO f/=          (6.32) 
 
If singular value decomposition is performed on the oblique projection matrix, 
then we have 
 
( ) TTTk VSUVVSUUO 11121121 00
0 =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=       (6.33) 
 
The following claims can be stated (Van Overschee and De Moor, 1996): 
(1) The matrix kO  is equal to the product of the extended observability matrix SΓ  and 
the estimated Kalman filter state sequence kXˆ , that is: 
 
kSk XO ˆΓ=           (6.34) 
 
(2) The order of the system is equal to the number of singular values of kO  that are not 
zero. 
 
(3) The extended observability matrix SΓ  can be obtained as follows: 
TSUS
2/1
11=Γ           (6.35) 
where T  is a similarity transformation matrix. 
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(4) The part of the state sequences kXˆ  can be computed as follows: 
 
T
k VSTX 1
2/1
1
1ˆ −=  
 
(5) The state sequences kXˆ  is related to the matrix kO  as follows: 
 
kSk OX
+Γ=ˆ           (6.36) 
 
Theorem 6.2 provides an optimal solution to the linear combination of the past 
inputs and outputs, that is, ppk WLO = , so that the prediction error of the future output is 
minimized with respect to the Frobenius norm.  The row space of this optimal solution 
kO  is the projection of the row space of fY  along the row space of fU  onto the row 
space of pW .   
For a system with l  outputs and n  true states, the oblique projection matrix kO  
has lk ⋅  rows and N  columns, whose rows span a subspace of lk ⋅  dimensional row 
space in the N  dimensional ambient space.  However, only n  states are sufficient to 
predict the future output from the past information.  Therefore, it is necessary for 
subspace identification to determine the true number of states from the oblique projection 
matrix.  In mathematics, this problem can be formulated as follows (Favoreel, De Moor, 
and Van Overschee, 1998): 
 
2||||min FkRR ROqli −×∈          (6.37) 
 
with the constraint that the rank of R  is n. 
 
The best solution to the minimization problem given in Equation (6.37) is as 
follows: 
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T
kkk VSUXOR 111ˆ =Γ=≈         (6.38) 
 
The columns of kΓ  spans n-dimensional space because the original system is 
observable and the rows of kXˆ  are n-dimensional since the system has n states.  Because 
the oblique projection matrix kO  is a product of kXˆ  and kΓ , the rank of kO  is indeed 
equal to n 
Moreover, the column space of kO  is the same as the column space of kΓ  since 
each column of kO  is nothing but a linear combination of the columns of kΓ  as is shown 
in Equation (6.38).  For the same reason, the row space of kO  is the same as the row 
space of kXˆ  since each row of kO  is nothing but a linear combination of the rows of 
kXˆ  as is also shown in Equation (6.38). Therefore, after a singular decomposition of kO , 
there are theoretically only n nonzero singular values.  However, for a real world problem 
where N  is not infinite and there may be nonlinearity, the singular value decomposition 
of kO  does not produce zero singular values.  In this situation, the predominant singular 
values are used to determine the order of system dynamics. 
Because the column space of kO  is the same as the column space of kΓ  and the 
row space of kO  is the same as the row space of kXˆ , Equation (6.38) can then be split 
into two parts as follows: 
 
T
k
k
VSTX
TSU
1
2/1
1
1
2/1
11
ˆ −=
=Γ          (6.39) 
 
Therefore, we have the results (6.35) and (6.36), which can be used to estimate 
the extended observability matrix kΓ  and the Kalman state sequence kXˆ  directly from 
the input and output data without the knowledge of system matrices. 
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At this point, Kalman state sequence has been identified from the input-output 
data without the knowledge of system matrices, the dynamic system identification is then 
transformed to a least squares estimation problem, which is described in section 6.2.2.   
 
Example 1:  An illustrating example is designed here to help understand why the 
extended observability matrix and the Kalman state sequence can be extracted from 
projection matrix based on singular value decomposition, as shown in Equation (6.39).   
Given two matrices A  and B  and a matrix ABC =  as follows: 
 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
0.00.3
0.20.2
0.10.1
0.70.2
0.10.1
A  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= 0.10.10.2 0.30.20.1B  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
− −=
0.90.60.3
0.40.60.6
0.40.10.1
0.10.110.16
0.20.30.3
C  
 
The matrix A  has 2-dimensional column space and the matrix B  has 2-
dimenisonal row space.  It can be verified that the rank of C  is also 2.  If a singular value 
decomposition is performed on C , we have: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −− −−−•
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡•
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−− −−
−−−
−−
==
9247.01448.03521.0
1448.06234.07582.0
7688.100
07163.22
7554.03405.0
2280.03986.0
3896.00277.0
4611.08275.0
114.01993.0
111
TVSUC
 
 
Obviously, the matrix C  has two non-zero singular values.  Because 1U  is 
orthonormal, it is always possible to find a transformation matrix AUST T1
5.0
1
−=  such 
that TSUA 5.011=  and TVSTB 15.011−= .  The matrix T  is a full rank square matrix and 
thus invertible because the matrix A  has full column rank, the same as the rank of 1S .  
For the example problem, the transformation matrix T  is given by: 
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⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡− −−= 9287.07019.0 4186.17764.0T  
 
This simple example clearly shows the reasoning behind Equation (6.39).  It 
should be emphasized that subspace identification is based on the major result of 
Equation (6.34) with three significant implications:  
 
(1) The projection matrix can be obtained directly from input-output data;  
(2) The column space of kΓ  has the same dimension as the number of states. 
(3) The row space of kXˆ  has the same dimension as the number of states. 
 
In fact, subspace identification theory is established by revealing the equivalence 
between the column space of a projection matrix and the column space of the extended 
observability matrix and the equivalence between the row space of the projection matrix 
and the row space of the Kalman state sequence.  It is because of the importance of 
subspace that this identification technique was given the name of subspace identification.   
 
6.3 Robust Dynamic Fault Diagnosis Algorithm 
 
After system dynamics is identified either from data generated by simulation 
calculations or from on-line experimental data using subspace identification technique, 
the developed model will always have certain degrees of uncertainty either because the 
simulation model does not truly represent the physical system or because a model 
reduction is implicitly performed in subspace identification.   
In general, the uncertainty of a dynamic model can be represented as follows 
(Chen and Patton, 1999): 
 
)()()(*
)()()()()1(
*
*
kDukCxky
kdkwkBukAxkx
+=
+++=+      (6.40) 
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where )(kd  is a vector representing the deterministic model uncertainty, )(kw  is a 
vector representing stochastic process noise, )(* ku  is the true input vector, and )(* ky  is 
the true output vector.   
In Equation (6.40), the model uncertainty term plays the same role on the system 
dynamics as the process disturbance defined in Equation (6.1) except that model 
uncertainty is deterministic.  In fact, the model uncertainty term is an extension of 
process disturbance from modeling point of view, which may arise from unmeasured 
inputs, non-linear terms in system dynamics, terms related to time-varying dynamics, 
linearization and model reduction, parameter variation, and simulation model uncertainty, 
etc. 
Given that the measured inputs and outputs are corrupted with some measurement 
noise uv  and yv , respectively, and some additive sensor faults, the observed input vector 
)(ku  and the observed output vector )(ky are then as follows (Li and Shah, 2002): 
 
)()()()( * kfEkvkuku uuu ++=        (6.41a) 
)()()()( * kfEkvkyky yyy ++=        (6.41b) 
 
where )(kfu  and )(kf y  are the fault magnitude vectors and uE  and yE  are the fault 
distribution matrices for the inputs and the outputs, respectively.  
 
The objective of robust fault detection is to generate a residual that is statistically 
significant if and only if the fault magnitude vectors are not zero, i.e., the residual )(tr  
satisfies the following property: 
 
0)( ≠tr    iff   0)( ≠tfu  or 0)( ≠tf y       (6.42) 
 
If different residual patterns are predefined to signify different faults, the task of 
fault isolation is then to design some residual generators such that each fault must 
generate the predefined residual pattern regardless of its fault magnitude.  Such a 
formulation of fault isolation problem can avoid the use of fault information for fault 
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isolation, which may depend on fault magnitude and is difficult to obtain in nuclear 
power systems. 
 
6.3.1 Robust Dynamic Fault Detection Algorithm 
 
Considering a time window of length s , the dynamic redundancy relation in 
stacked vector form can be derived for the given system defined in Equation (6.40) as 
follows: 
 
)()()()()( ** kwGkdGkuHskxky ssssssss +++−Γ=     (6.43) 
 
where )(* kys , )(
* kus , )(kws , and )(kds  are the stacked column vectors of )(
* ky , 
)(* ku , )(kw , and )(kd  at a sequence of s  time instants, respectively.  The matrices 
sH  and sG  are Toeplitz block matrices that relate the system inputs and the model 
uncertainty to the system outputs, respectively.   
 
The stacked output error vector within the given time window can be written as 
follows: 
 
)(~~)()()( kzHkuHkyke ssssss =−=       (6.44) 
 
where  ( )ss HH −Ι=~   ( )TTsTss kukykz )()()(~ =  
 
From Equation (6.43) and Equation (6.44), the stacked output error vector can be 
rewritten in its physical form as follows (Li and Shah, 2002): 
 
)(~)(
)(~)()()()( kfEHkv
kvHkwGkdGskxke szzs
us
ys
sssssss +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+++−Γ=   
           (6.45) 
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where  
⎟⎠
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and 1+Ι s  is a s  dimensional identity matrix, ⊗  represents the Kronecker product, and 
)(kf sz  is the stacked fault magnitude vector combining both the output faults and the 
input faults. 
 
Equation (6.44) and Equation (6.45) represent the computational form of the 
output error and its internal form from system physics, respectively.  In order to construct 
a residual signal insensitive to the initial states and the model uncertainty, a linear 
transformation is performed on the original stacked output error vector.  That is, a 
residual vector, )(krs , can be designed for robust fault detection through a transformation 
matrix 0V  with the following constraints: 
 
))()(()( 0 kuHkyVkr ssss −=        (6.46a) 
0)(0 =−Γ skxV s          (6.46b) 
0)(
0
=kdGV ss          (6.46c) 
 
Accordingly, the internal form of the residual vector takes the following 
simplified form: 
 
)(~)()(
)(~)( 000 kfEHVkwGVkv
kvHVkr szzsss
us
ys
ss ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=     (6.47) 
 
If there is no measurement and process noise, the internal form of the residual 
vector defined in Equation (6.47) is only a function of the fault magnitude.  Therefore, 
such a residual generator has the desired property for robust fault detection.   
The residual vector generated from Equation (6.47) follows a multi-dimensional 
Gaussian distribution that is zero-mean with a covariance matrix that can be determined 
from the data obtained for fault free conditions.  If a sensor fault occurs in the system, 
Equation (6.47) indicates that the fault condition residual vector will also follow a multi-
 221
dimensional Gaussian distribution with the same covariance matrix but with a non-zero 
mean value.  Therefore, fault detection can be achieved by detecting the change of the 
mean value of the generated residual vectors.  In order to avoid false alarms and missing 
detection rates due to noise, an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) filter 
(Lowry et al., 1992) can be applied to the residual vector (Qin and Li, 2001), which is 
given by: 
 
)()1()1()( krkrkr sss γγ −+−⋅=       (6.48) 
 
where )(krs  is the EWMA filtered residual vector and γ  is the forgetting factor for 
filtering.  The filtered residual vector for fault free condition also follows zero mean 
Gaussian distribution with the covariance matrix )(0 kRs  given by (Del Castillo, 2002), 
(Qin and Li, 2001): 
 
∑
=
−++
−= s
j
T
ss
j
ss jkrkrEkRkR
1
00 }))()({2)((1
1)( γγ
γ
    (6.49a) 
 
where )(0 kRs  is the covariance matrix of the unfiltered residual vector.   
To simplify the computation, asymptotic covariance matrix can be used, which is 
given by (Rigdon, 1995): 
 
)(
2
)(lim 00 kRkR sss γ
γ
−=∞→         (6.49b) 
 
The filtered square weighted residual can be used as a fault signal for fault 
detection with better performance than a simple weighted residual, which is given by: 
 
)())(()( 10 krRkrk ss
T
ss
−=β        (6.50) 
During fault free condition, the filtered square weighted residual )(ksβ  follows a 
central 2χ  distribution.  If )(ksβ  does not follow a central 2χ  distribution at a specified 
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significance level α , the decision can then be made that a fault has occurred to the 
system at this significance level.  That is, a fault is detected if the fault detection index 
)(ksω  is greater than 1.0, which is defined as follows: 
 
2
)()(
αχ
βϖ kk ss =          (6.51) 
 
6.3.2 One-Step Robust Dynamic Residual Generator Design 
 
As described in section 6.3.1, the key of robust fault detection is to design a linear 
transformation matrix such that the generated residuals are independent of the initial 
states and insensitive to the model uncertainties, which is written in Equation (6.46).  The 
traditional method of dealing with model uncertainty in robust residual generator design 
has two steps.  The first step is to determine the model uncertainty vector using Kalman 
filter technique and the second step is to determine the uncertainty distribution matrix 
using SVD algorithm.  This approach is presented in Chapter 2.   
A new approach was been developed for robust dynamic residual generator 
design in this dissertation.  Inspired by subspace identification algorithm, this approach 
utilizes block data matrix equation to determine the relationship between the subspace 
spanned by the projection matrix of measured data and the subspace spanned by the 
projection matrix of model uncertainty.  The advantage of this approach is that robust 
residual generator design does not need to identify the model uncertainty vector and the 
distribution matrix.   
Let’s recall the block data matrix kY , kU , kP , kW , kuV , , kyV , and kZ  defined for 
the output, input, model uncertainty, process disturbance, input noise, output noise, and 
past information, which are written as follows: 
 [ ])1()1()( −++= NkykykyY sssk "      (6.52a) [ ])1()1()( −++= NkukukuU sssk "      (6.52b) [ ])1()1()( −++= NkdkdkdP sssk "      (6.52c) 
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[ ])1()1()( −++= NkwkwkwW sssk "     (6.52d) [ ])1()1()(, −++= NkvkvkvV usususku "     (6.52e) [ ])1()1()(, −++= NkvkvkvV ysysysky "     (6.52f) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
k
k
k U
YZ           (6.52g) 
 
The block data matrix equation can be derived as follows: 
 
1,111,111 +++++++ +++−+Γ= kykskskusksksk VWGPGVHUHXY    (6.53) 
 
If we postmultiply the Equation (6.53) by TkZ , then we have: 
 
T
kky
T
kks
T
kks
T
kkus
T
kks
T
kks
T
kk ZVZWGZPGZVHZUHZXZY 1,111,111 +++++++ +++−+Γ=  
           (6.54) 
 
Considering that the model uncertainty is a deterministic variable, and the input 
measurement noise, the output noise, and the process noise are all uncorrelated white 
Gaussian, if the size of data is sufficiently big, then we have: 
 
PZsUZsXZsYZ GH Ω+Ω+ΩΓ=Ω        (6.55) 
 
where Ω  denotes the corresponding product term in Equation (6.54).   
 
If Equation (6.55) is then premultiplied by the complement matrix of sΓ , denoted 
by ⊥Γs , then we have: 
 
PZssUZsYZs GH ΩΓ=Ω−ΩΓ ⊥⊥ )(        (6.56) 
 
The left hand side of Equation (6.67) can be determined from the measured data 
and the right hand side of the equation is related to the space spanned by the model 
uncertainty vectors.  Therefore, a singular value decomposition can be performed on the 
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related matrix on the left hand side of the equation to determine the null space spanned by 
the model uncertainty vectors. 
Redefine the matrix on the left hand side of Equation (6.56) as Θ , that is: 
 
)( UZsYZs H Ω−ΩΓ=Θ ⊥         (6.57) 
 
If a singular value decomposition is performed on Θ , we have: 
 
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡=Θ ⊥ΘΘΘ⊥ΘΘ VVSUU 00 0        (6.58) 
 
Obviously, the obtained matrix ΘU  satisfies the following equation: 
 
0)()( 1 =Γ +⊥⊥Θ TkkssT ZPGU         (6.59) 
 
If there is at least one columns of TkZ  which do not lie in the null space of 
)()( 1+
⊥⊥
Θ Γ kssT PGU , then we have: 
 
0)()( 1 =Γ +⊥⊥Θ kssT PGU         (6.60) 
If it is further assumed that the model uncertainty is piecewise constant, a linear 
transformation matrix 0V  satisfying the desired property of robust residual generator 
defined in Equation (6.46), can be chosen as follows: 
 
)()(0
⊥⊥
Θ Γ= sTUV          (6.61) 
 
Based on the above algorithm, robust residual generator can be designed without 
knowing the model uncertainty vector.  Compared with the classical approach developed 
by Chen and Patton, 1999, this algorithm is much easier for implementation. 
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Example 2.:  An illustrating example is designed here to demonstrate that the developed 
one-step algorithm is able to design dynamic residual generators for robust fault detection 
without the need to identify model uncertainty explicitly.  
Considering a linear dynamic system with four inputs and four outputs, the 
system matrices are identified as follows: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−= 5.05.0 5.05.0A      ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−= 1.02.13.07.1 2.11.11.04.0B  
 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
=
2.07.0
2.02.0
2.22.0
6.03.0
C      
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
0000
0000
0000
0000
D   
 
The normal operation data are generated with measurement noise of 1% signal-to-
noise ratio for all the four input signals and the four output signals, and process noise of 
3% signal-to-noise ratio, and model uncertainty of constant direction.  The distribution 
matrix and the magnitude vector of model uncertainty are given as follows: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= 25.05.0 5.025.0dE      ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= 0.10 0.10d  
 
Because the number of state variables is 2 in this example, the block data matrix 
of kY , kU , and kZ  can be constructed with s  equal to 2 and N  equal to 2000 
according to Equation (6.52), where the system is excited with input signal 
∑
=
= 10
1
)cos(
i
tiu π  and the initial state vector [ ]Tx 00)0( = .   
After the extended observability matrix sΓ  is constructed from the system 
matrices, the dimension of the matrix is 12 by 2.  If a singular value decomposition is 
performed on Θ  defined in Equation (6.57), which has a dimension of 10 by 24, we have 
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the following singular values from large to small in order, 3.2281e+006, 4.5777e+003, 
121.3397, 59.2458, 1.5377, 0.9983, 0.1805, 0.0910, 0.0230, and 0.0164.  Because a sharp 
drop occurs at the second singular value, the last nine left singular vectors can be retained 
to design robust residual generator for fault detection.  In fact, if we remove the 
measurement noise and process noise, the last 9 singular values of Θ  would be exactly 
zeros. 
Figure 6.1 shows a comparison between the residual norms without the model 
uncertainty decoupled and with the model uncertainty decoupled.  The new test data of 
2000 samples are generated by exciting the system with input signal ∑
=
= 10
1
)sin(
i
tiu π  
with the initial state vector [ ]Tx 0.10.1)0( =  and introducing the model uncertainty at 
the 1000th sample.  The upper subplot shows the results when the model uncertainty is 
not decoupled.  As can be seen, the residuals are small before the 1000th sample although 
the system is excited by a different input signal at a different initial state vector.  
However, false alarms will be produced after the 1000th sample.  The lower subplot 
shows the results when the model uncertainty is decoupled using the developed algorithm 
in this section.  It can be seen that the generated robust residuals will not produce false 
alarms after the 1000th sample when model uncertainty was introduced.   
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Figure 6.1.  Robust fault detection for the example case during normal operation 
condition. 
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The simple example has demonstrated that the newly developed robust residual 
generation algorithm is able to decouple model uncertainty without the need to identify 
model uncertainty vector explicitly. 
 
6.3.3 Robust Fault Isolation Algorithm 
 
Structured residuals generated by multiple residual generators provide a simple 
and systematic approach to fault isolation.  If residual generators are designed such that 
each one is only sensitive to a subset of the considered faults, a fault isolation scheme can 
then be achieved since each fault corresponds to a different residual pattern.   
Although it is possible to design numerous residual structures for fault isolation 
with different isolation capability, a generalized residual set is a simple design scheme for 
single fault isolation (Qin and Li, 2001).  In this scheme, each residual set is sensitive to 
all faults but one.  In particular, the residual structure dedicated to the isolation of the thi  
fault is given as follows: 
 
0)( =tri  for the thi fault.       (6.62a) 
0)( ≠tri  for other faults.       (6.62b) 
 
The fault direction matrix uE  and yE  are decomposed into the first part 1,uiE  and 
1,yiE  corresponding to the faults to be desensitized, and the second part 2,uiE  and 2,yiE  
corresponding to the faults to be sensitized, that is: 
 
( )2,1, uiuiui EEE =           (6.63a) ( )2,1, yiyiyi EEE =          (6.63b) 
 
The primary residual vector for robust fault detection defined in Equation (6.47) 
can then be rewritten as follows: 
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where 1zE  and 2zE  are constructed from 1,uiE , 1,yiE  and 2,uiE , 2,yiE , respectively, in the 
same manner as zE  is constructed from uE  and yE . 
 
The residual generator iV  dedicated to the isolation of the thi  fault is designed as 
follows: 
 
0~ 10 =⋅ zsi EHVV          (6.65) 
 
In order to make the residual generator given in Equation (6.65) still sensitive to 
the other faults, the transformation matrix iV  can be obtained by solving an optimization 
problem such that its row vectors v  can minimize the objective function J  defined as 
follows: 
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where  
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A complicated algorithm based on Cholesky decomposition and standard 
eigenproblem was developed to solve the above optimization problem in (Li and Shah, 
2002).  In this dissertation, the optimization is formulated as a generalized eigenproblem 
defined as follows: 
 
TTTT vMMvMM 2211 λ=         (6.67) 
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Similarly, in order to remove the noise effects on decision-making, an EWMA 
filter can also be applied to each of the generated residual vectors and an FDI index is 
used to check its significance of change.  The FDI index is defined as follows: 
 
2
)()(
αχ
βϖ kk s=          (6.68) 
 
6.4 Application to the HCSG System 
 
The developed algorithm was applied to the sensor fault diagnosis using the 
dynamic model identified from the data generated by the HCSG simulation model in 
Chapter 3.  The considered sensor faults include both the input and the output faults 
related to the system model.   
In the HCSG system, the steam pressure is controlled and the steam pressure 
sensor fault will propagate within the control loop.  The feed water flow rate is regulated 
when reactor power changes, so it is important to have a correct indication of the feed 
water flow rate for this power transient.  The detailed results are therefore presented for 
these two sensor faults.  To demonstrate the systematic solution to sensor FDI of the 
developed approach, the FDI results of all the other sensor faults are also summarized. 
 
6.4.1 Data Generation and Subspace Identification 
 
A linear state space model is identified for the HCSG system at full power 
operation condition using subspace identification technique.  The data characterizing the 
system dynamics are generated by exciting the developed simulation model in Chapter 3 
with white Gaussian noise inputs of standard deviation 1% power.  The perturbed inputs 
include the hot leg temperature, the primary flow rate, the feed water flow rate, the feed 
water temperature, and the steam flow rate.  The appropriate choice of the excitation 
inputs plays a significant role in the quality of the identified model.  If too much power is 
included in the input signals, some nonlinear modes of the system will be excited.  On the 
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contrary, if the included power is too small, the identified model cannot capture enough 
system dynamics.   
Figure 6.2 shows the singular values of the oblique projection matrix for different 
number of state variables ranging from 1 to 50.  The number of states is chosen as five 
since a significant breakpoint can be observed at this point.  If too many state variables 
are chosen, the resulting model will lose the capability of generalization because some of 
the degrees of freedom will be used to model the system noise.  If too few state variables 
are used, the resulting model may not be able to explain some significant dynamics of the 
system.  In general, the number of state variables should be chosen such that no 
significant information can be included if it is further increased.  As can be seen from the 
figure, a reduced order model can indeed be developed through a systematic approach of 
subspace identification.  The original 19th order physical model has been reduced to a 5th 
order empirical model that can still capture the dominant dynamics of the system. 
In order to test the generalization capability of the identified model, a test data set 
is generated with the reactor power at 90% full power and the input excitation power 
corresponding to a standard deviation of 0.5% nominal values.  Figure 6.3 shows the 
comparison of results between the cold leg temperature obtained from the simulation 
model and the corresponding predicted values based on the identified model.  The 
prediction errors are indeed very small.   
The prediction error index γ  can be used to quantify the prediction performance 
of the identified model, which is given by (Favoreel, De Moor, and Van Overschee, 
1998): 
 
∑ ∑
= =
−= N
k
N
k
kkk yyyN 1 1
22 /)ˆ(1γ        (6.69) 
 
where N  is the number of test data points, ky  is the actual value of the kth data point, 
and kyˆ is the predicted value of the kth data point. 
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Figure 6.2.  The singular values of the projection matrix. 
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Figure 6.3.  Model prediction of cold leg temperature. 
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Figure 6.4.  Robust fault detection for cold leg temperature sensor fault. 
 
The prediction error indices are 11.2%, 8.3%, 8.8%, 10.6%, 10.2% and 8.3% for 
the cold leg temperature, the steam pressure, the steam outlet temperature, the sub-cooled 
length and the saturated boiling length, respectively.  These small indices show that the 
identified model is able to give a good prediction for all the outputs even if the reactor is 
operating at a different power level with different magnitude of perturbations. 
 
6.4.2 Robust Fault Detection Design 
 
To show the performance of the developed robust fault detection algorithm, the 
identified linear state space model was used to generate data with model uncertainty.  The 
model uncertainty was introduced by adding an additive term to the state vector after the 
300th sample.  The model uncertainty term has a fixed direction but the magnitude of the 
model uncertainty varies linearly with time.   
Figure 6.4 shows the performance of the developed robust fault detection 
algorithm to sensor faults.  Model uncertainty is introduced after the 300th sample and a 
cold leg temperature sensor fault with a bias of 1 oC is injected after the 500th sample.  
The upper plot shows that if model uncertainty is not decoupled the fault detection index 
will not be able to distinguish a sensor fault and model uncertainty.  However, the lower 
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plot shows that the developed robust fault detection algorithm results in a fault detection 
index greater than 1.0 only after a fault has occurred in the system.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the developed robust fault diagnosis algorithm is able to decouple model 
uncertainty without loss of the capability of fault detection. 
Figure 6.5 shows the performance of the fault detection index for a feed water 
flow meter bias fault with a magnitude of 2% at 1500 second during the transient when 
the reactor power is reduced from 100% to 95% at a rate of 0.0012 Full Power/min.  The 
fault detection residual generator responds to the fault with no time delay and generates a 
significant fault signal as significant as 10.0 compared with the fault detection index of 
less than 1.0 for fault free condition.  It can also be seen that the generated fault detection 
index has the desirable property that it returns to an insignificant level when the fault is 
recovered during the transient at 2500 seconds.   
After the reactor reaches 95% power level, the fault detection index remains less 
than 1.0, which can demonstrate that the identified model has learned the system 
dynamics appropriately because the model still retains its good prediction capability at 
95% power level, an unknown operation condition, although the model is built from the 
data collected at 100% power level.   
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Figure 6.5.  Fault detection of feed water flow meter sensor fault during a reactor power 
transient. 
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Figure 6.6.  Fault detection of steam pressure sensor fault. 
 
From the viewpoint of FDI robustness, it can be concluded that a dynamic model 
is superior to a static model in which case model prediction is simply an interpolation 
among the data used to train it without revealing the causal relationship among the 
measured variables and thus without the capability of generalization outside the training 
space.   
Figure 6.6 shows the performance of fault detection for a steam pressure sensor 
bias fault of 2% magnitude at the 800th sample when the reactor is initially operating at 
90% full power.  Because the steam pressure is controlled in the HCSG system, the steam 
pressure will experience a fault-induced transient.  The fault detection index responds 
immediately when the sensor fault occurs at the 800th sample.  It is interesting to notice 
that the fault detection index is almost constant after the fault occurs.  On the one hand, 
this indicates that the identified model is able to represent the system dynamics initiated 
by the fault.  On the other hand, the fault detection index does not return to an 
insignificant level even though the measured steam pressure has been brought back to the 
original level.  This is because some other process variables such as the saturated boiling 
length and the sub-cooled length cannot be brought back to their original values due to 
the sensor fault.   
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6.4.3 Robust Fault Isolation Design 
 
Ten residual generators were designed for fault isolation.  Each of the ten residual 
generators corresponds to ten linear transformations on the original estimation error 
vector such that it is sensitive to all faults but the one to which the residual generator is 
dedicated for fault isolation.  The ten residual generators are dedicated to the isolation of 
the following sensor faults: 
 
Variable 1: the cold leg temperature. 
Variable 2: the steam pressure. 
Variable 3: the steam temperature. 
Variable 4: the saturated boiling length. 
Variable 5: the sub-cooled length. 
Variable 6: the hot leg temperature. 
Variable 7: the steam flow rate. 
Variable 8: the feed water temperature. 
Variable 9: the feed water flow rate. 
Variable 10: the primary flow rate. 
 
Figure 6.7 shows the FDI indices of the ten residual generators responding to the 
feed water flow meter bias fault with a magnitude of 2% at 1500 second during the 
transient when the reactor power is reduced from 100% to 95% at a rate of 0.0012 Full 
Power/min.  As can be seen, the residual generator dedicated to the isolation of the ninth 
variable produces an insignificant FDI index of less than 1.0 while all the other residual 
generators do not.  Therefore, the feed water flow meter sensor fault can be correctly 
isolated when the fault is detected between 1500 second and 2500 second (See Figure 
6.5) during the reactor power transient.   
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Figure 6.7.  Fault isolation of feed water flow meter sensor fault during a reactor power 
transient. 
 
The FDI indices for the fifth variable and the seventh variable are approximately 
1.2 and 2.0, respectively, while the FDI indices for the other variables are significantly 
greater than 1.0.  It can be seen from this that the fault isolation of feed water flow meter 
fault has less confidence level when it is to be isolated from a sub-cooled length 
measurement fault or a steam flow meter fault than the other faults.  This result is also in 
agreement with the statement obtained in Chapter 2 that an input fault may be not 
isolatable.  In addition, an insight we can obtain here is that FDI performance testing at 
design phase with a reliable simulation model should still be emphasized.   
Figure 6.7 has also demonstrated the success of the developed FDI method in that 
a predetermined logic of fault isolation is achieved through studying the identified model.  
This is a significant difference from many recently published literatures where FDI is 
inappropriately paraphrased as a pattern recognition problem.  Pattern recognition needs 
to determine the fault features through the collection of faulty data, which is unrealistic in 
process engineering application.   
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The fault isolation residual generators have shown the robustness of the 
developed method to measurement noises.  Although all the measured variables are 
added with 0.2% white Gaussian noise, the residual generators can successfully eliminate 
their effects on the residuals after EWMA filters are applied to the residuals. 
Figure 6.8 shows the FDI indices of the designed ten residual generators for the 
fault isolation of a steam pressure sensor fault.  In the figure, the FDI indices of all the 
variables, except the second variable, are greater than 1.0; therefore, the steam pressure 
sensor fault can be isolated correctly throughout the fault induced transient.  As compared 
with static model based FDI approaches, the developed approach is able to isolate a 
controlled variable related sensor fault at the initial stage when it occurs.  In the 
meantime, fault misdiagnosis can be avoided during the fault-induced transient.  
Moreover, fault isolation is based on the identified model rather than fault information 
through appropriate design of residual generators such that the generated residuals follow 
the predetermined logic.   
Table 6.1 summarizes the FDI results for the five other sensor faults of the HCSG 
system that occur at 95% full power.  The five faults are listed as follows: 
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Figure 6.8.  Fault isolation of steam pressure sensor fault. 
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Table 6.1.  The FDI indices of bias type sensor faults 
 
                     Faults 
FDI index 
Fault 
free 
Fault 1 
 
Fault 2 
 
Fault 3 
 
Fault 4 
 
Fault 5 
 
Fault detection 0.22 40.3 18.3 9.42 5.04 25.7 
Cold leg temperature 0.15 0.22 1.7 2.25 3.45 6.3 
Steam pressure 0.16 1.47 2.4 2.10 2.39 1.2 
Steam temperature 0.16 2.43 0.23 0.45 4.31 22.0 
Saturated boiling length 0.18 6.99 2.59 2.65 1.43 15.7 
Sub-cooled length 0.18 12.7 9.2 6.30 2.06 1.3 
Hot leg temperature 0.19 14.7 3.33 0.31 4.94 24.9 
Steam flow rate 0.20 29.9 14.94 8.18 0.22 14.9 
Feed water temperature 0.20 38.3 18.75 8.72 3.74 0.24 
Feed water flow rate 0.19 28.8 14.64 7.31 4.55 7.43 
Primary flow rate 0.16 16.1 4.51 1.65 5.76 23.7 
 
 
Fault 1: cold leg temperature sensor fault with a bias of 1.0 oC, 
Fault 2: steam temperature sensor fault with a bias of 1.0 oC, 
Fault 3: hot leg temperature sensor fault with a bias of 1.0 oC, 
Fault 4: steam flow meter fault with a bias of 1% nominal flow rate, 
Fault 5: feed water temperature sensor fault with a bias of 1.0 oC. 
 
During fault free conditions, the fault detection index is 0.22, which is less than 
1.0 and will not trigger a false alarm.  The FDI indices produced from all the designed 
residual generators for fault isolation are also less than 1.0 for fault free condition.  This 
indirectly proves that the EWMA filtered residual vector does indeed follow a multi-
dimensional Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a constant covariance matrix.   
The fault detection indices are all significantly greater than 1.0 after the five faults 
occur.  When the FDI indices of the ten residual generators designed for fault isolation 
are examined, they follow the predetermined logic of fault isolation for all the faults but 
hot leg temperature sensor fault.  For the hot leg temperature sensor fault, both the 
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residual generator dedicated to the isolation of the steam temperature sensor fault and the 
residual generator dedicated to the isolation of the hot leg temperature sensor fault 
generate an insignificant residual, which indicates an unknown fault according to the 
residual design scheme for isolation.   
The reason why the hot leg temperature sensor fault was diagnosed as an unkown 
fault is that there is a maximum sensitivity of the designed residual generator to an input 
fault, which is determined by the system model itself.  However, because the designed 
residual generator can maintain the capability of being insensitive to the fault that it is 
designed to isolate regardless of the fault magnitude, the predetermined logic for fault 
isolation can always be followed if the fault magnitude is big enough.  It is found that the 
hot leg temperature sensor fault can be unambiguously isolated if its fault magnitude is 
increased to 3 oC.  This example also demonstrates the importance of FDI design in 
reactor design phase and the necessity of testing its performance based on a realistic 
simulation. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
A robust dynamic fault diagnosis algorithm is presented in this chapter for 
dynamic fault diagnosis of nuclear power systems.  The theory of subspace identification 
was first described to extract low order state-space model from data generated by 
simulation calculations.  Robust parity space approach was then combined with subspace 
identification to design residual generators.  A new one-step algorithm was derived 
without the need of explicitly identifying model uncertainty for uncertainty decoupling.  
The implementation of robust residual generator design was formulated as a generalized 
eigenvalue problem.  Finally, the developed robust dynamic fault diagnosis algorithm 
was applied to the IRIS HCSG systems for transient fault detection and isolation.  It was 
shown that the developed algorithm was able to deal with model uncertainty for dynamic 
fault diagnosis without causing false alarms and can be used for fault tolerant control. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations  
for Future Research 
 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The preceding chapters have presented an integrated approach to the performance 
monitoring and fault diagnosis of nuclear power systems using robust data driven model 
based methods for both steady state and dynamic operation conditions.  The developed 
methods were demonstrated through the application to IRIS helical coil steam generator 
systems. 
A steady state model was developed for the IRIS helical coil steam generator to 
prepare for the initialization parameters of dynamic simulation and find out a unique 
method to monitor the tube inside water inventory.  The calculated primary outlet 
temperature and the steam outlet temperature based on the developed model are within 
0.5% error of the results obtained from a more sophisticated simulation.  The calculated 
primary coolant temperature profile also demonstrated that a clear breakpoint exists when 
the saturated boiling heat transfer transits to the superheated heat transfer.  It was 
proposed that the breakpoint determined from the primary fluid temperature 
measurements could be used to indicate the HCSG tube inside water inventory.   
A dynamic model was also developed to study the dynamic responses of the IRIS 
helical coil steam generator systems for control and fault diagnosis design.  The 
developed dynamic model is a nodal model, which has two nodes each, to represent the 
axial changes in the superheated, saturated, and sub-cooled region of the primary side and 
the secondary side.  The steady state results and the typical transient results showed that 
the developed dynamic model was able to characterize the HCSG behavior with 
reasonably good accuracy to study the control and fault diagnosis of IRIS HCSG system. 
Sensor placement was considered as a crucial design element of performance 
monitoring and fault diagnosis of nuclear power systems.  A systematic approach was 
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developed in this dissertation to accomplish sensor placement design in reactor design 
phase.  In this approach, the minimum set of sensors for process diagnosis was 
determined based on cause effect analysis using graph theory.  If steady state balance 
equations were used for sensor fault diagnosis, the minimum set of sensors were 
determined based on observability and redundancy analysis using orthogonal projection 
algorithm.  Finally, to ensure reliable sensor fault diagnosis and accurate performance 
parameter estimation, data reconciliation was used to study the sensitivities.   
Steady state fault diagnosis is useful for condition-based maintenance in nuclear 
power plants.  Reconstruction based PCA was proposed as a baseline approach, which is 
able to deal with both sensor faults and process faults through characterizing the fault 
effects in a unified manner.  When reconstruction based PCA approach was used, the 
conditions of fault detectablity and fault identifiablity could be quantitatively evaluated, 
which is very important for applications to nuclear power systems.  In addition, 
reconstruction based PCA approach can usually give more conclusive results in terms of 
fault isolation since a decision is made only if the fault effects can be fully explained 
through the reconstruction procedure. 
Hybrid PCA model based approach was developed in this dissertation to improve 
the performance of steady state fault diagnosis through incorporating prior knowledge.  
When historical data were collected during reactor power changes, many measured 
variables would have significant amount of variation due to the manipulation of a few 
variables.  Hybrid PCA model based approach allowed us to decompose the variation of 
the collected data based on this prior knowledge.  The demonstration example showed 
that the developed algorithm could lead to more sensitive fault diagnosis after some large 
variations were removed. 
An integrated framework of robust PCA model based fault diagnosis was 
developed to deal with the situation when no qualified historical data were available for 
fault diagnosis.  In this approach, PCA models were developed from data generated by 
well-designed simulation calculations.  Robust fault detection was achieved by 
calculating a fault detection index, which was robust to model uncertainty, that was larger 
than 1.0 only if a fault occurred.  Robust fault isolation was based on determining a fault 
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isolation index, which was also robust to model uncertainty, that measured how well the 
fault measurements could be reconstructed in different candidate fault subspaces with 
model uncertainty.  The developed algorithm was demonstrated through applying to the 
IRIS HCSG system with the thermal degradation considered as model uncertainty.  Both 
sensor faults and process faults could be correctly detected and isolated based on the 
calculated fault detection index and fault isolation index when model uncertainty was 
considered.   
The importance of dynamic fault diagnosis to nuclear power systems was 
emphasized in order to enhance the robustness to plant disturbance and meet the needs of 
fault tolerant control and transient fault diagnosis.  The goal of dynamic fault diagnosis 
algorithm, which was proposed in this dissertation, was to use subspace identification 
technique to identify a low order state-space model from plant data and then apply parity 
space approach for model based fault diagnosis.  Because data with persistent excitation 
were usually not available in nuclear power systems, robust subspace model based 
dynamic fault diagnosis algorithm was developed in this dissertation, and was able to 
deal with dynamic model uncertainty.  The uniqueness of the developed algorithm was 
that a separate procedure of identifying model uncertainty was not necessary.  Instead, 
after a subspace model was identified from simulation data, the robust residual generator 
design for fault diagnosis was achieved by combining the identification of model 
uncertainty and the robust residual generator design into one step.  The demonstration 
example through applying to the IRIS HCSG systems showed that the developed 
algorithm could avoid false alarms due to dynamic model uncertainty for transient fault 
diagnosis. 
 
7.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
To the author’s knowledge, this dissertation is the only work focused on 
developing fault diagnosis methods including sensor placement design, steady state fault 
diagnosis, and dynamic fault diagnosis for application to nuclear power systems.  
Although the proof-of-principle was demonstrated for the developed algorithms using 
IRIS HCSG systems, these algorithms still need to be implemented on a laboratory 
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system and tested using real nuclear power plant data before they can be integrated into 
the Generation-IV I&C systems.   
Sensor placement design based on graph theory was presented to determine the 
minimum set of sensors for process fault detection and isolation and was applied to IRIS 
Helical Coil Steam Generator systems.  In this application, the DG graph was developed 
by hand from engineering models.  To facilitate computer aided design, this process can 
be automated by developing a general purpose software, which allows an automatic 
transformation of engineering models into DG and the determination of minimum 
requirements of sensor placement for a specified objective of fault diagnosis. 
The developed robust data driven model based fault diagnosis methods in this 
dissertation were based on linear data driven models in order to deal with model 
uncertainty.  Further study need to be performed to deal with the nonlinearity inherent in 
nuclear power systems.  One foreseeable solution is to use multiple locally linear models 
built from data generated by a high fidelity nonlinear simulation model through 
perturbing the system inputs at different operating conditions.  For a known operation 
condition, the measured data would be compared with the available model prediction 
using classification algorithms to determine which linear model would be able to best fit 
the current data sequence.  It is this best linear data driven model that would be used for 
robust fault diagnosis.   
Although this dissertation has only dealt with process performance monitoring 
and fault diagnosis, equipment diagnostics is also very important in the integrated fault 
diagnosis system to improve the operational safety and economics of nuclear power 
systems.  In fact, the developed fault diagnosis algorithms are also relevant to equipment 
diagnostics.  For instance, the proposed steady state fault diagnosis algorithm can be 
directly used to diagnose the malfunctioning of steam turbines using the measurements of 
temperature, steam pressure, and steam flow rate at inlet and outlet points.  The proposed 
subspace identification algorithm can be combined with first principle-based models to 
detect and localize structural damages.  Some initial efforts on on-board vibration 
monitoring using subspace based covariance driven modal identification for 
nonstationary excitation have been made by Basseville, Abdelghani, and Benveniste, 
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1999.  It is worthwhile to demonstrate its performance for structural monitoring of major 
components in nuclear power plants. 
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Appendix 1  Matlab Code for HCSG Steady State Simulation 
clear all; 
close all; 
Tmax = 300; 
%Number of tubes=655; 
N =655; N0=8; 
% Tube inner diameter=13.24mm 
Ri_thermal=13.24/2*1.0E-3; 
% Tube outside diameter=17.46mm 
Ro_thermal=17.46/2*1.0E-3; 
%Tube inside flow area; 
Ri_hydraulic=Ri_thermal; 
%Internal shell external diameter Di=0.61 m; 
Di=0.61; 
%External shell internal diameter Dt=1.62m 
Do=1.62; 
%Radial pitch=25mm; 
t=25*1.0E-3; 
%Total shell side projected area 
shadow=1.0;  
Ap_total=1/4*pi*(Do^2-Di^2)*(1-Ro_thermal*2/t)*shadow; 
Ap=Ap_total/N; 
%Shell side hydraulic radius=2*flow area/wetting perimeter 
%Wetting area 
Peri_wet=N*2*pi*Ro_thermal; 
Ro_hydraulic=2*Ap_total/Peri_wet; 
%Tube side hydraulic dimater 
Ri_hydraulic=Ri_thermal; 
%Flow area on the secondary side; 
As=pi*(Ri_hydraulic^2);   
%Cross section for the tube; 
Aw=pi*(Ro_thermal^2-Ri_thermal^2); 
%Tube length 
Lt=32; 
%Flow rate on the primary side=4707/8kg/s; 
Wp=4707/N/N0; 
%Flow rate on the secondary side=502.8kg/s; 
Ws=502.8/N/N0*1.00; 
% Inlet temperature on the primary side 
Tpin=328.4+273; 
%Primary system outlet temperature 
Tpout=292+273; 
%Feed water temperature; 
Tfw=224+273;  
%Steam outlet temperature; 
Tsout=317+273;  
%Geometric tube radius  
Ri=Ri_thermal; 
Ro=Ro_thermal;  
T100=[]; 
T200=[]; 
P100=[]; 
P200=[]; 
H100=[]; 
H200=[]; 
Hall=[]; 
Ltube=[]; 
XX=[]; 
Kw=16.0;  %W/m/K 
%Pressure on the secondary side 
Ps0=5.8*1.01325; 
%Ps0=6.0*1.01325; 
deltaPs=0.296; 
Ps=Ps0+deltaPs; 
%Pressure on the primary side 
Pa0=15.52; 
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deltaPa=0.072; 
Pa=Pa0+deltaPa; 
scwater(Pa,Ps); 
load data1; 
HH1=dxxx(:,1); 
TT1=dxxx(:,2); 
load data2; 
HH2=dyyy(:,1); 
TT2=dyyy(:,2); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%To determine the subcooled boiling length%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
P1in=Pa; 
P2in=Ps; 
T2in=Tfw; 
T1in=Tpout; 
[P1sat,H1in,Cp1in,rho1in]=hsub(P1in,T1in); 
[P2sat,H2in,Cp2in,rho2in]=hsub(P2in,T2in); 
%%%%%%%%%iterate till saturated temperature is reached%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
i=1; 
deltaz=0.03; 
Lsub=0.0; 
T1sub(1)=T1in; 
T2sub(1)=T2in; 
P1sub(1)=P1in; 
P2sub(1)=P2in; 
Xsub(1)=0.0; 
[Tsat,dum1,dum2,dum3,dum4,dum5,dum6,dum7,dum8]=hsat(P2in); 
while abs(T2sub(i)-Tsat)/Tsat >0.001  
[T1out,T2out,T1avg,T2avg,P1out,P2out,P1avg,P2avg,h1,h2,Unew,H1out,H2out]=itersub0_new(T1in,T2in,H1in,H2in,P1in,P2in,Wp,
Ws,deltaz,... 
Kw,Ri_thermal,Ro_thermal,Ri_hydraulic,Ro_hydraulic,Ap,As); 
T1sub(i+1)=T1out; 
T2sub(i+1)=T2out; 
P1sub(i+1)=P1out; 
P2sub(i+1)=P2out; 
P1asub(i+1)=P1avg; 
P2asub(i+1)=P2avg; 
h1sub(i+1)=h1; 
h2sub(i+1)=h2; 
Usub(i+1)=Unew; 
Xsub(i+1)=0.0; 
LLsub(i+1)=Lsub; 
T1in=T1out; 
T2in=T2out; 
P1in=P1out; 
P2in=P2out; 
H1in=H1out; 
H2in=H2out; 
i=i+1; 
Lsub=deltaz+Lsub; 
end; 
fprintf('Subcooled heat transfer coefficient on the primary side===%f(BTU/hr/ft**2)\n',h1*0.1761); 
fprintf('Subcooled heat transfer coefficient on the seconday side===%f(BTU/hr/ft**2)\n',h2*0.1761); 
fprintf('Temperature on the primary side===%f(C)\n',T1out-273); 
fprintf('Temperature on the secondary side===%f(C)\n',T2out-273); 
fprintf('Subcooled boiling length===%f(m)\n',Lsub); 
Ltube=[Ltube,LLsub(2:end)]; 
T100=[T100,T1sub(2:end)]; 
T200=[T200,T2sub(2:end)]; 
P100=[P100,P1sub(2:end)]; 
P200=[P200,P2sub(2:end)]; 
H100=[H100,h1sub(2:end)]; 
H200=[H200,h2sub(2:end)]; 
Hall=[Hall,Usub(2:end)]; 
XX=[XX,Xsub(2:end)]; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Prepare initial data for satuarated region calculation%%%%%%%%%%%% 
[Tsat,h2f,h2g,k2f,k2g,mu2f,mu2g,Prf,Prg]=hsat(P2in); 
Tp0=T1sub(end); 
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Ts0=Tsat; 
hp0=h1sub(end); 
Usub_end=Usub(end); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%To determine the saturated boiling length%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
hp=hp0; 
Tpsat=Tp0; 
hsold=h2sub(end); 
U0old=8888; 
U0new=9999; 
hsnew=hsold*1.25; 
while abs((U0new-U0old)/U0old > 0.01) | abs((hsnew-hsold)/hsold > 0.01) 
a=Ro/Kw*log(Ro/Ri)+1/hp0; 
b=Ro/Ri; 
A=(exp(Ps*1.0E6/8.69E6)/0.02253); 
c=-(A^2)*Ro/Ri*(Tpsat-Tsat); 
hsold=(-b+(b^2-4*a*c)^0.5)/(2*a); 
a1=Ro/(Ri*hsold); 
b1=Ro/Kw*log(Ro/Ri); 
c1=1/hp; 
U0old=1/(a1+b1+c1); 
%Compute Hfg 
[dum,Hsf,Hsg]=hsat(Ps); 
Hfg=Hsg-Hsf; 
[dum1,dum2,Cpp,rhop]=hsub(Pa,Tpsat); 
B=Ws*Hfg/(Wp*Cpp); 
deltaT=Tpsat-Tsat; 
G=Ws/(As); 
De=2*Ri; 
R=0.15*Hfg*(De^(-0.1))*G^0.51; 
CHF=(Ro/Ri*U0old*(deltaT+B))/(1+Ro*B/(Ri*R)*U0old); 
xi=1-CHF/R; 
Tpdryout=Tpsat+Ws/(Wp*Cpp)*xi*Hfg; 
a=Ro/Kw*log(Ro/Ri)+1/hp0; 
b=Ro/Ri; 
A=(exp(Ps*1.0E6/8.69E6)/0.02253); 
c=-(A^2)*Ro/Ri*(Tpsat-Tsat); 
hsnew=(-b+(b^2-4*a*c)^0.5)/(2*a); 
a1=Ro/(Ri*hsnew); 
b1=Ro/Kw*log(Ro/Ri); 
c1=1/hp; 
U0new=1/(a1+b1+c1); 
end; 
fprintf('Saturated heat transfer coefficient on the seconday side===%f(BTU/hr/ft**2)\n'... 
,hsnew*0.1761); 
fprintf('Dryout temperature on the primary side===%f(C)\n', Tpdryout-273); 
fprintf('Dryout quality on the secondary side===%f\n', xi); 
U0avg=(U0new+Usub_end)/2; 
Lbavg=Wp*Cpp/(2*pi*Ro*U0avg)*log((Tpdryout-Tsat)/(Tp0-Tsat)); 
fprintf('Average boiling length===%f(m)\n', Lbavg); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
P1in=P100(end); 
P2in=P200(end); 
T2in=T200(end); 
T1in=T100(end); 
[P1sat,H1in,Cp1in,rho1in]=hsub(P1in,T1in); 
[Tsat,h2f,h2g,k2f,k2g,mu2f,mu2g,Prf,Prg]=hsat(P2in); 
H2in=h2f; 
HH1(1)=H1in; 
HH2(1)=H2in; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%To determine the saturated boiling length%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
i=1; 
deltaz=0.03; 
Lsat=0.0; 
T1sat(1)=T1in; 
T2sat(1)=T2in; 
P1sat(1)=P1in; 
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P2sat(1)=P2in; 
h1sat(1)=H100(end); 
h2sat(2)=H200(end); 
Xsat(1)=0.0; 
X(1)=0.0; 
Xin=0.0; 
while (X(i) < xi)  
 
[T1out,X2out,T1avg,T2avg,P1out,P2out,P1avg,P2avg,h1,h2,Unew,H1out,H2out]=... 
itersat0_new(T1in,H1in,H2in,Xin,P1in,P2in,Wp,Ws,deltaz,Kw,Ri_thermal,Ro_thermal,Ri_hydraulic,Ro_hydraulic,Ap,As); 
 
T1sat(i+1)=T1out; 
T2sat(i+1)=Tsat; 
Xsat(i+1)=X2out; 
X(i+1)=X2out; 
Xin=X2out; 
P11sat(i+1)=P1out; 
P22sat(i+1)=P2out; 
h1sat(i+1)=h1; 
h2sat(i+1)=h2; 
Usat(i+1)=Unew; 
LLsat(i+1)=Lsat; 
HH1(i+1)=H1out; 
HH2(i+1)=H2out; 
T1in=T1out; 
T2in=T2out; 
P1in=P1out; 
P2in=P2out; 
H1in=H1out; 
H2in=H2out; 
i=i+1; 
Lsat=deltaz+Lsat; 
end; 
fprintf('X2out==%f,Lsat==%f T1out=%f h2=%f P2out=%f\n',X2out,Lsat,T1out,h2,P2out); 
Ltube1=Ltube(end); 
Ltube2=LLsat+Ltube1; 
Ltube=[Ltube,Ltube2]; 
T100=[T100,T1sat]; 
T200=[T200,T2sat]; 
P200=[P200,P22sat]; 
H100=[H100,h1sat]; 
H200=[H200,h2sat]; 
Hall=[Hall,Usat]; 
XX=[XX,Xsat]; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%To compute the temperature profile in the superheated region%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
P1in=Pa; 
P2in=P22sat(end); 
T1in=T100(end); 
T2in=T200(end); 
nss=50; 
Lss=Lt-Ltube(end); 
deltaz=Lss/nss; 
%%%%%%%%%iterate till saturated temperature is reached%%%%%%%%% 
i=1; 
T1ss(1)=T1in; 
T2ss(1)=T2in; 
P1ss(1)=P1in; 
P2ss(1)=P2in; 
H11sg(1)=H100(end); 
H22sg(1)=H200(end); 
Xss=1.0; 
Length=0.0; 
[P1sat,H1in,Cp1in,rho1in]=hsub(P1in,T1in); 
[dum,H2in,Cp2in,vsin]=hsh(P2in,T2in); 
%H1in=HH1(end); 
%H2in=HH2(end); 
while Length<Lss   
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[T1out,T2out,T1avg,T2avg,P1out,P2out,P1avg,P2avg,h1,h2,Unew,H1out,H2out]=iterss0_new(T1in,T2in,H1in,H2in,P1in,P2in,Wp,W
s,deltaz,... 
Kw,Ri_thermal,Ro_thermal,Ri_hydraulic,Ro_hydraulic,Ap,As); 
T1ss(i+1)=T1out; 
T2ss(i+1)=T2out; 
P1ss(i+1)=P1out; 
P2ss(i+1)=P2out; 
Xss(i+1)=1.0; 
H1in=H1out; 
H2in=H2out; 
P1ssavg(i+1)=P1avg; 
P2ssavg(i+1)=P2avg; 
T1in=T1out; 
T2in=T2out; 
P1in=P1out; 
P2in=P2out; 
Lssg(i+1)=deltaz; 
H11sg(i+1)=h1; 
H22sg(i+1)=h2; 
Uass(i+1)=Unew; 
i=i+1; 
Length=deltaz+Length; 
end; 
fprintf('Length==%f T1out=%f T2out=%f P2out=%f\n',Length,T1out,T2out,P2out); 
Ltube1=Ltube(end); 
Ltube2=cumsum(Lssg)+Ltube1; 
Ltube=[Ltube,Ltube2]; 
T100=[T100,T1ss]; 
T200=[T200,T2ss]; 
P200=[P200,P2ss]; 
H100=[H100,H11sg]; 
H200=[H200,H22sg]; 
Hall=[Hall,Uass]; 
XX=[XX,Xss]; 
fprintf('Superheated heat transfer coefficient on the primary side===%f(BTU/hr/ft**2)\n',H11sg(i)*0.1761); 
fprintf('Superheated heat transfer coefficient on the seconday side===%f(BTU/hr/ft**2)\n',H22sg(i)*0.1761); 
fprintf('Temperature on the primary side===%f(C)\n',T1ss(i)-273); 
fprintf('Temperature on the secondary side===%f(C)\n',T2ss(i)-273); 
fprintf('Superheated boiling length===%f(m)\n',Lss); 
 
figure; 
T11=T100-273; 
T22=T200-273; 
x1=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),T11(1:10:end),'marker','s','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
hold on; 
x2=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),T22(1:10:end),'marker','v','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','-.','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('Tube length(m)'); 
ylabel('Temperature(C)'); 
grid on; 
title('Fluid temperature versus tube length');  
hold off; 
legend([x1,x2],'Primary tempearture','Secondary tempearture'); 
figure(2); 
x1=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),H100(1:10:end)*0.1761,'marker','s','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
hold on; 
x2=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),H200(1:10:end)*0.1761,'marker','v','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','-.','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('Tube length(m)'); 
ylabel('Heat Transfer Coefficient(BTU/Hr/ft**2)'); 
grid on; 
title('Heat transfer coefficient versus tube length');  
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hold off; 
legend([x1,x2],'Primary side','Secondary side'); 
grid on; 
 
figure(3); 
x1=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),P200(1:10:end)-P200(end),'marker','s','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('Tube length(m)'); 
ylabel('Pressure Drop(Mpa)'); 
grid on; 
title('Pressure drop versus tube length on the seconsary side');  
grid on; 
 
figure(4); 
x1=plot(Ltube(1:10:end),XX(1:10:end),'marker','s','markersize',4,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('Tube length(m)'); 
ylabel('Steam Quality'); 
grid on; 
title('Steam quality versus tube length');  
grid on; 
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Appendix 2  Matlab Code for HCSG Transient Simulation 
 
close all; 
clear all; 
Tmax = 300; 
JJ=778.16; %BTU/ft/lbf; 
Fudge1=1.0; 
Fudge2=1.0; 
%from mm to ft; 
c1=0.1*0.3937/12;  
%conversion from kg to lbm; 
c2=1/0.4536;  
%Number of tubes=820; 
N =655;  
% Tube inner diameter=13.24mm 
Ri_thermal=13.24/2*c1; 
% Tube outside diameter=17.46mm 
Ro_thermal=17.46/2*c1; 
% Inlet temperature on the primary side 
Tpin=1.8*328.4+32; 
 
%Tube inside flow area; 
Ri_hydraulic=Ri_thermal; 
As=pi*Ri_hydraulic^2; 
 
%Internal shell external diameter Di=0.61 m; 
Di=0.61*1000*c1; 
%External shell internal diameter Dt=1.62m 
Do=1.62*1000*c1; 
%Radial pitch=25mm; 
t=25*c1; 
%Total shell side projected area 
Ap_total=1/4*pi*(Do^2-Di^2)*(1-Ro_thermal*2/t); 
%Shell side hydraulic radius=2*flow area/wetting perimeter 
%Wetting area 
Peri_wet=N*2*pi*Ro_thermal; 
Ro_hydraulic=2*Ap_total/Peri_wet; 
Ap=pi*Ro_hydraulic^2;   
 
%Tube side hydraulic dimater 
Ri_hydraulic=Ri_thermal; 
%Flow area on the secondary side; 
As=pi*(Ri_hydraulic^2);   
%Cross section for the tube; 
Aw=pi*(Ro_thermal^2-Ri_thermal^2); 
 
%Specific heat capacity; 
Cpp=1.3355; 
Cpw=0.109; 
%Cps=1.0185; 
Cpfw=1.122; 
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Cpsc=1.122; 
 
%Density lbm/ft**3 
rhop=44.75; 
rhow=526.0; 
%rhos=1.876; 
rhoavg=8.86; %for entire boiling region; 
rhofw=51.71; 
rhof=46.91; %for boiling water 
rhosc=(rhofw+rhof)/2; 
 
 
Ps=5.8; 
Ps=Ps; Ts=(280+318)/2+273;  
[dum,dum,Cps,vss]=hsh(Ps,Ts); 
Cps=Cps*9.4783E-4/(2.2046*1.8); 
rhos=1/vss*0.06243; 
 
%Initial heat transfer coefficient 
 
Rii=Ri_thermal; 
Roo=Ro_thermal; 
ccc=0.1761; 
 
Kw=(10.1924/3600)*1.0; 
hp=21000*ccc/3600.0; 
hs=8500*ccc/3600.0; 
hsc=16000*ccc/3600.0; 
hb=55000*ccc/3600.0; 
 
hpw=Kw*hp/(Kw+hp*Roo*(0.5+log(Roo/Rii)/(1-(Roo/Rii)^2))); 
hws=Kw*hs/(Kw+hs*Rii*(log(Rii/Roo)/(((Rii/Roo)^2)-1)-0.5)); 
hwsc=Kw*hsc/(Kw+hsc*Rii*(log(Rii/Roo)/(((Rii/Roo)^2)-1)-0.5)); 
hwb=Kw*hb/(Kw+hb*Rii*(log(Rii/Roo)/(((Rii/Roo)^2)-1)-0.5)); 
 
 
%Feed water temperature=224C; 
Tfw=1.8*224+32;  
 
%Tube length 
Lt=32*3.2808; %total bundle length 
Lb=21.5*3.2808;  %this value is fixed to determine accurate heat transfer coefficient in this region. 
Lsc=4.5*3.2808; %this value is malipulated given that hwsc is known. 
Ls=Lt-Lb-Lsc; 
%%%%%Heating circumference%%%%% 
Ri=Ri_thermal; 
Ro=Ro_thermal; 
Uwb=2*pi*Ri; 
Uws=2*pi*Ri; 
Uwsc=2*pi*Ri; 
 
Ptable=5.0:0.1:6.0; 
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Tsavg=(280+318)/2+273; 
Ttable=[]; 
HfgTable=[]; 
hsTable=[]; 
for PPP=5.0:0.1:6.0 
[Tsat,hf,hg,kf,kg,muf,mug,Prf,Prg]=hsat(PPP); 
[dum,hss,dum,dum]=hsh(PPP,Tsavg); 
Ttable=[Ttable,Tsat]; 
hsTable=[hsTable,hss]; 
HfgTable=[HfgTable,hg-hf]; 
end; 
c3=1000/6.895; 
Ptable=Ptable*c3; %Pressure; 
Ttable=(Ttable-273)*1.8+32; %Saturated temperature; 
cc1=9.4783E-4/2.2046; 
HfgTable=HfgTable*cc1; 
hsTable=hsTable*cc1; 
a=POLYFIT(Ptable,Ttable,1); 
X5=a(2);K5=a(1); 
b=POLYFIT(Ptable,HfgTable,1); 
X4=b(2); K4=b(1); 
c=POLYFIT(Ptable,hsTable,1); 
dHsdPs=c(1); 
 
N0=8; 
%Flow rate on the primary side=560.46kg/s; 
Wp=4707*c2/N/N0*Fudge1; 
Wp0=Wp; 
Wp1=Wp; 
Wp2=Wp; 
Wp3=Wp; 
Wp4=Wp; 
Wp5=Wp; 
 
Fraction=1.0; 
%Flow rate on the secondary side=62.85kg/s; 
AdjustFactor=1.0; 
Wsec=502.8*c2/N0/N*Fraction*AdjustFactor; 
Ws=Wsec; 
Wb=Wsec; 
Wfw=Wsec; 
Wsg=Wsec; 
Ws0=Wsec; 
Ri=Ri_thermal; 
Ro=Ro_thermal;  
 
 
%Preparing data matrix; 
a1=Ap*Cpp*rhop/2;   %primary side; 
a2=Aw*Cpw*rhow/2;   %metal; 
a3=As*Cps*rhos/2;   %secondary side; 
a4=hpw*pi*Ro/a1; 
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a51=Cpp*Wp0/a1; 
a52=Cpp*Wp1/a1; 
a53=Cpp*Wp2/a1; 
a54=Cpp*Wp3/a1; 
a55=Cpp*Wp4/a1; 
a56=Cpp*Wp5/a1; 
 
a6=hpw*pi*Ro/a2; 
a7=hwb*pi*Ri/a2; 
a8=hws*pi*Ri/a2; 
a9=hws*pi*Ri/a3;     
 
a11=As*Cpsc*rhosc/2; %  
a12=hwsc*pi*Ri/a2; %  
a13=hwsc*pi*Ri/a11; %  
a14=144/(JJ*Cpp*rhop); 
%dHsdPs=(1245.9-1251.8)/50.0; 
a15=144/(JJ*Cps*rhos)-dHsdPs/Cps; 
dHscdPsc=(430.47-430.19)/500; 
a16=144/(JJ*Cpsc*rhosc)-dHscdPsc/rhosc; 
 
%Saturated temperature for 7Mpa 
c3=1000/6.895; 
Ps=5.8*c3; 
deltaP=0.2; 
Psat=(5.8+deltaP)*c3; 
%X5=402.94; K5=0.14;  %Tsat~Psat 
Tsat=X5+K5*Psat; 
%Tsat=546.6;  %Exit temperature=317C and Degree of superheat is 43.4; 
Hfg=X4+K4*Psat; 
sim('htsgss'); 
 
a99=hws*pi*Ri/Cps;   
a88=2*Wfw/As/rhosc; 
a77=2/As/rhosc; 
Ksc=(1/0.02152-1/0.02145)/20;        
Kb=0.00552445; 
dTsatdP=K5; 
 
Z=0.76634; % 570K, 60atm; 
R=4.55465*3.5314455E-5*14.696006/(5/9*2.2046223E-3); %cm^3atm/deg*g 
Ct=Ws/Ps; 
Ktb=1.5428e-004; 
 
Pset=5.8*c3; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Generate Fault Free Data%  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
NormData=[]; 
PsBias=0.0; 
WsBias=0.0; 
WfwBias=0.0; 
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TclBiasPer=0.0; 
Cs0=Ws/Ps; 
CsInc=1.0; 
Pcor=1.0; 
tout=[]; 
htsgdata=[]; 
TpinInc=1.0; 
TfwInc=0.0; 
WfwInc=0.0; 
WsInc=0.0; 
WsPer=0.0; 
 
sim('HCSG_Transient'); 
NormData=htsgdata; 
figure(1); 
mg=20; 
mmm1=find(tout>500); 
mmm=mmm1(1); 
aaa.time=tout(mmm+1:mg:end)-tout(mmm); 
aaa.Tstm=(NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,6)-32)/1.8; 
aaa.Tcold=(NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,3)-32)/1.8; 
aaa.Prs=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,4)/145.038; 
aaa.Lb=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,7)*0.3048; 
aaa.Lsc=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,12)*0.3048; 
 
NormData=[]; 
PsBias=0.0; 
WsBias=0.0; 
WfwBias=0.0; 
TclBiasPer=0.0; 
Pcor=1.0; 
tout=[]; 
htsgdata=[]; 
TpinInc=0.0; 
TfwInc=0.0; 
WfwPer=0.01; 
WfwInc=WfwPer*Wfw; 
Cs0=Ws/Ps; 
CsInc=1.0; 
WsPer=0.0; 
sim('HCSG_Transient'); 
NormData=htsgdata; 
mmm1=find(tout>500); 
mmm=mmm1(1); 
bbb.time=tout(mmm+1:mg:end)-tout(mmm); 
bbb.Tstm=(NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,6)-32)/1.8; 
bbb.Tcold=(NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,3)-32)/1.8; 
bbb.Prs=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,4)/145.038; 
bbb.Lb=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,7)*0.3048; 
bbb.Lsc=NormData(mmm+1:mg:end,12)*0.3048; 
 
figure(1); 
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x1=plot(aaa.time,aaa.Tcold,'marker','s','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
hold on; 
x2=plot(bbb.time,bbb.Tcold,'marker','v','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','-.','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('time(sec)'); 
ylabel('cold leg temperature (C)'); 
grid on; 
hold off; 
legend([x1,x2],'hot leg temperature transient','feed water flow transient'); 
 
figure(2); 
x1=plot(aaa.time,aaa.Tstm,'marker','s','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
hold on; 
x2=plot(bbb.time,bbb.Tstm,'marker','v','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','-.','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('time(sec)'); 
ylabel('steam outlet temperature (C)'); 
grid on; 
hold off; 
legend([x1,x2],'hot leg temperature transient','feed water flow transient'); 
 
 
 
figure(3); 
x1=plot(aaa.time,aaa.Prs,'marker','s','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','--','color','r','linewidth',2);  
hold on; 
x2=plot(bbb.time,bbb.Prs,'marker','v','markersize',3,... 
                 'markeredgecolor','b','markerfacecolor',[.6 0 .6],... 
                 'linestyle','-.','color','r','linewidth',2);  
xlabel('time(sec)'); 
ylabel('steam pressure (Mpa)'); 
grid on; 
hold off; 
legend([x1,x2],'hot leg temperature transient','feed water flow transient'); 
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Appendix 3  Matlab Code for HCSG Bilinear Data Reconcilation 
 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%                IRIS Data Reconciliation Problem                                                                        %%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%                           Bilinear Case                                                                                              %%%%%%%%   
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
close all; 
clear all; 
 
warning off; 
W1_nominal=563.0*2; 
T1_nominal=328.5; 
T3_nominal=292.0; 
T5_nominal=292.0; 
W6_nominal=563.0*2; 
T6_nominal=292.0; 
W7_nominal=62.85*2.0; 
T7_nominal=224.0; 
W12_nominal=62.85*2.0; 
T12_nominal=317.2; 
P1_nominal=15.5; 
P6_nominal=15.5+0.072; 
P7_nominal=5.8+0.296; 
P12_nominal=5.8; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Adjust the data based on the given water/steam table %%%%%%%%%%%%   
[mid,H120,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,T12_nominal); 
[mid,H70,mid,mid]=Hsub(P7_nominal,T7_nominal); 
[mid,H10,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P1_nominal,T1_nominal); 
[mid,H60,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P6_nominal,T6_nominal); 
 
H120=H120/1.0E6; 
H70=H70/1.0E6; 
H10=H10/1.0E6; 
H60=H60/1.0E6; 
 
W1_nominal=W12_nominal*(H120-H70)/(H10-H60); 
W6_nominal=W1_nominal; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     Compute the parameters needed for linearization        %%%%%%% 
HHH12=[]; 
TTT12=[]; 
for Ttemp=T12_nominal-35:0.1:T12_nominal+35 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HHH12=[HHH12,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TTT12=[TTT12,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch12,mid] = POLYFIT(TTT12,HHH12,1); 
 
HHH7=[]; 
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TTT7=[]; 
for Ttemp=T7_nominal-10:1:T7_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P7_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HHH7=[HHH7,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TTT7=[TTT7,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch7,mid] = POLYFIT(TTT7,HHH7,1); 
 
HHH1=[]; 
TTT1=[]; 
for Ttemp=T1_nominal-10:1:T1_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P1_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HHH1=[HHH1,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TTT1=[TTT1,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch1,mid] = POLYFIT(TTT1,HHH1,1); 
 
HHH6=[]; 
TTT6=[]; 
for Ttemp=T6_nominal-30:0.1:T6_nominal+30 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P1_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HHH6=[HHH6,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TTT6=[TTT6,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch6,mid] = POLYFIT(TTT6,HHH6,1); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                         Categorization of energy flow                                                                                                                        %%% 
%%%  No.    Flow             Temperature                                                                                                                                            %%% 
%%%   1     Yes               Yes                                                                                                                                                            %%% 
%%%   2     No                Yes                                                                                                                                                            %%% 
%%%   3     Yes/No            No                                                                                                                                                          %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%  f: enthalpy flow of category 1. 
%%%  d: specific enthalpy of category 2. 
%%%  v: enthalpy flow rates of category 3. 
%%%  V: unmeasured flow rates for the enthaly flow of category 2. 
%%%  B1*f+B2(V*d)+B3*v=0 
%%%  d=d0+delta_d 
%%%  Theta=V*delta_d 
%%%  B2(V*d)=B2*Theta+B2*V*d0   
%%%  B4*Fu2=B2*V*d0  
%%%    where Each column of B4 = the sum of the columns of B2 for the considered stream  
%%%    multiplied by the corresponding consistent specific enthalpy. 
%%%    where Fu2 is the corresponding mass unmeasured flow rate. 
%%%  Reorganize such that B5*Fu=B2*V*d0. 
%%%    where Fu groups all the unmeasured flow rate.  
%%%  Therefore, we have 
%%%    [O B1 B2 B5 B3][FM f Theta Fu v]'=0. 
 
%FM={W2,W4,W7,W12}  measured flow 
%f={7,12}    enthalpy flow with both temperature and flow measured 
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%theta={1,3,9} 
%FU={W1,W3,W5,W6,W8,W10,W9,W11} Unmeasured flow 
%V={2,4,5,6,8,10,11} enthalpy flow with temperature unmeasured  
 
 
%Index    1   2   3   4   
     xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
     nFM=length(xFM); 
%Index    1   2   
     xf= [7  12]; 
     nxf=length(xf); 
%Index    1   2   3 
 xTheta= [1   3   9]; 
     nxTheta=length(xTheta); 
%Index    1   2   3   4   5   6    7    8 
    xFu= [1   3   5   6   8   9   10   11]; 
    nxFu=length(xFu); 
%Index    1   2   3   4   5  6   7  
     xv= [2   4   5   6   8  10  11]; 
    nxv=length(xv); 
%%%neq1=number of enthaply balance equations 
neq1=6; 
O1=zeros(neq1,nFM); 
B1=zeros(neq1,nxf); 
B2=zeros(neq1,nxTheta); 
B5=zeros(neq1,nxFu); 
B3=zeros(neq1,nxv); 
%%%neq2=number of mass balance equations 
neq2=8; 
E4=zeros(neq2,nFM); 
E1=zeros(neq2,nxf); 
E2=zeros(neq2,nxTheta); 
E8=zeros(neq2,nxFu); 
E3=zeros(neq2,nxv); 
 
 
%Index    1   2   3   4   
%     xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
%     nFM=length(xFM); 
%Index    1   2   
%     xf= [7  12]; 
%     nxf=length(xf); 
 
 
W11_Pred=[]; 
W9_Pred=[]; 
W11_brute=[]; 
W9_brute=[]; 
Q1_brute=[]; 
Q2_brute=[]; 
Q11=[]; 
Q22=[]; 
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Est_Flow=[]; 
Est_Temp=[]; 
noise_Flow=0.01/3; 
noise_temp=0.0025/3; 
load iris_ss XmNormal XmFault X_nominal WsecInd1 WsecInd2; 
ndata=150; 
NormData=[]; 
for i=1:1:ndata 
    temp=XmNormal(i,:); 
    NormData=[NormData;temp]; 
end; 
XmData=[NormData;XmFault]; 
Wsec1Data=[NormData(:,7)/2;WsecInd1]; 
Wsec2Data=[NormData(:,7)/2;WsecInd2]; 
 
 
%Index     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9   10   11  12   13  14  15  16   17    18 
%XmFault=[W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  tT3 tT9 tT1  tT7 tT11 tT12]; 
 
%XmFault=XmData; 
[ndata,mdata]=size(XmData); 
ndata_n=ndata-50; 
mmp=1; 
XmData(ndata_n+1:ndata,mmp)=XmData(ndata_n+1:ndata,mmp)+ones(ndata-ndata_n,1).*X_nominal(mmp).*0.01; 
 
 
DataRecon=[]; 
DataRecon1=[]; 
 
DataRaw=[]; 
%Index    1   2   3   4   
%     xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
%     nFM=length(xFM); 
 
 
for itt=1:1:ndata 
FlowData = XmData(itt,[1 5 7 9])'; 
FlowData([1,2])=FlowData([1,2])/2; 
FlowData0= X_nominal([1 5 7 9])'; 
FlowData0([1,2])=FlowData0([1,2])/2; 
FM=FlowData+noise_Flow*randn(4,1).*FlowData0; 
TempData0=X_nominal([2,6,8,10]); 
 
T1=XmData(itt,2)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(1); 
T6=XmData(itt,6)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(2); 
T7=XmData(itt,8)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(3); 
T12=XmData(itt,10)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(4); 
 
[mid,H10,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P6_nominal,T1); 
[mid,H60,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P6_nominal,T6); 
[mid,H70,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P7_nominal,T7); 
[mid,H120,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,T12); 
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H10=H10/1.0E6; 
H60=H60/1.0E6; 
H70=H70/1.0E6; 
H120=H120/1.0E6; 
 
%Index    1   2   
%     xf= [7  12]; 
%     nxf=length(xf); 
 
aa=  FM([3,4])'.*[H70 H120]; 
f=aa'; 
 
 
TempData0=X_nominal([3,12]) 
TT3=XmData(itt,3)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(1); 
TT9=XmData(itt,12)+noise_temp*randn(1).*TempData0(2);; 
[mid,H30,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P6_nominal,TT3); 
[mid,H90,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,TT9); 
H30=H30/1.0E6; 
H90=H90/1.0E6; 
 
 
Qptot=aa(2)-aa(1); 
Qp1=FM(1)*(H10-H30); 
Qp2=Qptot-Qp1; 
Flow9=Qp2/(H90-H70); 
Flow11=FM(4)-Flow9; 
W11_brute=[W11_brute;Flow11]; 
W9_brute=[W9_brute;Flow9]; 
Q1_brute=[Q1_brute;Qp1]; 
Q2_brute=[Q2_brute;Qp2]; 
 
H20=H10; H40=H10; H80=H70; H100=H70;  H50=H60;  H110=H120;     
 
 
%Index    1   2   3   4   
%     xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
%Index    1   2   
%     xf= [7  12]; 
%xTheta= [1   3   9]; 
%Index    1   2   3   4   5   6    7    8 
    %Fu= [1   3   5   6   8   9   10   11]; 
%Index    1   2   3   4   5  6   7  
    %xv= [2   4   5   6   8  10  11]; 
%%%neq1=number of enthaply balance equations 
 
 
Hd=[H10 H30 H90]; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Energy Balance Equations%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     
%%%    [O B1 B2 B5 B3][FM f Theta Fu v]'=0. 
%%   Constraint 1: W1dh1+h10*W1-v2-v4=0 
             B2(1,1)=1;     B5(1,1)=H10;       B3(1,1)=-1; B3(1,2)=-1; 
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%%   Constraint 2: W3dh3+h30W3+v5-v6=0 
             B2(2,2)=1;     B5(2,2)=H30;       B3(2,3)=1; B3(2,4)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 3: f7- v8-v10=0 
B1(3,1)=1;                                     B3(3,5)=-1;B3(3,6)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 4: f12-W9dh9-h90W9- v11=0 
B1(4,2)=1;   B2(4,3)=-1;     B5(4,6)=-H90;     B3(4,7)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 5: -W3dh3 -h30W3  +v2+v10-v11=0 
             B2(5,2)=-1;      B5(5,2)=-H30;     B3(5,1)=1;B3(5,6)=1;B3(5,7)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 6: -W9dh9 -h90W9  +v4+v8-v5=0 
             B2(6,3)=-1;      B5(6,6)=-H90;     B3(6,2)=1;B3(6,5)=1;B3(6,3)=-1; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Mass Balance Equations%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     
%%%    [E4 E1 E2 E8 E3][FM f Theta Fu v]'=0. 
%Index    1   2   3   4   
%     xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
%Index    1   2   3   4   5   6    7    8 
    %Fu= [1   3   5   6   8   9   10   11]; 
 
%%   Constraint 1: W1-W2-W4=0; 
E4(1,1)=-1;  E4(1,2)=-1; E8(1,1)=1;  
%%   Constraint 2: W2-W3=0; 
E4(2,1)=1;               E8(2,2)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 3: W4-W5=0; 
E4(3,2)=1;               E8(3,3)=-1; 
 
%%   Constraint 4: W6-W3-W5=0; 
                         E8(4,4)=1;  E8(4,2)=-1;  E8(4,3)=-1; 
 
%%   Constraint 5: W12-W9-W11=0; 
E4(5,4)=1;               E8(5,6)=-1; E8(5,8)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 6: W10-W11=0; 
                         E8(6,7)=1;  E8(6,8)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 7: W8-W9=0; 
                         E8(7,5)=1;  E8(7,6)=-1; 
%%   Constraint 8: W7-W8-W10=0; 
E4(8,3)=1;               E8(8,5)=-1;  E8(8,7)=-1; 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                  Elimination of unmeasured variables                      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
 
B11=[O1 B1 B2; E4 E1 E2]; 
B22=[B5;E8]; 
B33=[B3;E3]; 
bx=[FM;f]; 
e=-[O1,B1;E4,E1]*bx; 
 
%%%  QR decomposition of matrix B33 
rv=rank(B33,1.0E-10); 
[n,m]=size(B33); 
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[QB,RB,Ev]=qr(B33); 
QB1=QB(:,1:rv); 
RB1=RB(1:rv,1:rv); 
RB2=RB(1:rv,rv+1:end); 
QB2=QB(:,rv+1:end); 
%%%  Define a new matrix D 
D=QB2'*B22; 
%%% QR decomposition of matrix D 
rf=rank(D,1.0E-10); 
[n,m]=size(D); 
[QD,RD,EFu]=qr(D); 
QD1=QD(:,1:rf); 
RD1=RD(1:rf,1:rf); 
RD2=RD(1:rf,rf+1:end); 
QD2=QD(:,rf+1:end); 
%%%  The process constraint equation is reduced to be as follows: 
%%%  QD2'*QB2'*B11*t=QD2'*QB2'*e; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%       Estimation of measured variables and unmeasured mass flow      %% %%%%% %%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
%%%  Initial Guess V=Diagonal matrix of unmeasured mass flow for enthalpy flow  
%%%  of category 2. 
noise_Flow=0.01/3; 
noise_temp=0.0025/3; 
 
phi_FM=(FM*noise_Flow).^2; 
phi_f= (f*noise_Flow).^2; 
%xTheta= [1   3   9]; 
 
dHV= ([H10 H30 H90].*1.0E-3).^2; 
phid=diag(dHV); 
%%%Index  W1           W3          W9 
init_V=[W1_nominal   0.5*W1_nominal   0.5*W7_nominal]; 
FLowE_old=0; 
 
%%%   Updating the value of the determinable mass flow rate untill it is convergent 
while  1 
V=diag(init_V); 
%%%  phid=covariance matrix of the measured speicific enthalpy d. 
phi_Theta=diag(V*phid*V'); 
phet=[phi_FM;phi_f;phi_Theta]; 
phit=diag(phet); 
 
%%%Step 1:  Find estimate t=[delta_FM,delta_f,Theta]'; 
Gt=QD2'*QB2'*B11; 
b=QD2'*QB2'*e; 
t_estimate=phit*Gt'*inv(Gt*phit*Gt')*b; 
%%%Step 2:  Estimation of unmeasured mass flow 
uuu=EFu'*xFu'; 
%%%uuu2 is indeterminable  
uuu2=uuu(rf+1:end); 
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fprintf('The unmeasured flow is unobservable\n'); 
disp(uuu2); 
RIF=inv(RD1)*RD2; 
GGRIF=(abs(RIF)>1.0E-10); 
ccc=any(GGRIF,2); 
ind_obs=find(ccc==0); 
ind_unobs=find(ccc~=0); 
 
%%% fe=the number of determinable unmeasured flow rates. 
fe=length(ind_obs); 
 
fprintf('The observable umeasured flow is as follows\n'); 
uuu1=uuu(1:rf); 
disp(uuu1(ind_obs)); 
 
if ~isempty(ind_obs); 
FLow_Estimate=inv(RD1)*QD1'*QB2'*e-inv(RD1)*QD1'*QB2'*B11*t_estimate; 
if norm(FLow_Estimate(ind_obs)-FLowE_old)<1.0E-10*norm(FLow_Estimate(ind_obs)) break; end; 
 
  for i=1:1:length(xTheta) 
    for j=1:1:length(ind_obs) 
        if  xTheta(i)==uuu1(ind_obs(j))   
       init_V(i)=FLow_Estimate(ind_obs(j)); 
        end; 
    end; 
  end; 
 FLowE_old=FLow_Estimate(ind_obs); 
else 
break; 
end; 
 
end; 
 
 
 
%      xFM=[2   4   7  12];  
%xTheta= [1   3   9]; 
 
fprintf('The reconciled measured flow is\n'); 
FM_pred=FM+t_estimate(1:nFM); 
f_pred=f+t_estimate(nFM+1:nxf+nFM); 
Theta_pred=t_estimate(nFM+nxf+1:end); 
Ind_Theta=uuu1(ind_obs); 
 
ijk=0; 
for inum=1:1:nxTheta 
    icol=find(xTheta(inum)==Ind_Theta); 
    if ~isempty(icol) 
    ijk=ijk+1; 
    Flow_Theta(ijk)=FLow_Estimate(icol); 
    end; 
end; 
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for iii=1:1:nFM 
fprintf('iii=%d FM=%f\n',[xFM(iii),FM_pred(iii)]); 
end; 
fprintf('\n'); 
 
 
 
T_pred(1)= interp1(HHH7,TTT7,f_pred(1)/FM_pred(1)); 
T_pred(2)= interp1(HHH12,TTT12,f_pred(2)/FM_pred(2)); 
 
for jjj=1:1:nxf 
fprintf('jjj=%d enthalpy=%f  temperature=%f\n',[xf(jjj),f_pred(jjj),T_pred(jjj)]); 
end; 
 
fprintf('The estimated flow is\n'); 
for iii=1:1:fe 
fprintf('iii=%d flow=%f\n',[uuu1(ind_obs(iii)),FLow_Estimate(iii)]); 
end; 
 
fprintf('The reconciled temperature is as follows\n'); 
delta_d=Theta_pred./Flow_Theta'; 
Hd_pred=Hd'+delta_d; 
Fd_pred=Flow_Theta'; 
 
%xTheta= [1   3   9]; 
 
Te_pred(1)=interp1(HHH1,TTT1,Hd_pred(1)); 
Te_pred(2)=interp1(HHH6,TTT6,Hd_pred(2)); 
Te_pred(3)=interp1(HHH12,TTT12,Hd_pred(3)); 
for iii=1:1:nxTheta 
fprintf('iii=%d specific enthalpy=%f  temperature=%f\n',[xTheta(iii),Hd_pred(iii),Te_pred(iii)]); 
end; 
 
%%% Estimation of vector v. 
%%%Reordering the observable and the unobservable mass flow rates. 
Fud=FLow_Estimate; 
xFud=uuu1(ind_obs); 
xFui=[uuu1(ind_unobs);uuu2]; 
fe1=length(xFud); 
fe2=length(xFui); 
for inum=1:1:fe1 
    icol=find(xFud(inum)==xFu); 
    B2d(:,inum)=B22(:,icol); 
end; 
 
B2i=[]; 
for inum=1:1:fe2 
    icol=find(xFui(inum)==xFu); 
    B2i(:,inum)=B22(:,icol); 
end; 
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vvv=Ev'*xv'; 
vvv1=vvv(1:1:rv); 
vvv2=vvv(rv+1:end); 
 
fprintf(' The undeterminable variables v include\n'); 
disp(vvv2); 
 
RIV=inv(RB1)*RB2; 
RIFi=inv(RB1)*QB1'*B2i; 
vf=inv(RB1)*QB1'*e-inv(RB1)*QB1'*B11*t_estimate-inv(RB1)*QB1'*B2d*Fud; 
 
if isempty(RIV)  
    ccc1=zeros(length(vvv1),1); 
else 
GGRIV=(abs(RIV)>1.0E-10); 
ccc1=any(GGRIV,2); 
end; 
if isempty(RIFi) 
    ccc2=zeros(length(vvv1),1); 
else 
GGRIFi=(abs(RIFi)>1.0E-10); 
ccc2=any(GGRIFi,2); 
end; 
 
indv_obs=find(ccc1==0 & ccc2==0 ); 
indv_unobs=find(ccc1~=0 | ccc2~=0); 
fprintf(' The determinable variables v are as follows\n'); 
 
 
Hv_pred(1)=vf(1)/FLow_Estimate(7); 
Hv_pred(2)=vf(2)/FLow_Estimate(6); 
Fv_pred=[FLow_Estimate(7);FLow_Estimate(6)]; 
 
Tv_pred(1)=interp1(HHH6,TTT6,Hv_pred(1)); 
Tv_pred(2)=interp1(HHH12,TTT12,Hv_pred(2)); 
 
 
% xTheta= [2   3   4   8   9  10]; 
 
%aaa=(Hd_pred(1)*Fd_pred(1)-Hd_pred(2)*Fd_pred(2))/(Hv_pred(2)*Fv_pred(2)-Hd_pred(6)*Fd_pred(6)); 
%bbb=(Hd_pred(3)*Fd_pred(3)-Hv_pred(1)*Fv_pred(1))/(Hd_pred(5)*Fd_pred(5)-Hd_pred(4)*Fd_pred(4)); 
aaa=(Hd_pred(1)*Fd_pred(1)-Hd_pred(2)*Fd_pred(2)); 
bbb=(Hd_pred(3)*Fd_pred(3)-Hv_pred(1)*Fv_pred(1)); 
 
Q11=[Q11,aaa]; 
Q22=[Q22,bbb]; 
 
 
for ill=1:1:length(indv_obs) 
fprintf(' inum=%d enthalpy=%f specific enthalpy=%f temperature=%f\n',[vvv1(ill),vf(ill),Hv_pred(ill),Tv_pred(ill)]); 
end; 
fprintf(' The undeterminable variables v include\n'); 
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disp(vvv1(indv_unobs)); 
 
rr(1)=f(1)-Hd_pred(1)*Fd_pred(1)-Hd_pred(3)*Fd_pred(3); 
rr(2)=f(2)-Hd_pred(2)*Fd_pred(2)-vf(1); 
rr(3)=f(4)-Hd_pred(5)*Fd_pred(5)-vf(2); 
rr(4)=f(3)-Hd_pred(4)*Fd_pred(4)-Hd_pred(6)*Fd_pred(6); 
rr(5)=(Hd_pred(1)*Fd_pred(1)-Hd_pred(2)*Fd_pred(2))-(Hv_pred(2)*Fv_pred(2)-Hd_pred(6)*Fd_pred(6)); 
rr(6)=(Hd_pred(3)*Fd_pred(3)-Hv_pred(1)*Fv_pred(1))-(Hd_pred(5)*Fd_pred(5)-Hd_pred(4)*Fd_pred(4)); 
fprintf(' The constrained residual for the energy equations\n'); 
fprintf(' %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f\n',rr); 
 
 
%%%  Unmeasured tempeartures are determinable only if the mass flow is  
%%%  measured or determinable and the enthalpy is determinable. 
aaaa=FLow_Estimate(6); 
bbbb=FLow_Estimate(1); 
W11_Pred=[W11_Pred;aaaa]; 
W9_Pred=[W9_Pred;bbbb]; 
afl=[FM_pred',FLow_Estimate'] 
atemp=[T_pred,Te_pred,Tv_pred]; 
Est_Flow=[Est_Flow;afl]; 
Est_Temp=[Est_Temp;atemp]; 
 
 
tempd=[FM_pred',T_pred,Te_pred([2,5])]; 
DataRecon=[DataRecon;tempd]; 
tempd=[FM_pred',T_pred,Te_pred,aaa,bbb]; 
DataRecon1=[DataRecon1;tempd]; 
 
DataRaw=[DataRaw;[FM',T1,T6,T7,T12,TT3,TT9]]; 
end; 
 
 
figure (1); 
plot(W11_Pred(1:2:end),'r-'); 
hold on; 
plot(W9_Pred(1:2:end),'b-'); 
hold on; 
plot(W11_brute(1:2:end),'ro'); 
hold on; 
plot(W9_brute(1:2:end),'bo'); 
 
figure (2); 
plot(Q11,'r-') 
hold on; 
plot(Q1_brute,'ro') 
 
hold on; 
plot(Q22,'b-') 
hold on; 
plot(Q2_brute,'bo') 
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fprintf(' %d  %d  %d   %d   %d  %d  %d   %d  %d  %d  %d   %d\n',[xFM,uuu1(ind_obs)']); 
for i=1:1:ndata 
    fprintf(' %f  %f  %f   %f   %f  %f  %f   %f  %f  %f  %f   %f\n',Est_Flow(i,:)); 
end; 
 
fprintf(' %d  %d  %d   %d   %d  %d  %d   %d  %d  %d  %d   %d\n',[xf,xTheta,vvv1']); 
 
for i=1:1:ndata 
    fprintf(' %f  %f  %f   %f   %f  %f  %f   %f  %f  %f  %f   %f\n',Est_Temp(i,:)); 
end; 
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Appendix 4  Matlab Code for HCSG linear Data Reconcilation 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%                Data Generation for Simulation             %%%%% 
%%Primary inlet pressure: 15.5Mpa 
%%Primary inlet temperature:  328.5 C 
%%Primary inlet flow rate:  563.0 kg/s 
%%Primary outlet pressure: 15.5+0.072 Mpa 
%%Primary outlet temperature:  292.2 C 
%%Primary outlet flow rate: 563.0 kg/s 
%%Secondary inlet feed water pressure: 5.8+0.296 Mpa  
%%Secondary inlet feed water temperature: 224.0 C 
%%Secondary inlet feed water flow rate: 62.85 kg/s 
%%Secondary outlet steam pressure:  5.8Mpa 
%%Secondary outlet steam temperature:  317.2C 
%%Secondary outlet steam flow rate:  62.85 kg/s                                  
 
W2_nominal=563.0; 
T1_nominal=328.5; 
T3_nominal=292.0; 
T5_nominal=292.0; 
W4_nominal=563.0; 
T6_nominal=292.0; 
W7_nominal=62.85*2.0; 
T7_nominal=224.0; 
W12_nominal=62.85*2.0; 
T12_nominal=317.2; 
P1_nominal=15.5; 
P6_nominal=15.5+0.072; 
P7_nominal=5.8+0.296; 
P12_nominal=5.8; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Adjust the data based on the given water/steam table %%%%%%%%%%%%   
[mid,H12,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,T12_nominal); 
[mid,H7,mid,mid]=Hsub(P7_nominal,T7_nominal); 
[mid,H1,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P1_nominal,T1_nominal); 
[mid,H6,Cpp,mid]=Hsub(P6_nominal,T6_nominal); 
H12=H12/1.0E6; 
H7=H7/1.0E6; 
H1=H1/1.0E6; 
H6=H6/1.0E6; 
 
W2_nominal=0.5*W12_nominal*(H12-H7)/(H1-H6); 
W4_nominal=W2_nominal; 
W1_nominal=2*W2_nominal; 
W6_nominal=2*W2_nominal; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     Compute the parameters needed for linearization        %%%%%%% 
HH=[]; 
TT=[]; 
for Ttemp=T12_nominal-10:1:T12_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsh(P12_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HH=[HH,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
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  TT=[TT,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch12,mid] = POLYFIT(TT,HH,1); 
 
HH=[]; 
TT=[]; 
for Ttemp=T7_nominal-10:1:T7_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P7_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HH=[HH,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TT=[TT,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch7,mid] = POLYFIT(TT,HH,1); 
 
HH=[]; 
TT=[]; 
for Ttemp=T1_nominal-10:1:T1_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P1_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HH=[HH,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TT=[TT,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch1,mid] = POLYFIT(TT,HH,1); 
 
HH=[]; 
TT=[]; 
for Ttemp=T6_nominal-10:1:T6_nominal+10 
  [mid,Htemp,mid,mid]=hsub(P1_nominal,Ttemp); 
  HH=[HH,Htemp/1.0E6]; 
  TT=[TT,Ttemp]; 
end; 
[Ch6,mid] = POLYFIT(TT,HH,1); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%              Obtain the linearized Contraint Equations                                                                   %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%                              A1*x+A2*u=0                                                                                              %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%VarName  W1 T1 W2 T2 W3 T3 W4  T4  W5  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W8  T8  W9  T9  W10  T10  W11  T11  W12  T12  W7-2 T1-2 
%T7-2 T12-2  
VarNam{1}='W1';   VarNam{2}='T1';  VarNam{3}='W2';  VarNam{4}='T2';  VarNam{5}='W3';  VarNam{6}='T3'; 
VarNam{7}='W4';   VarNam{8}='T4';  VarNam{9}='W5';  VarNam{10}='T5'; VarNam{11}='W6'; VarNam{12}='T6'; 
VarNam{13}='W7';  VarNam{14}='T7'; VarNam{15}='W8'; VarNam{16}='T8'; VarNam{17}='W9'; VarNam{18}='T9'; 
VarNam{19}='W10'; VarNam{20}='T10';VarNam{21}='W11';VarNam{22}='T11';VarNam{23}='W12'; VarNam{24}='T12'; 
VarNam{25}='2T3'; VarNam{26}='2T9';VarNam{27}='2T1';VarNam{28}='2T7';VarNam{29}='2W7';VarNam{30}='2T12'; 
%VarName  W1 T1 W2 T2 W3 T3 W4  T4  W5  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W8  T8  W9  T9  W10  T10  W11  T11  W12  T12  2T3 2T9  
2T1  2T7 2W7 2T12 
xid=     [1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8   9   10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19   20   21   22   23   24    25  26  27   28   29   30]; 
 
%Measured variables: W2  T1  T3  W4  T6  W7  T7  T9  W12  T12 
%No.                  1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9    10 
xm=                  [3  2   6   7  12   13  14  18  23   24]; 
n_xm=length(xm); 
%Unmeasured variables: all the else 
%VarName  W1 W3  T2  W6  T4  W5  W8   T8   W9   W10  T10  W11  T11 T5 
%         1  2   3   4   5   6   7    8    9    10   11   12   13  14 
 285
xu=      [1  5   4   11  8   9   15   16   17   19   20   21   22  10]; 
n_xu=length(xu); 
 
%%neq=number of equations. 
neq=16; 
b=zeros(neq,1); 
 
%%initialization 
A1=zeros(neq,n_xm); 
A2=zeros(neq,n_xu); 
%%%Constraint Equation 1:  W1=W2+W4  
A1(1,1)=-1; A1(1,4)=-1;  
A2(1,1)=1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 2:  W2=W3 
A1(2,1)=1; A2(2,2)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 3:  W4=W5 
A1(3,4)=1; A2(3,6)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 4:  W6=W3+W5; 
A2(4,4)=1;  
A2(4,2)=-1; A2(4,6)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 5:  W7=W8+W10; 
A1(5,6)=1;  
A2(5,7)=-1; A2(5,10)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 6:  W8=W9; 
A2(6,7)=1; 
A2(6,9)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 7:  W10=W11; 
A2(7,10)=1;  
A2(7,12)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 8:  W12=W9+W11; 
A1(8,9)=1;  
A2(8,9)=-1; A2(8,12)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 9:  T1=T2; 
A1(9,2)=1;  
A2(9,3)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 10:  T1=T4; 
A1(10,2)=1;  
A2(10,5)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 11:  T7=T10; 
A1(11,7)=1;  
A2(11,11)=-1; 
%%%Constraint Equation 12:  T7=T8; 
A1(12,7)=1;  
A2(12,8)=-1; 
%Measured variables: W2  T1  T3  W4  T6  W7  T7  T9  W12  T12 
%No.                  1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9    10 
 
%VarName  W1 W3  T2  W6  T4  W5  W8   T8   W9   W10  T10  W11  T11 T5 
%         1  2   3   4   5   6   7    8    9    10   11   12   13  14 
 
%%%Constraint Equation 13:  W2*h2-W3*h3=W11*h11-W10*h10 
A1(13,3)=-W2_nominal*Ch6(1); A2(13,2)=-H6;  %-W3*dT3-T3*dW3 
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A2(13,3)=W2_nominal*Ch1(1); A1(13,1)=H1;   %W2*dT2+T2*dW2 
A2(13,13)=-0.5*W12_nominal*Ch12(1); A2(13,12)=-H12; %W11*dT11+T11*dW11 
A2(13,11)=0.5*W7_nominal*Ch7(1); A2(13,10)=H7;%W10*dT10+T10*dW10 
b(13)=0.5*W7_nominal*Ch7(1)*T7_nominal-0.5*W12_nominal*Ch12(1)*T12_nominal... 
    +0.5*W1_nominal*Ch1(1)*T1_nominal-0.5*W6_nominal*Ch6(1)*T6_nominal; 
 
%%%Constraint Equation 14:  W4*h4-W5*h5=W9*h9-W8*h8 
A2(14,14)=-W4_nominal*Ch6(1); A2(14,6)=-H6; 
A2(14,5)=W4_nominal*Ch1(1); A1(14,4)=H1; 
A1(14,8)=-0.5*W12_nominal*Ch12(1); A2(14,9)=-H12; 
A2(14,8)=0.5*W7_nominal*Ch7(1);A2(14,7)=H7; 
b(14)=0.5*W7_nominal*Ch7(1)*T7_nominal-0.5*W12_nominal*Ch12(1)*T12_nominal... 
    +0.5*W1_nominal*Ch1(1)*T1_nominal-0.5*W6_nominal*Ch6(1)*T6_nominal; 
 
 
%%Constraint Equation 15:  W1*h1-W6*h6=W12*h12-W7*h7 
 
A1(15,5)=-W6_nominal*Ch6(1); A2(15,4)=-H6; 
A1(15,2)=W1_nominal*Ch1(1); A2(15,1)=H1; 
A1(15,10)=-W12_nominal*Ch12(1); A1(15,9)=-H12; 
A1(15,7)=W7_nominal*Ch7(1);A1(15,6)=H7; 
b(15)=W7_nominal*Ch7(1)*T7_nominal-W12_nominal*Ch12(1)*T12_nominal... 
    +W1_nominal*Ch1(1)*T1_nominal-W6_nominal*Ch6(1)*T6_nominal; 
 
%Measured variables: W2  T1  T3  W4  T6  W7  T7  T9  W12  T12 
%No.                  1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9    10 
%VarName  W1 W3  T2  W6  T4  W5  W8   T8   W9   W10  T10  W11  T11 T5 
%         1  2   3   4   5   6   7    8    9    10   11   12   13  14 
%%%Constraint Equation 15:  W1*h1-W3*h3-W5*h5=W12*h12-W7*h7 
 
A1(16,3)=-0.5*W6_nominal*Ch6(1); A2(16,2)=-H6; 
A2(16,14)=-0.5*W6_nominal*Ch6(1); A2(16,6)=-H6; 
A1(16,2)=W1_nominal*Ch1(1); A2(16,1)=H1; 
A1(16,10)=-W12_nominal*Ch12(1); A1(16,9)=-H12; 
A1(16,7)=W7_nominal*Ch7(1);A1(16,6)=H7; 
b(16)=W7_nominal*Ch7(1)*T7_nominal-W12_nominal*Ch12(1)*T12_nominal... 
    +W1_nominal*Ch1(1)*T1_nominal-W6_nominal*Ch6(1)*T6_nominal; 
 
 
%Measured variables: W2  T1  T3  W4  T6  W7  T7  T9  W12  T12 
%VarName  W1 W3  T2  W6  T4  W5  W8   T8   W9   W10  T10  W11  T11 T5 
XX=[W2_nominal, T1_nominal, T3_nominal, W4_nominal,T6_nominal, W7_nominal, T7_nominal, T12_nominal, W12_nominal, 
T12_nominal]; 
UU=[W1_nominal, W2_nominal, T1_nominal, 
W6_nominal,T1_nominal,W4_nominal,W7_nominal/2,T7_nominal,W7_nominal/2,W7_nominal/2,... 
    T7_nominal,W12_nominal/2,T12_nominal,T5_nominal]; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                                 Variable classification algorithm                             %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
x=xm'; 
u=xu'; 
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ru=rank(A2,1.0E-8); 
[n,m]=size(A2); 
[Q,R,E]=qr(A2); 
ux=E'*u; 
Qu1=Q(:,1:ru); 
Ru1=R(1:ru,1:ru); 
Ru2=R(1:ru,ru+1:end); 
Qu2=Q(:,ru+1:end); 
Gx=Qu2'*A1; 
 
%the zero columns of Gx corresond to the variables that do not participate in the reconciliation, they are nonredundant. 
%the remaining columns correspond to redundant measurements 
 
u1=ux(1:ru);   
u2=ux(ru+1:end); %unestimatable 
%u1 satisfy u1=-inv(Ru1)*Qu1'*A1*x-inv(Ru1)*Ru2*u2 
RIU=inv(Ru1)*Ru2; 
%A variable in subset u1 is estimatable if the corresponding row in the RIU matrix is zero 
%Otherwise, the variable in the subset is not estimable; 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                    Generate Mesured Data                                                       %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Measured variables: W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  2T3 2T9 2T1  2T7 2T11 2T12 
%No.                  1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9    10   11   12  13  14  15   16  17   18 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                                 Variable classification algorithm                             %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
x=xm'; 
u=xu'; 
ru=rank(A2,1.0E-5); 
[n,m]=size(A2); 
[Q,R,E]=qr(A2); 
ux=E'*u; 
Qu1=Q(:,1:ru); 
Ru1=R(1:ru,1:ru); 
Ru2=R(1:ru,ru+1:end); 
Qu2=Q(:,ru+1:end); 
Gx=Qu2'*A1; 
bx=Qu2'*b; 
%the zero columns of Gx corresond to the variables  
%that do not participate in the reconciliation, they are nonredundant. 
%the remaining columns correspond to redundant measurements 
 
u1=ux(1:ru);   
u2=ux(ru+1:end); %unestimatable 
%u1 satisfy u1=-inv(Ru1)*Qu1'*A1*x-inv(Ru1)*Ru2*u2 
RIU=inv(Ru1)*Ru2; 
%A variable in subset u1 is estimatable if the corresponding row in the RIU matrix is zero 
%Otherwise, the variable in the subset is not estimable; 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%                         Data Reconciliation Algorithm                                   %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
load iris_ss XmNormal XmFault X_nominal WsecInd1 WsecInd2; 
 
index=[1 2 3 1 6 7 8 12 9 10]; 
 
 
noi_X=[0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.0025,0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.0025]/3; 
X_nominal=[X_nominal(:,[1 2 3 1 6 7 8 12 9 10])]; 
X_nominal([1,4])=X_nominal([1,4])/2; 
ndata=200; 
m=length(X_nominal); 
Data=[]; 
for i=1:1:ndata 
    temp=X_nominal; 
    Data=[Data;temp]; 
end; 
XmNormal=Data; 
     
[ndata,m]=size(Data); 
ndata_Train=ndata-50; 
X_measure=[]; 
for ii=1:1:m 
    aaa=randn(ndata,1)*noi_X(ii)*X_nominal(ii); 
    X_measure(:,ii)=Data(:,ii)+aaa; 
end; 
phi_X=diag((X_nominal.*noi_X).^2); 
 
XXdata=Data(1:ndata,:); 
idf=2; 
X_measure(ndata_Train+1:ndata,idf)=X_measure(ndata_Train+1:ndata,idf)+ones(ndata-ndata_Train,1)*X_nominal(1,idf)*0.005; 
 
 
bbb=diag(phi_X); 
phim=diag(bbb); 
Xm=X_measure; 
Gxm=Gx; 
XmData=[]; 
XuData=[]; 
for i=1:1:ndata 
bbb=Xm(i,:)'; 
bbb=bbb-phim*Gxm'*inv(Gxm*phim*Gxm')*(Gxm*bbb-bx); 
Xe=bbb'; 
fprintf('\n'); 
fprintf('Xnominal     %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f\n', XmNormal(i,:)); 
fprintf('Xmesured     %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f\n', Xm(i,:)); 
fprintf('Xrecon       %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f\n', Xe); 
XmData=[XmData;Xe]; 
Xu=inv(Ru1)*Qu1'*b-inv(Ru1)*Qu1'*A1*Xe'; 
XuData=[XuData;Xu']; 
end; 
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Gx0=Gx; 
bx0=bx; 
 
 
x=xm'; 
u=xu'; 
fprintf('Measured variables\n'); 
mm=length(x); 
for i=1:1:mm 
    fprintf('     %s    ',VarNam{x(i)});  
end 
fprintf('\n'); 
for jj=1:1:ndata 
    for ii=1:1:mm 
    fprintf(' %f',XmData(jj,ii));  
    end 
    fprintf('\n'); 
end 
     
fprintf('Unmeasured variables\n'); 
nn=length(u1); 
for i=1:1:nn 
    fprintf('    %s     ',VarNam{u1(i)});  
end 
fprintf('\n'); 
for jj=1:1:ndata 
    for ii=1:1:nn 
    fprintf(' %f',XuData(jj,ii));  
    end 
    fprintf('\n'); 
end 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%                     Gross Error Detection based on PCA Algorithms                                                                                          %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
aaa_rec=XmData(1:ndata_Train,:); 
bbb_mes=X_measure(1:ndata_Train,:); 
Rdif=X_measure-XmData; 
[zr0,mr0,stdr0]=zscore1(Rdif(1:ndata_Train,:)); 
     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                  Fault Isolation by Serial Elimination                              %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%   Loop over the eliminated variable  %% 
Xgdata=X_measure(end,:); 
JJJ=[]; 
for i=1:1:m 
    Au=[Gx0(:,1:i-1),Gx0(:,i+1:m)]; 
    Ac=[Gx0(:,i)]; 
    b111=diag(phi_X); 
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    b222=[b111(1:i-1);b111(i+1:m)]; 
    phiu=diag(b222); 
    phic=phim(i,i); 
    phi=Au*phiu*Au'+Ac*phic*Ac'; 
    III=eye(length(Ac)); 
    phi_n_inv=inv(phi)*(III-Ac*inv(Ac'*inv(phi)*Ac)*Ac'*inv(phi)); 
    r=Gx0*Xgdata'-bx0; 
    temp=r'*phi_n_inv*r; 
    JJJ=[JJJ,temp]; 
end; 
%%  End the serial elimination %% 
 
fprintf('Measured variables\n'); 
mm=length(x); 
for i=1:1:mm 
    fprintf('     %s    ',VarNam{x(i)});  
end 
fprintf('\n'); 
    for ii=1:1:mm 
    fprintf(' %f ',JJJ(ii));  
    end 
    fprintf('\n'); 
 
 KKK=JJJ./max(JJJ);    
     
 figure; 
 bar(KKK); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%                   Fault Magnitide Estimation                                     %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
nm=length(Xgdata); 
Brm=zeros(nm,1); 
Faultind=find(JJJ==min(JJJ)); 
idk=Faultind(1); 
Brm(idk)=1; 
Pb=Gx0*Brm; 
temp1=Pb'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Pb; 
temp2=Pb'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0'); 
mb=inv(temp1)*temp2*(Gx0*Xgdata'-bx0); 
xb=-phim*Gx0'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Pb*mb; 
x0=Xgdata'; 
xc=-phim*Gx0'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*(Gx0*Xgdata'-bx0); 
%% The reconstructed value is consists of (1)the original solution of the problem;  
%% (2)Correction term due to the constraints; (3) The correction terms due to the failure term. 
X_recon=x0+xc+xb; 
X_reconstruct=X_recon'; 
 
 
fprintf('\n'); 
fprintf('Xnnoise      %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f \n', XXdata(end,1:end)); 
fprintf('XFdata       %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f \n', Xgdata); 
fprintf('Xrcnstrt     %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f \n', X_reconstruct); 
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%% To determine the precision of the estimation  %% 
Sigma0=phim; 
Sigmac=-phim*Gx0'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Gx0*phim; 
Sigma_mb=inv(Pb'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Pb); 
Sigmab=-phim*Gx0'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Pb*Sigma_mb*Pb'*inv(Gx0*phim*Gx0')*Gx0*phim; 
Sigma=Sigma0+Sigmac+Sigmab; 
fprintf('Precision     %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f  %f   %f   %f   %f\n', diag(Sigma)); 
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Appendix 5  Matlab Code for HCSG Reconstruction PCA based FDI 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%                IRIS PCA FDI Algorithm based on Qin's Algorithm for multiple faults                       %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%% With the new algorithm, the fault reconstruction gives much better results                                  %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
close all; 
clear all; 
warning off; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%                          Load Normal Operation Data PCA  Variables                              %%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Measured variables: XmNormal=[W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  tT3 tT9 tT7 tT12; 
%Index                         1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9   10   11  12   13  14  15   16 
%No.                           1    2   6  10  11  12  13  14   23   24   21  18   25  26  28   30 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%  The following variables are chosen beacause the other variables are simply constant with noise      %%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
idd=[3 4 6 7 9 10 11 12]; 
load iris_ss XmNormal XmFault X_nominal WsecInd1 WsecInd2; 
Data=XmNormal(:,idd); 
X_nominal=X_nominal(:,idd); 
[ndata,m]=size(Data); 
XmData=[]; 
noi_X=[0.0025,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.0025]/3; 
for ii=1:1:m 
    aaa=randn(ndata,1)*noi_X(ii).*Data(:,ii); 
    XmData(1:ndata,ii)=Data(1:ndata,ii)+aaa; 
end; 
 
TrainData=XmData; 
ndata_Train=ndata-100; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%                                         Standard PCA are implemented                                                                                                         %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
[zr0,mr0,stdr0]=zscore1(TrainData); 
covR=cov(zr0); 
[PC, LATENT, EXPLAINED] = pcacov(zr0); 
sumExp=cumsum(EXPLAINED); 
fprintf('Explained fraction of differet PC for reconciled data\n'); 
fprintf('%f \n',sumExp); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%        Choose the number of Principal Components based on the un reconstructed variance                                              %%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
for np=1:1:m-1 
sum=0.0; 
bvec=zeros(m,1); 
for ni=1:1:m 
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        bvec(ni)=1; 
        RPC=PC(:,np+1:m);  
        aa=RPC*RPC'*bvec; 
        aaa=aa'*covR*aa; 
        bbb=(aa'*aa)^2; 
        ccc=aaa/bbb; 
        dd=PC(:,1:np)*PC(:,1:np)'*bvec;  
        ddd=dd'*covR*dd; 
        sum=sum+ccc/ddd; 
bvec=zeros(m,1); 
end; 
 
FaultVar(np)=sum; 
end; 
%figure; 
%plot(FaultVar); 
%input('Number of PC for best fault reconstruction=%d'); 
nPC=find(FaultVar==min(FaultVar));  
PCC=PC(:,1:nPC); 
RPC=PC(:,nPC+1:m); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%               Check the quality of the measured data                                                                                                                    %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
ncc=nPC; 
bvec=zeros(m,1); 
fprintf(' No        ui       comparison\n');    
for ni=1:1:m 
        bvec(ni)=1; 
        aa=RPC*RPC'*bvec; 
        aaa=aa'*covR*aa; 
        bbb=(aa'*aa)^2; 
        ccc=aaa/bbb; 
        gg=PCC*PCC'*bvec; 
        ddd=gg'*covR*gg; 
bvec=zeros(m,1); 
 
fprintf(' %d         %f          %f\n',[ni ccc  ddd]);         
end; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%                 Performance of Model Prediction                                                                                                                              %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
qlimit=qlim(zr0,nPC); 
tlimit=tlim(ndata_Train,nPC); 
zzrr=zr0*PCC*PCC'; 
resTrain=zr0-zzrr; 
TrainData_pred=unscore(zzrr,mr0,stdr0); 
figure (1); 
plot(TrainData_pred(:,1),'ro'); 
hold on; 
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plot(TrainData(:,1),'b+'); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%                                             Define the library of fault directions                                                                                               %%% 
%%                                          Determine the threshold based on fault free data                                                                              %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
bbb=eye(m); 
for ni=1:1:m 
    for nj=1:1:m 
    if ni~=nj 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.bvec=[bbb(:,ni),bbb(:,nj)]; 
    else 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.bvec=bbb(:,ni); 
    end; 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC=RPC*RPC'*Fchar{ni,nj}.bvec; 
    [Svec,D,V]=svd(Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC); 
    md=find(abs(diag(D))>=1.0E-3); 
    D=D(1:md,1:md); 
% Fault direction projected onto the residual space. 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.Svec=Svec(:,1:md);     
    Fchar{ni,nj}.D=D; 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.V=V(:,1:md); 
% Learning the confidence limit for the fault free case along the the predefined fault direction  
    dxyz=[]; 
    for jj=1:1:ndata_Train 
    xres=(eye(m)-Fchar{ni,nj}.Svec*Fchar{ni,nj}.Svec')*resTrain(jj,:)'; 
    xxx=norm(xres).^2; 
    dxyz=[dxyz;xxx]; 
    end; 
    mxx=mean(dxyz); 
    stdxx=std(dxyz); 
    Fchar{ni,nj}.SPElimit=mxx+2*stdxx; 
end; 
end; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                              Generate Fault Data                                                                                                                   %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
TestData=XmData; 
idd=[1,4]; 
Magnitude=[0.01,0.03]; 
ndd=length(idd); 
for mi=1:1:ndd 
mmp=idd(mi); 
TestData(ndata_Train+1:ndata,mmp)=Data(ndata_Train+1:ndata,mmp)+ones(ndata-
ndata_Train,1).*X_nominal(mmp).*Magnitude(mi); 
end; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                                T2 and Q Statistics                                                                                                                  %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
zr=zscore1(TestData,mr0,stdr0); 
[t2]=tstat(zr,PC,LATENT,nPC); 
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figure(2); 
plot(t2); 
hold on; 
line([0 ndata],[tlimit,tlimit]); 
hold off; 
[q]=qstat(zr,PC,nPC); 
figure(3); 
plot(q); 
hold on; 
line([0 ndata],[qlimit,qlimit]); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                          Plot Residual Plot (same as Contribution Plot)                                                                             %%% 
%%%                                         The Residual Pattern are not stable                                                                                                 %%% 
%%%                                 Especially if the Number of PC is not appropriately chosen                                                                  %%% 
%%%    When some variables which are not correlated with the other variables exist, Scree plot is not correct                             %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
zrpd=zr*PCC*PCC'; 
resz=(zr-zrpd); 
resz2=resz.^2; 
SPE=resz(end,:)*resz(end,:)'; 
figure(4); 
%plot(resz2(ndata_Train+1:ndata,:)'); 
plot(resz2(end,:)'); 
grid on; 
 
 
xtest=zr(end,:); 
Xbrute=unscore(zrpd(end,:),mr0,stdr0); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                Fault Identification                                                                                                                                    %%% 
%%%Notice: If the fault reconstruction of a fault (ni,ni) is able to bring SPE back to normal, then the fault                                 %%%  
%%% is considered as a single fault instead of a dual fault                                                                                                               %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
IdentIndex=[]; 
IdentRatio=[]; 
for ni=1:1:m 
    for nj=1:1:m 
    ztilt=resz(end,:); 
    [mmm1,mmm2]=size(Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC); 
    if rank(Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC)==mmm2 
    Freal=inv(Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC'*Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC)*Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC'*ztilt'; 
    else 
    Ftilt=(Fchar{ni,nj}.Svec)'*xtest'; 
    Freal=(Fchar{ni,nj}.V)*inv(Fchar{ni,nj}.D)*Ftilt; 
    end 
    xtilt=ztilt'-Fchar{ni,nj}.RPC*Freal; 
    SPEindex(ni,nj)=xtilt'*xtilt; 
    IdentRatio(ni,nj)=SPEindex(ni,nj)/Fchar{ni,nj}.SPElimit; 
    if IdentRatio(ni,nj)>=3.0 IdentRatio(ni,nj)=3.0; end; 
     
    if SPEindex(ni,nj)<=Fchar{ni,nj}.SPElimit  
    IdentIndex=[IdentIndex;ni,nj]; 
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    IdentFreal{ni,nj}.Freal=Freal; 
    fprintf ('%d %d\n',[ni,nj]); 
    end;   
end; 
end; 
 
fprintf('Dual fault isolation index\n'); 
for ni=1:1:m  
    fprintf('%d  %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f \n',[ni,SPEindex(ni,:)]); 
end; 
 
fprintf('Dual fault isolation index\n'); 
for ni=1:1:m  
    fprintf('%d  %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f \n',[ni,IdentRatio(ni,:)]); 
end; 
figure; 
bar3(IdentRatio); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                Fault Reconstruction                                                                                                                               %%% 
%%%                                                                                                                                                                                             %%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
[nn,mm]=size(IdentIndex); 
for jj=1:1:nn 
Indint=IdentIndex(jj,:); 
a=Indint(1); b=Indint(2); 
bbb=xtest'-Fchar{a,b}.bvec*IdentFreal{a,b}.Freal; 
Xrecon=unscore(bbb',mr0,stdr0); 
fprintf('\n\n\n'); 
fprintf('True value    = %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f\n',Data(end,:)); 
fprintf('Measured value= %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f\n',TestData(end,:)); 
fprintf('Qin Recon     = %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f\n',Xrecon); 
fprintf('Conventional  = %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f\n',Xbrute); 
end; 
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Appendix 6  Matlab Code for HCSG Hybrid PCA Based FDI 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
%%%%%%%%%                IRIS PCA FDI Algorithm based on Constrained PCA Modeling                                                %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
 
close all; 
clear all; 
warning off; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%                          Load Normal Operation Data PCA  Variables                                                                      %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Measured variables: XmNormal=[W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  tT3 tT9 tT7 tT12; 
%Index                         1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9   10   11  12   13  14  15   16 
%No.                           1    2   6  10  11  12  13  14   23   24   21  18   25  26  28   30 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%  The following variables are chosen beacause the other variables are simply constant with noise                   %%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
idd=[3  4   6   7   9  10  11  12]; 
load iris_ss XmNormal XmFault X_nominal WsecInd1 WsecInd2; 
Data=XmNormal(1:500,idd); 
X_nominal=X_nominal(:,idd); 
[ndata,m]=size(Data); 
XmData=[]; 
noi_X=[0.0025,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.0025]/3; 
for ii=1:1:m 
    aaa=randn(ndata,1)*noi_X(ii).*Data(:,ii); 
    XmData(1:ndata,ii)=Data(1:ndata,ii)+aaa; 
end; 
 
TrainData=XmData; 
[ndata,mdata]=size(TrainData); 
 
ndata_Train=ndata-50; 
[zr0,mr0,stdr0]=zscore1(TrainData(1:ndata_Train,:)); 
 
G=zr0(:,[4]); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%              Decomposition of the data matrix into four components                                                                                               %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
X=zr0; 
PG=G*pinv(G'*G)*G'; 
QG=eye(ndata_Train)-PG; 
 
X1=PG*X; 
X2=QG*X; 
dzx1=X1; 
[PC,Latent,Explain]=pcacov(dzx1); 
ns=1; 
model1_PC=PC(:,1:ns); 
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dzx2=X2; 
 
idm=[1:3,5:8]; 
dzx2=dzx2(:,idm); 
%dmx2=dmx2(idm); 
%dstdx2=dstdx2(idm); 
[PC,Latent,Explain]=pcacov(dzx2); 
ns=1; 
model2_PC=PC(:,1:ns); 
qlx2=qlim(dzx2,ns); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Measured variables: XmNormal=[W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  tT3 tT9 tT7 tT12; 
%Index                         1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9   10   11  12   13  14  15   16 
%No.                           1    2   6  10  11  12  13  14   23   24   21  18   25  26  28   30 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
idf=2; 
TestData=XmData; 
NTestData=TestData; 
TestData(ndata_Train+1:ndata,idf)=Data(ndata_Train+1:ndata,idf)+ones(ndata-ndata_Train,1).*X_nominal(idf).*0.0040; 
 
zv0=zscore1(TestData,mr0,stdr0); 
%zv0=TestData; 
figure (1) 
plot(TestData(:,idf),'b'); 
hold on; 
plot(NTestData(:,idf),'r'); 
 
ndata=ndata; 
zv0=zv0(1:ndata,:); 
G=zv0(1:ndata,[4]); 
 
%H=H; 
Y=zv0; 
PG=G*pinv(G'*G)*G'; 
%PH=H*pinv(H'*H)*H'; 
QG=eye(ndata)-PG; 
%QH=eye(mdata)-PH; 
 
Y1=PG*Y; 
Y2=QG*Y; 
%Y3=Y*PH; 
%Y4=Y*QH; 
 
%Y1_data=unscore(Y1,dmx1,dstdx1); 
Y2=Y2(:,idm); 
%Y2_data=unscore(Y2,dmx2,dstdx2); 
%Y3_data=unscore(Y3,mr0,stdr0); 
%Y4_data=unscore(Y4,mr0,stdr0); 
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%dzy1=zscore1(Y1,dmx1,dstdx1); 
dzy1=Y1; 
 
zy1=dzy1*model1_PC*model1_PC'; 
%Y1_pred=unscore(zy1,dmx1,dstdx1); 
%figure (2); 
%plot(Y1_pred(:,idf),'ro'); 
%hold on; 
%plot(Y1_data(:,idf),'b+'); 
 
%dzy2=zscore1(Y2,dmx2,dstdx2); 
dzy2=Y2; 
zy2=dzy2*model2_PC*model2_PC'; 
 
idf1=find(idm==idf); 
 
%Y2_pred=unscore(zy2,dmx2,dstdx2); 
%figure (3); 
%plot(Y2_pred(:,idf1),'r-'); 
%hold on; 
%plot(Y2_data(:,idf1),'b-'); 
 
figure (1); 
subplot(2,1,1); 
plot(X1(:,4),X1(:,1),'r'); 
hold on;  
plot(zr0(1:2:end,4),zr0(1:2:end,1),'b*'); 
xlabel('Feed water flow rate (scaled)'); 
ylabel('SG primary outlet temperature (scaled)'); 
 
subplot(2,1,2); 
plot(X1(:,4),X1(:,6),'r'); 
hold on;  
plot(zr0(1:2:end,4),zr0(1:2:end,6),'b*'); 
xlabel('Feed water flow rate (scaled)'); 
ylabel('SG steam outlet temperature (scaled)'); 
 
figure (2); 
resz=(zy1-dzy1); 
SPE=[]; 
for idk=1:ndata 
ttt=resz(idk,:)*resz(idk,:)'; 
SPE=[SPE;ttt]; 
end; 
subplot(2,1,1); 
plot(SPE); 
resz=(zy1-dzy1); 
reszw=resz.^2; 
subplot(2,1,2); 
bar(reszw(ndata,:)'); 
figure (3); 
resz=(zy2-dzy2); 
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SPE=[]; 
for idk=1:ndata 
ttt=resz(idk,:)*resz(idk,:)'; 
SPE=[SPE;ttt]; 
end; 
subplot(2,1,1); 
plot(SPE); 
hold on; 
line([0 ndata],[qlx2,qlx2]); 
hold off; 
 
 
reszw=resz.^2; 
subplot(2,1,2); 
bar(reszw(ndata,:)'); 
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Appendix 7  Matlab Code for HCSG Robust Data Driven Model based 
FDI for Steady State Operation Conditions 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%                Load Simulation Data and Build a PLS Models                                                             %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
close all; 
clear all; 
warning off; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%                          Load Normal Operation Data PCA  Variables                                                          %%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Measured variables: XmNormal=[W1  T1  T3  T5  W6  T6  W7  T7  W12  T12  T11  T9  tT3 tT9 tT7 tT12; 
%Index                         1    2   3   4   5   6   7   8    9   10   11  12   13  14  15   16 
%No.                           1    2   6  10  11  12  13  14   23   24   21  18   25  26  28   30 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%  The following variables are chosen beacause the other variables are simply constant with noise      %%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%   T3 T5 T6  W7  W12 T12 T11 T9  
idd=[3  4   6   7   9  10  11  12]; 
load iris_ss XmNormal XmFault X_nominal WsecInd1 WsecInd2; 
Data=XmNormal(1:500,idd); 
X_nominal=X_nominal(:,idd); 
[ndata,m]=size(Data); 
XmData=[]; 
noi_X=[0.0025,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.0025]/3; 
for ii=1:1:m 
    aaa=randn(ndata,1)*noi_X(ii).*Data(:,ii); 
    XmData(1:ndata,ii)=Data(1:ndata,ii)+aaa; 
end; 
 
TrainData=XmData; 
[ndata,m]=size(TrainData); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%                                         Standard PLS are implemented                                                                                                         %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
[zr0,mr0,stdr0]=zscore1(TrainData); 
xzr1=zr0(:,4); 
yzr1=zr0(:,3); 
b1=regress(yzr1,xzr1); 
[zr0,mr0,stdr0]=zscore1(TrainData); 
xzr2=zr0(:,4); 
yzr2=zr0(:,6); 
b2=regress(yzr2,xzr2); 
 
msm_input=1; 
msm_output=8; 
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BB=zeros(msm_output,msm_input); 
BB(1,1)=b1'; 
BB(2,1)=b1'; 
BB(3,1)=b1'; 
BB(4,1)=1.0; 
BB(5,1)=1.0; 
BB(6,1)=b2'; 
BB(7,1)=b2'; 
BB(8,1)=b2'; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%                                              Generate Fault Data                                                                                                                   %%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
Data=XmFault(1:100,idd); 
[ndata,m]=size(Data); 
XProcess=[]; 
noi_X=[0.0025,0.0025,0.0025,0.01,0.01,0.0025,0.0025,0.0025]/5; 
for ii=1:1:m 
    aaa=randn(ndata,1)*noi_X(ii).*Data(:,ii); 
    XProcess(1:ndata,ii)=Data(1:ndata,ii)+aaa; 
end; 
zd=zscore1(XProcess(1:1:100,:),mr0,stdr0); 
temp=BB*zd(:,[4])'; 
zd_pred=temp'; 
 
resdDisturbance=zd-zd_pred; 
[uu,ss,vv]=svd(resdDisturbance'); 
Dbvec=uu(:,[1 2]); 
 
%%% Load plant measurements here 
%MeasureData=TrainData(:,:); 
MeasureData=XProcess; 
NTestData=MeasureData(1:end,:); 
TestData=NTestData; 
ntest=size(NTestData,1); 
idf=6;  
 
TestData(ntest-50:1:ntest,idf)=NTestData(ntest-50:1:ntest,idf)+2.5; 
mSensor=m; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
zv0=zscore1(TestData,mr0,stdr0); 
 
 
Ef=eye(mSensor); 
Wt=BB; 
Mt=Ef; 
%Rsv=kron(eye(s+1),Rv); 
%Rsd=kron(eye(s+1),Rd); 
%Rso=kron(eye(s+1),Ro); 
%Rphi=H*Rsv*H'+G*Rsd*G'+Rso; 
WWt=[Wt]; 
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AAA=WWt*WWt'; 
BBB=Mt*Mt'; 
 
 [VE,DE]=eig(AAA,BBB,'qz'); 
ccc=abs(diag(DE)); 
ddd=sort(ccc); 
idhg=find(abs(diag(DE))<1.0E-10); 
mmk=length(idhg); 
 
Omega=[]; 
for ijj=1:1:mmk 
npp=find(ccc==ddd(ijj)); 
if(ccc(npp)>1.0E-10) fprintf('warning\n'); end; 
bbb=VE(:,npp); 
bbb=bbb/norm(bbb); 
Omega=[Omega,bbb]; 
end; 
BBB=orth(Omega); 
 
err=[]; 
for jjk=1:1:ntest 
xtest=zv0(jjk,:); 
eee=BBB'*zv0(jjk,:)'; 
spde=eee'*eee; 
err=[err;spde]; 
end; 
figure; 
plot(err); 
title('Fault Detection without disturbance decoupling'); 
 
Ef=eye(mSensor); 
Wt=BB; 
Mt=Ef; 
%Rsv=kron(eye(s+1),Rv); 
%Rsd=kron(eye(s+1),Rd); 
%Rso=kron(eye(s+1),Ro); 
%Rphi=H*Rsv*H'+G*Rsd*G'+Rso; 
WWt=[Wt Dbvec]; 
AAA=WWt*WWt'; 
BBB=Mt*Mt'; 
 
[VE,DE]=eig(AAA,BBB,'qz'); 
ccc=abs(diag(DE)); 
ddd=sort(ccc); 
idhg=find(abs(diag(DE))<1.0E-10); 
mmk=length(idhg); 
Omega=[]; 
for ijj=1:1:mmk 
npp=find(ccc==ddd(ijj)); 
if(ccc(npp)>1.0E-10) fprintf('warning\n'); end; 
bbb=VE(:,npp); 
bbb=bbb/norm(bbb); 
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Omega=[Omega,bbb]; 
end; 
BBB=orth(Omega); 
 
err=[]; 
for jjk=1:1:ntest 
xtest=zv0(jjk,:); 
eee=BBB'*zv0(jjk,:)'; 
spde=eee'*eee; 
err=[err;spde]; 
end; 
figure; 
plot(err); 
title('Fault Detection with disturbance decoupling'); 
 
Ef=eye(mSensor); 
mhk=1:1:mSensor; 
ErrPlot=[]; 
for ikk=1:1:mSensor 
Wt=BB; 
Vt=Ef(:,ikk); 
isk=find(mhk~=ikk); 
Mt=Ef(:,isk); 
%Rsv=kron(eye(s+1),Rv); 
%Rsd=kron(eye(s+1),Rd); 
%Rso=kron(eye(s+1),Ro); 
%Rphi=H*Rsv*H'+G*Rsd*G'+Rso; 
WWt=[Wt Vt Dbvec]; 
AAA=WWt*WWt'; 
BBB=Mt*Mt'; 
 
 [VE,DE]=eig(AAA,BBB,'qz'); 
ccc=abs(diag(DE)); 
ddd=sort(ccc); 
idhg=find(abs(diag(DE))<1.0E-10); 
mmk=length(idhg); 
 
Omega=[]; 
for ijj=1:1:mmk 
npp=find(ccc==ddd(ijj)); 
if(ccc(npp)>1.0E-10) fprintf('warning\n'); end; 
bbb=VE(:,npp); 
bbb=bbb/norm(bbb); 
Omega=[Omega,bbb]; 
end; 
BBB=orth(Omega); 
 
err1=[]; 
for jjk=1:1:ntest 
xtest=zv0(jjk,:); 
eee=BBB'*zv0(jjk,:)'; 
spde=eee'*eee; 
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err1=[err1;spde]; 
end; 
ErrPlot=[ErrPlot,err1]; 
end; 
 
figure; 
for ilk=1:1:mSensor 
subplot(4,2,1); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,1)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 1');   
subplot(4,2,2); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,2)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 2');   
 
subplot(4,2,3); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,3)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 3');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
 
subplot(4,2,4); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,4)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 4');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
 
subplot(4,2,5); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,5)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 5');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
 
subplot(4,2,6); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,6)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 5');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
 
 
subplot(4,2,7); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,7)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 5');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
 
subplot(4,2,8); 
plot(ErrPlot(:,8)); 
ylabel('Res. Gen.dedicated to Signal 5');   
xlabel ('sample'); 
end; 
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Appendix 8  Matlab Code for HCSG Robust Data Driven Model based 
FDI for Dynamic Operation Conditions 
close all; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%                            Robust Data Driven Model Based FDI Algorithm for Dynamic Operation Conditions         %%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%WpinDisturb=[ThotMx,TcoldMx,PsteamMx,WsteamMx,TsteamMx,TfwMx,WfwMx,LboilingMx,LscboilingMx,WpinMx]; 
warning off; 
clear all; 
close all; 
%index=[2,3,5,8,9,1,4,6,7,10];   
index=[2,3,5,8,9,1,4,6,7,10];   
indexout=[2,3,5,8,9]; 
indexinp=[1,4,6,7,10]; 
 
load Hcsgmodel; 
meanx=meanx; 
stdx=stdx; 
A=A; 
B=B; 
C=C; 
D=D; 
nd=0; 
[ny,my]=size(C); 
[nx,mx]=size(A); 
K=zeros(nx,5);  
nbb=11; 
Nc=5; 
Nb=5; 
resd=[]; 
V1=[]; 
JJ=[]; 
iii=2; 
 
load MVarNormalData_detPs_100; 
%load MVarNormalData_100test_openloop; 
%load MVarNormalData_sim 
NormalData0=NormalData(1:end,:); 
NormalData=NormalData(1:end,:); 
[n,m]=size(NormalData); 
noi=[0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001]; 
 
%noi=[0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001]; 
noise=[]; 
for i=1:1:m 
noise=[noise,randn(n,1).*noi(i)]; 
end; 
for i=1:1:m 
NormalData(:,i)=NormalData(:,i)+noise(:,i).*mean(NormalData(:,i)); 
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end; 
 
%NormalData=dlmread('MVarNormalData_simm.txt',' '); 
[nlen,m]=size(NormalData); 
nstart=600; 
nlen=2000; 
%rawDataP=NormalData(n-1000:1:n,index); 
rawDataP=NormalData(1:1:end,[indexout indexinp]); 
[n,m]=size(rawDataP); 
%rawDataP(nstart:nlen,iii)=rawDataP(nstart:nlen,iii)+mean(rawDataP(:,iii))*0.01; 
rawDataP(nstart:nlen,iii)=rawDataP(nstart:nlen,iii); 
%[1,2,3,9,6]; 
GGG1=eye(Nc); 
GGG2=zeros(Nc,Nc); 
%Thy=[GGG1(:,[1,2,3]),GGG2(:,[4,5])]; 
Thy=GGG1; 
WWW1=eye(Nb); 
WWW2=zeros(Nb,Nb); 
%Thu=[WWW1(:,[1,2,3]),WWW2(:,[4,5])]; 
Thu=WWW1; 
 
fff=[]; 
ggg=[]; 
for k=nbb+1:1:nlen 
    V1=[]; 
    JJ=[]; 
    zv=zscore1(rawDataP(k-nbb:1:k,:),meanx,stdx); 
    [V1,JJ,eee,Ps]=resgen_noi_mod1(A,B,C,D,zv,Nc,Nb,nbb,V1,JJ,Thu,Thy); 
    fff=[fff,eee]; 
    ggg=[ggg,norm(eee)]; 
end; 
gama=0.90; 
ntrain=400; 
Rse=1/ntrain*fff(:,1:ntrain)*fff(:,1:ntrain)'; 
eta=emwa(fff,gama,Rse,nbb,nx,ny,ntrain,nlen); 
figure(1) 
subplot(2,1,1); 
plot(rawDataP(nbb+1:nlen,2)); 
ylabel('steam pressure (Mpa)'); 
subplot(2,1,2); 
plot(eta); 
ylabel('fault detection index'); 
xlabel('sample'); 
 
figure(2); 
for iii=1:1:Nc+Nb; 
GGG1=eye(Nc); 
GGG2=zeros(Nc,Nc); 
%Thy=[GGG1(:,[1,2,3]),GGG2(:,[4,5])]; 
WWW1=eye(Nb); 
WWW2=zeros(Nb,Nb); 
if iii<=Nc 
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%Thu=[WWW1(:,[1,2,3]),WWW2(:,[4,5])]; 
Thy1=[GGG1(:,1:1:iii-1),GGG2(:,iii),GGG1(:,iii+1:1:end)]; 
Thu1=WWW1; 
Thy2=[GGG2(:,1:1:iii-1),GGG1(:,iii),GGG2(:,iii+1:1:end)]; 
Thu2=WWW2; 
else 
iis=iii-Nc; 
Thy1=GGG1; 
Thu1=[WWW1(:,1:1:iis-1),WWW2(:,iis),WWW1(:,iis+1:1:end)]; 
Thy2=GGG2; 
Thu2=[WWW2(:,1:1:iis-1),WWW1(:,iis),WWW2(:,iis+1:1:end)]; 
end; 
     
fff=[]; 
ggg=[]; 
for k=nbb+1:1:nlen 
    V1=[]; 
    JJ=[]; 
    zv=zscore1(rawDataP(k-nbb:1:k,:),meanx,stdx); 
    [V1,JJ,eee,Ps]=resgen_noi_mod3(A,B,C,D,zv,Nc,Nb,nbb,V1,JJ,Thu1,Thy1,Thu2,Thy2); 
    fff=[fff,eee]; 
    ggg=[ggg,norm(eee)]; 
end; 
gama=0.90; 
ntrain=400; 
Rse=1/ntrain*fff(:,1:ntrain)*fff(:,1:ntrain)'; 
eta=emwa(fff,gama,Rse,nbb,nx,ny,ntrain,nlen); 
subplot(5,2,iii); 
plot(eta); 
ylabel(['variable ', int2str(iii)]); 
if iii==9 | iii==10 xlabel('sample'); end; 
end; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%                                                                       Robust Residual Generator Design Algorithm                                       %%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
function [V1,JJ,optresd,Ps]=resgen_noi_mod3(A,B,C,D,data,Nc,Nb,nbb,V1,JJ,Thu1,Thy1,Thu2,Thy2); 
%data=[output,input] 
if V1==[]  
    iv=1; 
end; 
s=nbb; 
[nx,mx]=size(A); 
[nd,md]=size(D); 
Dp=zeros(nd,nx); 
Bp=eye(nx); 
[ncc,mcc]=size(C); 
outputy=data(:,1:Nc);   %Nc=number of outputs; 
inputx=data(:,Nc+1:Nc+Nb); %Nb=number of inputs; 
resd=[]; 
    y=[]; 
    u=[]; 
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    Ht=[]; 
    Wt=[]; 
    Lt=[]; 
    Mt=[]; 
    Gt=[]; 
    for ii=s:-1:0   %loop over stack 
    y=[y;outputy(s-ii+1,:)'];  %stacked output vector with dimension=number of outputs*(stack number+1)  
    u=[u;inputx(s-ii+1,:)'];   %stacked input vector with dimension=number of inputs*(stack number+1)  
    Wt=[Wt;C*A^(s-ii)];   %extended observability matrix with dimension=number of outputs*(stack number+1) by number of states 
    Lrow=[]; 
    Mrow=[]; 
    Hrow=[]; 
    Grow=[]; 
    irow=s-ii+1; 
    for jcol=1:1:s+1 
        if irow>jcol 
            irow1=irow-2; 
        Hrow=[Hrow,(C*A^(irow1-jcol+1))*B];  
        Grow=[Grow,(C*A^(irow1-jcol+1))*Bp];  
  %      Lrow=[Lrow,(C*A^(irow1-jcol+1))*E1];   
  %      Mrow=[Mrow,(C*A^(irow1-jcol+1))*R1];   
         
        elseif irow<jcol 
        Hrow=[Hrow,zeros(nd,md)]; 
        Grow=[Grow,zeros(nd,nx)]; 
  %      Lrow=[Lrow,zeros(ncc,me)]; 
  %      Mrow=[Mrow,zeros(ncc,mf)]; 
       
        elseif irow==jcol 
        Hrow=[Hrow,D]; 
        Grow=[Grow,Dp]; 
  %      Lrow=[Lrow,E2]; 
  %      Mrow=[Mrow,R2]; 
        end; 
    end; 
    Ht=[Ht;Hrow];   %Extended Hankel matrix with dimension= number of outputs*(stack number+1) by number of inputs*(stack 
number+1)  
    Gt=[Gt;Grow]; 
 %   Lt=[Lt;Lrow]; 
 %   Mt=[Mt;Mrow]; 
end; 
H=Ht; 
G=Gt; 
Hbar=[eye(Nc*(s+1)),-H]; 
Th11=kron(eye(s+1),Thy1); 
Th12=zeros(Nc*(s+1),(s+1)*Nb); 
Th21=zeros(Nb*(s+1),(s+1)*Nc); 
Th22=kron(eye(s+1),Thu1); 
ThetaP1=[Th11,Th12;Th21,Th22]; 
Mt=Hbar*ThetaP1; 
Th11=kron(eye(s+1),Thy2); 
Th12=zeros(Nc*(s+1),(s+1)*Nb); 
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Th21=zeros(Nb*(s+1),(s+1)*Nc); 
Th22=kron(eye(s+1),Thu2); 
ThetaP2=[Th11,Th12;Th21,Th22]; 
Vt=Hbar*ThetaP2; 
 
%Rsv=kron(eye(s+1),Rv); 
%Rsd=kron(eye(s+1),Rd); 
%Rso=kron(eye(s+1),Ro); 
%Rphi=H*Rsv*H'+G*Rsd*G'+Rso; 
WWt=[Wt Vt]; 
Rphi=eye(Nc*(s+1)); 
Rphio=chol(Rphi); 
AAA=WWt*WWt'; 
BBB=Mt*Mt'; 
[VE,DE]=eig(AAA,BBB,'qz'); 
ccc=abs(diag(DE)); 
ddd=sort(ccc); 
Omega=[]; 
for ijj=1:1:(Nc-1)*(s+1)-nx 
npp=find(ccc==ddd(ijj)); 
if(ccc(npp)>1.0E-10) printf('warning\n'); end; 
bbb=VE(:,npp); 
bbb=bbb/norm(bbb); 
Omega=[Omega,bbb]; 
end; 
BBB=orth(Omega); 
WWW=BBB'*inv(Rphio'); 
eee=WWW*Hbar*[y;u]; 
Ps=WWW*Hbar; 
%Rse=WWW*Rphi*WWW'; 
%optresd=eee'*inv(Rse)*eee; 
optresd=eee; 
return; 
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